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HOW MOSCOW VOTES IN U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

by Jiri Valenta and John Cunningham

In an interview on NBC News in December 1987, Mikhail S. Gorbachev sidestepped Tom Brokaw's question regarding his interest in the outcome of the 1988 U.S. presidential election. He replied that the Soviets would be "working constructively with any administration regardless of party affiliation [and would] cooperate provided there is an appropriate desire and effort on the other side."

Had Gorbachev's seeming nonchalance been genuine, it would have represented a dramatic departure from the interest in the American presidential elections customarily shown by the Soviet leadership since World War II. According to Arkady Shevchenko, a high-level Soviet diplomat who defected to the United States in 1978, the Kremlin's interest in U.S. presidential campaigns, particularly in the last several weeks before the votes are cast, amounts to "an all consuming . . . fever."[1]

It is not, of course, literally all-consuming. Soviet behavior is guided by a complex calculus of domestic and international considerations, and not every word spoken or action taken during the year preceding an American election reflects an interest in the outcome. Nonetheless, Soviet leaders do sometimes try to influence an election by aiding the candidate who seems less threatening to their own interests. At other times, they exploit the election-year paralysis of U.S. policy makers in order to further other policy objectives. Any inquiry into the connection between Soviet behavior and American domestic politics, therefore, demands an analysis of the Soviet press, of memoirs, and of interviews with U.S. officials and Soviet analysts.

This study begins with the election of 1948 and proceeds chronologically. For each campaign, we explain how the Soviets viewed the contest; what they said and did about it; what lessons they drew regarding the American electoral process; and how those lessons influenced their perceptions and behavior in subsequent elections.[2]

[1] Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 275.

[2] Since Stalin's day it has been extremely difficult to establish whether Soviet attempts at influence have had an impact on American voting. That question is beyond the scope of this article.

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Two patterns emerge from Soviet behavior. First, the Kremlin has developed a certain affection for non-ideological Republicans; second, it prefers men it knows to untested candidates. And so strong are these preferences among Soviet leaders that, in some close races, Moscow has even tried to influence the outcome of U.S. presidential elections.

Two patterns emerge from varied Soviet behavior. First, the Kremlin has developed a certain affection for non-ideological Republicans; second, it prefers men it knows to untested candidates.

1948: The Kiss of Death

The Soviets held definite views about the 1948 presidential contenders. The candidate who appeared to have Stalin's backing was Henry Wallace, the former secretary of agriculture (1933-1940), vice president (1940-44), and secretary of commerce (1944-46). The Kremlin's support for Wallace reflected a nostalgia for Roosevelt, whom the Soviets admired for being an architect of the World War II alliance against Germany and for being the American president who (in 1934) recognized the Soviet government. Equating Wallace's program with Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the USSR, the Soviet press wrote that Wallace had developed "a concrete platform" for the solution of the disputes between the superpowers — a view that supposedly reflected the attitude of "many millions of progressive-minded Americans."[3] In May 1948, during the primaries, Stalin endorsed Henry Wallace, declaring that Wallace's program was a "good and fruitful" basis for Soviet-American cooperation.[4] Soviet diplomats apparently believed in the spring of 1948 that Wallace had a chance of being elected President.[5]

The Soviets feared and despised Wallace's opponent, the incumbent Democrat Harry Truman, whom they saw as having betrayed the Roosevelt line. Further, the Soviets disliked Truman's folksy pedestrianism. According to Nikita Khrushchev, Truman was "an aggressive man," with "neither an ounce of statesmanship nor a flexible mind."[6] Shevchenko adds that Truman was viewed as "the bedrock

[3] A. Sokolov, "Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia i politika Vashingtona," *Novoe vremia*, May 19, 1948, pp. 3-4.

[4] *The Times*, May 18, 1948.

[5] *The Times*, May, 19, 1948. Also, John R. Sadler, "The 1948 United States Presidential Election: The Soviet View," unpublished paper.

[6] Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, Vol I., tr. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970) p. 361; and *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, Vol. II, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 356.

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anti-Communist [of whom they] were prepared to believe anything."[7] But if Stalin hoped Truman would be voted out of the White House, Soviet behavior may have helped him remain. In January 1948, the Berlin Blockade began; and in February came the communist coup in Czechoslovakia.

In this election, contrary to later elections, the Soviets found nothing to like in the Republicans. They saw even the GOP's unusually liberal candidate, Thomas E. Dewey, as simply a protégé of the "sinister" John Foster Dulles, and thus no better than Truman.

So, Moscow backed Wallace and his Progressive party the whole way, as evidenced by the U.S. Communist party's endorsement. In keeping with the general Soviet ineptness in the matter of influencing U.S. elections, this endorsement may have contributed to Truman's re-election.

1952: Indifference and Restraint

The 1952 election seemed to confirm the Soviet belief that Republicans and Democrats are ideologically identical, for Dwight Eisenhower was courted by both parties, just as he had been in 1948. The Soviets described this common pursuit of Eisenhower as a deal to maintain "complete and full continuity of the present aggressive course [of Truman] under a new president."[8] They also objected to Eisenhower's proposed secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, because of his talk about the "liberation of captive peoples" and "rolling back" communism in Eastern Europe. Although the Soviet press never compared Eisenhower to Hitler (as it did Truman in the late 1940s and Reagan in 1983), it came close: Some Soviet officials characterized Eisenhower's prospective election as equivalent to the rise of General Kurt von Schleicher in Germany — the prelude to a fascist dictatorship in America.[9]

On the other hand, Eisenhower's personal attributes (unlike Truman's) contributed to a positive perception of him in Moscow. Stalin had been impressed by Eisenhower during the latter's 1945 visit to Moscow "not only because of his military accomplishments but because of his human, friendly, kind and frank nature. He is not a *grubyi* [a coarse man of brusque manners] like most military [men]."[10]

Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate, was not well regarded and certainly not perceived as "progressive." As he was relatively unknown outside his home state of Illinois, Stalin apparently worried that his inexperience might cause him to retain the services of such Truman "cold warriors" as Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

[7] Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, p. 66.
[8] "Izbiratel'naia kampaniia v SShA," *Pravda*, June 15, 1952.
[9] Reported by James Reston, *The New York Times*, September 12, 1984.
[10] W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946* (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 503.

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In the end, then, the Soviets did not actively seek to influence the 1952 election, probably believing that Stevenson's defeat was inevitable and that Eisenhower's policies would be tolerable and predictable. This assessment may help explain the Soviet leadership's reluctance to initiate assertive foreign policies during the 1952 campaign, although the primary factor was the power struggle and instability in the Kremlin preceding Stalin's death in March 1953.

1956: Eisenhower's Re-election

The Soviet perception of Eisenhower did not change significantly between the 1952 and 1956 elections, despite the transition from Stalin to Khrushchev. Not only did the Soviets adopt the same approach to both elections; they also seem to have expected the same results.

By the time of the election, Khrushchev and Eisenhower had been hailing the "spirit of Geneva" — symbolizing a thaw in Soviet-American diplomacy — for a year. Even though Khrushchev "greatly" respected President Eisenhower and "told him so personally,"[11] he had mixed feelings because of Dulles, Eisenhower's secretary of state. Khrushchev later denounced Dulles as a "sinister" figure who behaved in Geneva like a "vicious cur . . . always prowling around Eisenhower, snapping at him if he got out of line."[12]

Stevenson's campaign rhetoric about peaceful coexistence brought him little advantage in Moscow. Even though "Stevenson's policy without Dulles"[13] may have appeared preferable to "Eisenhower's policy with Dulles," the Soviets thought they knew how to deal with Eisenhower and were not eager to see him replaced by an unknown. Khrushchev, furthermore, was astute enough to sense that Stevenson was facing almost certain defeat and so became resigned to Eisenhower's victory. In any case, there was little the Soviets could have done to spoil Ike's victory, even if they had wanted to.

There is no evidence to suggest the U.S. election was a key factor in the Soviet decision to intervene in Hungary three days before the election on November 7, 1956. However, the Soviets must have recognized that the forthcoming election, without having a significant effect on U.S. management of the Hungarian and Suez crises, complicated an already complex decision-making process in Washington. Although a tighter presidential race would have created an environment more conducive to bold Soviet conduct, the Soviets probably

[11] Text of the Khrushchev-Catledge interviews, TASS (Moscow), May 13, 1957, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: The Soviet Union* (hereinafter *FBIS: USSR*), May 14, 1957.

[12] *Khrushchev Remembers*, Vol. I, p. 398.

[13] *FBIS: USSR*, May 14, 1957.

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felt that (the campaign's predictable results notwithstanding) Election Day provided a deadline for the invasion.[14]

1960: A New Approach

In contrast to their behavior in 1952 and 1956, the Soviets actively sought to manipulate the outcome of the 1960 election, hoping to help defeat the then-vice president, Richard Nixon, and to abet John Kennedy. Avoiding Stalin's mistake of 1948, however, they expressed favoritism indirectly, ushering in an era of more subtle maneuvering during the U.S. elections.

Part of the stimulus for the attempted electoral manipulation was Soviet antagonism toward Richard Nixon, seen as aggressive, "hostile to the Soviet Union," and "reactionary" — "a McCarthyite."[15] (Ironically, Nixon has since become the postwar U.S. president most admired by the Soviet leadership.) Kennedy's campaign rhetoric was at least as anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban as Nixon's, but Khrushchev feared Kennedy less, because of his inexperience and privileged background. He had met Kennedy briefly in 1959, and (as Fyodor Burlatsky has confirmed) viewed him as "too intellectual," without (in Shevchenko's words) "a strong backbone," and therefore, likely to be "vulnerable to pressure."[16] Above all, however, Khrushchev had personal reasons for disliking Nixon, a bias that was reinforced during the two men's famous "kitchen debate" in Moscow in 1959.[17]

The Soviets' principal tactic in the 1960 campaign was to deny Nixon any opportunity to associate himself with the policy of U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. This tactic first surfaced early in 1960 when Khrushchev objected to Eisenhower's plans to bring Nixon to the Four Powers Conference, scheduled for May in Paris. Then, just prior to the summit, an American U-2 plane was shot down over the Soviet Union and its pilot captured. Khrushchev used the occasion to sabotage the meeting. Later, the Soviets cancelled negotiations on Berlin, walked out of the disarmament talks at Geneva, and withdrew an invitation to Eisenhower to visit Moscow.

Although the principal intent in these steps was to humiliate the U.S. government generally, the Soviets also may have been trying to hinder Nixon's electoral prospects. According to his memoirs, Khrushchev sought to undermine Nixon's alleged ability to deal with the Kremlin by not releasing U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers until after

[14] Brian McCauley, "Hungary and the Suez, 1956: The Limits of Soviet and American Power," in Bela K. Kiraly, Barbara Lotze, and Nandor F. Dreiszeiger, eds., *The First War Between Socialist States: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Its Impact* (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1984), p. 511.

[15] *Khrushchev Remembers*, Vol. II, pp. 364-67.

[16] Interview with Burlatsky, Miami, September 1988; and Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, pp. 110 and 117.

[17] *Khrushchev Remembers*, Vol. II, pp. 364-67.

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the election; and this ploy, Khrushchev maintained, helped Kennedy. As he told the Soviet Politburo, presumably sometime in September-October of 1960,

> The United States government has asked us to release Powers. Now is *not* the time to do it because the two presidential candidates are both trying to cash in on an improvement in relations. If we release Powers now it will be to Nixon's advantage. Judging from the press, I think the two candidates are at a stalemate. If we give the slightest boost to Nixon it will be interpreted as an expression of our willingness to see him in the White House. This would be a mistake. If Nixon becomes President, I don't believe he will contribute to an improvement in relations between our countries. Therefore, let's hold off on taking final steps in releasing Powers. As soon as the elections are over we'll hand him over.

Later, Khrushchev claimed:

> we had cast the deciding ballot in . . . [Kennedy's] election to the Presidency over that son-of-a-bitch Richard Nixon . . . our ploy made a difference of at least half a million votes which gave Kennedy the edge he needed.[18]

1964: A Choice, Not an Echo

The Soviets had disliked Lyndon Johnson intensely prior to his becoming president in 1963. Shevchenko relates that he was "anathema to Khrushchev," and that he was considered a "racist," a hard-core "anti-Communist," and a reactionary who smelled "oily" (a pejorative reference to Johnson's association with the Texas oil industry). Anti-Johnson feelings ran so strong that many Soviet diplomats speculated he, the CIA, and the Mafia had masterminded Kennedy's assassination.[19] By 1964, however, the Soviets saw Johnson as heir to Kennedy's policy of cooperation with the USSR and as a candidate not likely to involve the United States in the Vietnamese conflict.

In the 1964 primary season, therefore, the Soviets did their best not to harm Johnson's drive for the presidency. For example, in March a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over East German territory and its crew captured. Treating the affair in a low-key manner, Khrushchev quickly released the crew.[20] Similarly, the Soviets reacted mildly to U.S.-North Vietnamese confrontations in the Gulf of Tonkin.

As for the Republicans, the Soviets overwhelmingly favored the liberal Nelson Rockefeller, but the nomination went to the conservative Barry Goldwater, whom the Soviets described as a "department-store Führer" (*fiurer iz univermaga.*)[21]

[18] *Khrushchev Remembers*, Vol. II, p. 490; Vol. I, p. 458.
[19] Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, pp. 123-24.
[20] "V poriadke iskliucheniia," *Pravda*, March 28, 1964; and William Dossel, "Soviet Attempts to Influence American Presidential Elections," unpublished paper.
[21] S. Vishnevskii, "Besnovatyi iz Arizony," *Pravda*, January 26, 1964.

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1968: An Attempted Double Play

During the 1968 primaries Soviet press reports gave favorable coverage to Democrats Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy, the two anti-Vietnam War candidates. Soviet observers were drawn not only by Kennedy's perceived "realism," but also by nostalgia for his brother's administration. After Robert Kennedy's assassination, and Hubert Humphrey's emergence as the strongest Democrat, the Soviets resisted repeating the blunder of 1948. Rather than associate themselves with the spoiler, Eugene McCarthy, they leaned toward Humphrey, who they thought would be more manageable than Nixon.

The Soviet perception of Nixon had become more discriminating since 1960 but was still negative. Khrushchev, the most outspoken Nixon-hater, had left the scene, and some Soviet observers had noted Nixon's retreat from former views.[22] But Soviet leaders still perceived him as the more dangerous candidate. Moscow apparently feared he would be an unpredictable hard-liner having a free hand to deal with the Vietnam conflict.[23]

With Nixon cast as the villain, the Soviets tilted toward Humphrey, and this helps explain why they agreed in August to a summit meeting between President Johnson and Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, scheduled to take place in early October. Such a summit would likely have boosted the Humphrey campaign, but after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20 Johnson felt compelled to cancel the meeting.

The Vietnam War surfaced as a factor in the election when the North Vietnamese, backed by Moscow, agreed to open negotiations with the United States in return for a halt in the U.S. bombing of the North. Johnson had been under intense political pressure to reach some agreement that would signal the start of full-scale peace talks. The Soviets and North Vietnamese undoubtedly wanted both to harness this desperation to the benefit of North Vietnam and to help ensure a Democratic election victory. Offering talks just before the election served both ends, and Johnson announced the breakthrough — the "October surprise," as it has become known — on October 31, 1968, just five days before the election. The announcement gave considerable concern to Richard Nixon, who then led Humphrey in the polls by only two percentage points — 42 percent to 40 percent — with 4 percent of the vote undecided. Nixon is

[22] Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov, Moscow Radio, August 8, 1968, in *FBIS: USSR*, August 9, 1968.

[23] *Pravda*, August 11, 1968.

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certain that this Soviet-inspired "October surprise" almost cost him the presidency.[24]

1972: Nixon Triumphant

Toward the end of President Nixon's first term, as détente flourished, the Soviets openly undertook measures to assist his re-election. This was to be expected in light of what Nixon had given them: the SALT I agreement, easy credit and trade terms, and an attractive grain deal. Soviet leaders had revised their estimate of Nixon, now describing him as strong, sober-minded, predictable, "positive and realistic." As the Soviets saw it, Nixon's enthusiasm for détente was due, at least in part, to his efforts at "seeking re-election" (*pereizbranie*).[25] In apparent support of that cause, they invited Nixon to Moscow in the early spring of 1972, and kept the invitation open despite U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War later in May. The Moscow summit between Brezhnev and Nixon took place despite the opposition of the North Vietnamese and of Soviet leaders like Petr Shelest, suggesting the importance that the Politburo majority attached to a Nixon victory. Henry Kissinger's mission to Moscow in September further reinforced Nixon's image as a peacemaker.

Although at the time Soviet leaders did not openly discuss the Democratic challenger, their behavior toward Nixon indicates that they concluded George McGovern was an unknown, unpredictable opponent. Burlatsky has told us that he and his colleagues thought McGovern had very little chance to defeat Nixon.

As in 1968, Moscow and Hanoi were convinced that advantageous foreign-policy deals with the United States could be made around election time, and thus they planned another pre-election foreign-policy deal for 1972. At Kissinger's first meeting with the North Vietnamese in Paris, he was presented with a completed treaty by the chief North Vietnamese negotiator, who reportedly said to Kissinger, "You *are* in a hurry, aren't you?"[26]

1976: The Presidency in Decline

The Soviets viewed Gerald Ford as a transition figure by virtue of his having become president through appointment. In Ford's favor, however, was his continued backing of Nixon's policy initiatives, exemplified by the 1974 Vladivostok understanding on arms control and the 1975 Helsinki agreement. Also, Ford had pointedly refused to see the exiled Soviet author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn at the White

[24] Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 345.

[25] G. Arbatov, "Sila politiki realizma," *Izvestiia*, June 22, 1972.

[26] Constantine C. Menges, *Inside the National Security Council* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), p. 63. Menges based this account on a conversation with John Negraponte, who participated in both the 1968 and 1972 Vietnam peace negotiations.

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House. For the Soviets, this suggested a Nixonian "realist," even if an inexperienced one.

Ford had the advantages of an incumbent running on a good record, and the Soviets thought he would win. According to Shevchenko, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko expressed a preference for Ford in September 1976. The Soviets felt they would not be surprised by the predictable Ford — "a known quantity" leader with whom Moscow "could continue to do business." Moreover, Gromyko valued highly the special channel of communication established between the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford administrations. And he feared that if Carter were elected he would sever that link.[27]

Although Ford made concessions to Ronald Reagan at the 1976 Republican convention — including the platform amendment citing Solzhenitsyn as "a model of courage and morality" — the Soviets were encouraged by Kissinger's assurances that the "amendment adopted by the convention would not have any effect on the foreign policy activity of the United States."[28] A key Brezhnev adviser and head of the Institute of the United States and Canada, Georgi Arbatov, similarly discounted Ford's commitment to tough anti-communist positions: "Of course, right now he does the usual zigzagging . . . but that doesn't worry us very much. It's just the usual campaign bluster. After it's over, he'll be good old Jerry again."[29]

As for Ford's opponent, Jimmy Carter, he was for the Soviets what Stevenson had been in 1952 — an "unknown quantity." Soviet leaders noticed Carter's pronouncements on human rights, yet believed them to be election-year rhetoric.[30] They also noticed and disliked his principal foreign-policy adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Gromyko thought it a good sign that Cyrus Vance had become influential in the Carter inner circle, and deplored "the possibility that Zbigniew Brzezinski might play a prominent role in a Democratic administration."[31]

Although the Soviets privately favored Ford, they did not show this in their behavior. According to Ford's adviser William Hyland, Brezhnev had given Ford his unabashed endorsement at Helsinki in 1975 (an endorsement Ford scrupulously kept to himself),[32] but the Soviets did little to create an international climate conducive to his campaign. Their actions in Angola, for example, caused Kissinger to

[27] Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, pp. 276-78.
[28] TASS, August 19, 1976, in *FBIS: USSR*, August 20, 1976.
[29] Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, p. 46.
[30] Ibid., p. 276.
[31] Ibid., p. 291.
[32] William G. Hyland, *Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 125; and an interview with William Hyland. Hyland offered thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this study, for which the authors are grateful.

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postpone scheduled talks in Moscow in December 1975 (regarding SALT II), which Ford was counting on to boost his election chances. Then, in spring 1976, just as the primaries were under way, the Soviets and Cubans escalated their intervention in Angola, enhancing the political fortunes of Ford's main rival, Ronald Reagan. The Soviets disregarded Ford's efforts to convince them the Angola invasion was detrimental to détente[33] and of course to his re-election. In the end, the Soviets may have concluded it did not matter which candidate was elected, as both Carter and Ford had pledged to support some form of détente.

More fundamental to their considerations, however, was the recognition that the presidency's power was declining in the face of an increasingly assertive Congress. Thus, instead of seeking to enhance the aura of their preferred candidate, they sought to profit from the combination of America's electoral and presidential paralysis by intervening in Angola. As Shevchenko tells it, more than one Soviet official boasted cheerfully and confidently that, "Once again the Yankees have handcuffed themselves for most of the year — they won't be looking at us."[34] Unfortunately, we do not have details of a conscious Soviet effort to exploit the perceived U.S. inability to act decisively during the election of 1976. But his account leaves no doubt that the broader political paralysis was very much on the minds of Soviet leaders. After the U.S. defeat in Vietnam in the spring of 1975, and the ineffectual U.S. response to the Soviet involvement in Angola in 1975-76, Soviet leaders saw the United States as a helpless giant suffering from a "Vietnam syndrome" exacerbated by an "Angola syndrome."

1980: The Lesser of Two Evils

By 1980, the Soviets had come to view Jimmy Carter as the antithesis of the Richard Nixon of 1972. Nixon was viewed by them as realistic, predictable, and sober-minded. By contrast, the Carter administration was inconsistent and vacillating, and, in Brezhnev's view, an "unreliable partner [often] prompted by some whim, caprice, or emotional outburst, or by considerations of narrowly understood immediate advantage."[35] The deep Soviet dislike, if not hatred, of Carter became especially pronounced during his second campaign for the presidency in 1980.

In Moscow's simplistic understanding, Carter (with Brzezinski masterminding his policy) had fired the first salvo of his re-election campaign in September 1979, when he created an uproar over a "Soviet combat brigade" in Cuba. The Soviets — still enjoying the

[33] Gerald Ford, *A Time to Heal* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 358.
[34] Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, p. 272.
[35] *Pravda*, January 13, 1980.

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success of the SALT II agreement concluded only two months earlier — were apparently caught off guard by this. They also charged Carter with working up a "chauvinistic hysteria" over the November 1979 seizure of hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran.[36] The subsequent announcement of the Carter Doctrine for the Persian Gulf prompted talk of a "cold-warrior hysterical campaign." "Not since the peak of the cold war," *Pravda* wrote on January 28, 1980, "has the 'cult of brute force' been so openly professed."

So annoyed were the Soviets with Carter that, after a fleeting interest in Senator Edward Kennedy's candidacy in the spring of 1980, they appeared to tilt slightly toward Governor Ronald Reagan in the ensuing summer. Having observed Reagan during the 1976 primaries, the Soviets harbored no illusions about the anti-communist credentials of this "henchman of the extreme right."[37] Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko observed that "no one [knew] what kind of surprise this actor might spring."[38]

Despite these criticisms, some Soviet officials and advisers drew parallels between Reagan and Nixon, who also had begun his career as an anti-Communist and "right-wing" Republican. In 1980, at least some Soviet observers felt that Reagan's views would evolve, and that, in office, he would be more willing to negotiate with the USSR.[39] Such analysts, including Burlatsky, foresaw a transformation of the president's thinking from conservative to "pragmatic." A number of President Reagan's campaign statements, particularly his attack on the Carter grain embargo against the Soviet Union, seemed to support the theory that he would be more tractable in office. And his denunciations of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, like those of Carter, were regarded as campaign posturing and not taken too seriously.

Ultimately, however, despite this maverick tilt toward Reagan by some Soviet analysts during the early stage of the campaign, the Politburo appears to have concluded before the election that Reagan would be even more anti-Soviet than Carter and so leaned toward the latter.

1984: The New Truman

By the 1984 election campaign, the Soviets had lost most of their expectations regarding a Reagan transformation, and were seizing every opportunity to criticize Reagan in ways reminiscent of their campaign against Truman in 1948. One of those critics, Burlatsky, contended that the majority of Americans and their European allies feared Reagan was "the least capable of all the postwar presidents

[36] TASS, May 13, 1980, in *FBIS: USSR*, May 14, 1980.
[37] Moscow Television, February 16, 1976, in *FBIS: USSR*, February 27, 1976.
[38] Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, p. 46.
[39] Interview with Burlatsky, Miami, September 1988.

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of 'dealing with the Russians.' " However, even then, Burlatsky belonged to a minority of Soviet analysts who carefully hinted that the Soviets underestimated "the evolution of the President's psychology." Reagan might yet become "a pragmatist, capable of flexible policy."[40]

Nonetheless, as ever, the Soviets gave preferential treatment to the candidate whom they perceived to be least harmful to their interests. In 1984 it was Senator Gary Hart, described as the politician with the most "solid record" in arms control. He was also lauded for "opposing the policy of confrontation with the USSR."[41] Mondale initially was depicted as somewhat more conservative than Hart but, as his drive for the nomination picked up, he became the Soviet favorite. The Russians preferred his stand on arms control to that of Reagan, and they apparently judged him the more malleable leader. Burlatsky, who visited the United States midway through the 1984 electoral campaign, found Mondale to be Reagan's opposite: "well educated" and "an intellectual," but perhaps not "strong enough."

The Soviet anti-Reagan line of 1984 was accompanied by concrete steps apparently designed to demonstrate to the American public (as the Soviets tried to do in 1960) that Moscow could not do business with a Republican administration. Thus, Soviet negotiators walked out of arms limitation talks in Geneva in November 1983 and refused to return. Then followed the boycott of the 1984 Olympic Games and vitriolic anti-Reagan propaganda. A member of the Soviet Central Committee and editor in chief of *Pravda*, Viktor Afanasiev, confirmed that an unwillingness to help promote Reagan's re-election was one reason for the Soviets' negative stance on arms control in 1984.[42]

1988: In Search of Continuity

Soviet treatment of the 1988 presidential campaign has been subtle, making extensive use of Western source material, such as newspapers, expert analyses, and opinion polls. In comparison to Soviet coverage of other elections, reporting in 1988 conspicuously lacked judgmental statements regarding the candidates. Moscow's level of analysis was also less crude, as commentators went beyond the usual Wall Street-and-Pentagon rhetoric, identifying the social and regional forces to which the aspirants were appealing. This new approach, conditioned by the spirit of *glasnost*, resulted in more objective commentaries. With more points of view expressed more

[40] Fyodor Burlatsky, "Zametky O SShA: Kuda nachnetsia maiatnik?" *Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 30, 1984, p. 14.

[41] Anatolii Manakov, "Prezidentskii marafon-84: Zagadka Senatora Kharta," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 14, 1984, p. 9.

[42] An interview with Afanasiev, ANSA (Rome), April 24, 1984, in *FBIS: USSR*, April 25, 1984.

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freely, however, it has become more difficult to interpret Moscow's preferences and efforts.

It does appear, nonetheless, that the Soviets also tried to influence the 1988 election, primarily through foreign-policy initiatives. Their efforts began with the Washington summit of December 1987. As Gorbachev admitted before leaving Washington, "I have not just been engaged in politics, but in propaganda."[43] The Soviet publicity campaign that accompanied the Washington summit in December 1987 sought to convince Americans that the USSR was no longer an enemy. Subsequent Soviet media commentary described the summit and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as "participants" in the election, and their impact upon the candidates' fortunes has been repeatedly stressed.[44]

In 1988, Soviet behavior changed in two ways: efforts to study and influence the election began at an earlier stage, and efforts were designed less to favor a specific candidate than to undercut anti-Soviet candidates. Gorbachev's remarks and actions drew attention primarily to recent U.S.-Soviet negotiations, thereby making it difficult for candidates who espoused President Reagan's earlier, more conservative principles to claim to be his political heirs. Even before Gorbachev arrived in Washington, the effects of the INF Treaty and his visit were already having an impact on the presidential campaign. A *New York Times* analysis of December 6, 1987, stated that "Together, President Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev . . . [had] fundamentally altered the way foreign policy issues will be framed in the 1988 presidential campaign," and suggested that the INF Treaty had highlighted deep divisions within the Republican party, placing four of the six Republican candidates to the right of President Reagan by virtue of their refusal to endorse it.[45] An observer from the Heritage Foundation admitted that Gorbachev's popularity with the American public made it "more difficult for candidates to say bad things about the Soviet Union." The summit, he added, would only make matters worse from the conservatives' point of view, as it would draw Americans' attention away from the Soviet state and to Gorbachev's engaging personality, thereby blunting the concept of an "evil empire." Micah Morrison, deputy director of the anti-Soviet Committee for a Free World, agreed: "He's certainly caused conservatives a lot of problems."[46]

Soviet media commentary suggests that this objective was one purpose of the visit. Pre-summit analyses of Ronald Reagan's alleged turn toward "realism" repeatedly asserted that one of his motives

[43] *Pravda*, December 12, 1987.
[44] *Izvestiia*, March 13, 1988.
[45] *The New York Times*, December 6, 1987.
[46] Ibid.

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was his concern for the Republican party's fortunes in the coming election. And on December 3, 1987, in a revelation of one of the major objectives of the summit, Burlatsky said Gorbachev's public appearances during his coming visit to Washington were intended to "punch a hole in the wall of conservatism, narrow-mindedness and prejudice."[47]

Throughout the election, the Soviets worried greatly about right-wing Republican candidates. They worried that the presence of Pat Robertson might pressure other candidates to adopt similar views in an effort to steal some of his thunder.[48] Soviet coverage of Jack Kemp reflected a similar apprehension.[49] Elimination of these Republican candidates from the race pleased the Soviets who, in a press commentary, concluded that "the new dynamic policy of the Soviet Union, that we call new thinking in practice, undoubtedly influences the situation in the United States and the whole world."[50] By contrast, the Kremlin looked favorably on the candidacy of Robert Dole, whom they labeled a "moderate pragmatist." George Bush received favorable attention for his long involvement in foreign policy, his discounting of ideology in Soviet-American relations, and the support he gave the INF Treaty. At the Washington summit, Gorbachev scheduled a breakfast with Bush — an obvious sign of favor. The Soviet press praised Bush, using such terms as "consistency," "solid qualities," and "experience as a leading statesman."[51]

Still, the bulk of Soviet commentary on the vice president was unenthusiastic, in part because the Soviets had difficulty determining his precise positions.[52] As early as February 1987, Soviet analysts implied that the vice president's claims of non-involvement in the Iran/contra affair were not to be taken at face value. Much the same was said about his image as a moderate, and both lines were stressed repeatedly thereafter.[53] Bush's statements about dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of strength worried the Soviets. They characterized such assertions as showing a commitment to "the concept of bellicose neo-globalism" and drew a connection between this approach and presidential aspirations.[54]

But the Soviets' deepest misgivings about George Bush concerned his ability to control the GOP's right-wing — which is, after

[47] Fyodor Burlatsky, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, December 2, 1987.

[48] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, December 25, 1987. Vitalii Gan, "Verdikt Aiovy," *Pravda*, February 11, 1988.

[49] Moscow Television, April 8, 1987, in *FBIS: USSR*, April 10, 1987; and S. Volovets in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, February 9, 1988.

[50] Moscow Television, March 26, 1988, in *FBIS: USSR*, March 28, 1988.

[51] *Izvestiia*, March 13, 1988.

[52] *Pravda*, August 19, 1988.

[53] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, February 21, 1987.

[54] TASS International Service, January 6, 1988, in *FBIS: USSR*, January 7, 1988; TASS, Radio report in English, February 21, 1988, in *FBIS: USSR*, February 23, 1988; TASS, April 16, 1988, in *FBIS: USSR*, April 18, 1988.

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all, the principal virtue of moderate Republicans, in Soviet eyes. This apprehension grew following the Republican convention, where Bush acted "constantly with a backward glance at the right flank of his party."[55] Specifically, he chose to run with the conservative senator Dan Quayle, and he acceded to a platform "with four right legs." The platform, they alleged, "essentially [called] for global interventionism, for restructuring the world in accordance with U.S. aspirations" and ignored "the goodwill of the USSR, the flexibility it displayed, and the principle of taking mutual problems and interests into account."[56] In contrast to the 1976 GOP convention, where the Soviets dismissed conservative stances as campaign rhetoric, the 1988 convention struck them as worrisome.

Nevertheless, at a recent international conference, a Soviet analyst explained to the authors that while junior analysts tend to prefer Dukakis, more experienced Soviet analysts and department heads of research institutes tend to prefer Bush. Many of these senior Soviet analysts expect Bush to continue the efforts begun during the last year of the Reagan administration. Moreover, they expect he can simultaneously keep his anti-communist credentials while working with the Soviet Union — an ideal combination from Moscow's point of view.

Many senior Soviet analysts expect Bush to continue the efforts begun during the last year of the Reagan administration. Moreover, they expect he can simultaneously keep his anti-communist credentials while working with the Soviet Union — an ideal combination from Moscow's point of view.

This apparent preference for George Bush reflected in part a lack of enthusiasm for his Democratic rival, Michael Dukakis, who seems to have aroused the Soviets' uncertainty and wariness. Early notice laid positive emphasis on the "realism" of Dukakis's pronouncements, his gubernatorial career, and his ethnic heritage. One might have expected Dukakis's foreign-policy positions to stimulate favorable Soviet interest. Instead, they elicited suspicion in some quarters because a number of Soviet analysts found difficulty in reconciling them with the richness of his campaign fund. They further noted that his wife, Kitty, of Jewish background, was responsible for providing him with "a certain amount of political and financial support from Jewish circles," and they concluded that much of the "Mas-

[55] *Pravda*, August 24, 1988.
[56] *Pravda*, August 16, 1988.

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sachusetts Miracle" on which Dukakis's fame rested was due to an influx into the state of military contracts.

To the Soviets, these factors added up to Dukakis's indebtedness to the American Jewish community and the military-industrial complex. Such obligations, they feared, might induce in him a political amnesia, causing him to forget his election promises on attaining the presidency.[57]

With time, the Soviets modified their suspicions. In particular, they began to view Dukakis's ideas for the resolution of regional conflicts more positively;[58] and the issue of his connection to the American Jewish community was treated less stridently.[59] It is unlikely, however, that they ever viewed Dukakis's election as desirable, for they worried that his notion of arms control seemed to include linkages to human rights. A senior member of the Reagan administration present at the May-June Moscow summit quoted Soviet officials as expressing concern that Dukakis had the makings of another Jimmy Carter. (Of course, these comments could have been flattery, perhaps to win short-term concessions.)

The Democratic convention in July led the Soviets to note that Dukakis was "more and more markedly giving preference to wishy-washy positions that are subject to interpretations from the left and the right," a disturbing vagueness reflected in the Democrats' abbreviated platform.[60] Given their past difficulties with presidents whose intentions were unclear to them, the Soviets could only have viewed this tendency with concern. To be sure, as Burlatsky explained to the authors, eventually Dukakis could perhaps become even "a better negotiating partner for Gorbachev than Bush" since Dukakis is "more open and less bureaucratic." However, in the first years of his presidency, he would have to prove that he is not "soft on communism," and thus progress in U.S.-Soviet negotiations would have to wait. The last thing the Soviets need is to experiment with a new, unpredictable administration. As another Soviet official suggested, it took Moscow seven years to straighten Reagan out and they do not have seven more to waste on another president. Bush, in the estimate of Burlatsky and some other Soviet analysts, would be certain to continue, without much delay, a policy of serious negotiations with Moscow.

Patterns

Since World War II, the Soviet leaders have shown an increasing ability to distinguish among American presidential candidates. Their ideal president is one who, in their terms, is realistic, predictable,

[57] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, February 19, 1988.
[58] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, August 10, 1988, p. 14.
[59] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 27, 1988, p. 15.
[60] *Sovetskaia kultura*, July 26, 1988, p. 7.

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and sober-minded. Though they have an ideological preference for liberal Democratic candidates like John Kennedy and Gary Hart, they most frequently cast a pragmatic vote for Republicans from the center or center-left sectors of the GOP, such as Dwight Eisenhower, the second-term Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and George Bush. Unburdened by the Democrats' image of being "soft on communism," such Republicans have not had to demonstrate their anti-communist credentials, and have therefore been able as well as willing to reach the kind of arms control agreements and regional accords in which the Soviets are interested. This view was confirmed to us in September 1988 by Fyodor Burlatsky, who noted that the realization was "a key lesson of the Reagan era." When asked about the Soviet preferences for 1988, he elaborated: "In our hearts we prefer the Democrats; in our minds, the Republicans."

As Fyodor Burlatsky put it in September 1988: "In our hearts we prefer the Democrats; in our minds, the Republicans."

The least preferable candidates for the Soviets are conservative Republicans — such as Richard Nixon in 1960 and 1968, Barry Goldwater in 1964, and Ronald Reagan in 1976, 1980, and 1984. Nonetheless, the Soviets have learned to hope that conservative Republicans will move to the center of the political spectrum, at least in dealing with foreign-policy matters, as Richard Nixon did between the 1968 and 1972 elections, and Ronald Reagan did following his 1984 re-election. In Soviet terms, Presidents Nixon and Reagan came to have a "realistic" outlook, by which the Soviets mean a tacit belief in the equality of the two states; a willingness to negotiate with the Soviets (on arms control, above all); and the ability to deliver on promises made in negotiation. *Pravda* expressed these beliefs forthrightly in its February 1988 assessment of Ronald Reagan's perceived "conversion" to realism in late 1987:

> Why did they turn out to be right, after all, all those of our "prophets" [*providtsy*] who said, even before Reagan's election in 1980, that a conservative was a good thing and that it would be easier for us to reach an understanding with him? They proceeded from the premise that, in America, it is easier for conservatives to pursue agreements with us than for liberals, who constantly have to demonstrate to their own public their belligerence toward the USSR because they are constantly suspected of being "soft on communists."[61]

In addition to conservatives, the Soviets also dislike candidates and presidents whom they find unpredictable (Lyndon Johnson) or who are strongly influenced by religious or moral motives (Jimmy

[61] V. Linnik, "O prozreniiakh v iadernyi vek," *Pravda*, February 12, 1988.

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Carter). Predictability even leads the Kremlin to prefer centrists it knows (Eisenhower, Ford, Bush) over liberal but untested candidates. Within this latter group have been such Democrats as Adlai Stevenson, George McGovern, Michael Dukakis, and Jimmy Carter in 1976. John Kennedy was the single exception to this rule, and then only because of Khrushchev's strong anti-Nixon bias.

Given these strongly felt preferences, Soviet leaders follow the U.S. election polls assiduously, particularly in the final weeks of a campaign. During a close race, they appear to weigh carefully the effects of their public pronouncements and comments; at times (1960, 1968), they even appear to believe that they have sufficient leverage to influence the outcome in favor of their preferred candidate. At other times, when their preferred candidate appears to have a substantial lead, Moscow wants to be seen leaning cautiously toward him (1964, 1972, 1988), apparently believing that is a plus among the American voters.

As it has pursued an involvement in U.S. presidential elections over four decades, Moscow has also acquired a more sophisticated understanding of the American electoral process. To be sure, some Soviet analysts continue to discern the unchanging influence of "monopoly capitalism" and "the military-industrial complex," but others now realize the far greater importance of the middle-class American voter. The emphasis in 1988 on the appeal of various candidates to different "social and regional forces" was a further refinement of this theme.

Inevitably, along with this more sophisticated knowledge of presidential politics comes a more sophisticated ability to play the American political game. Josef Stalin used Kremlin influence ignorantly and Nikita Khrushchev used it exuberantly; Leonid Brezhnev exercised it carefully and deliberately. Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko had minimal opportunity to participate in American presidential campaigns. Though a new voter in 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev appears to have displayed considerable talent for casting the Kremlin ballot.

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THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING: HAS IT TURNED AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION?

by Eytan Gilboa

In the two decades that followed the Six Day War of 1967, American public opinion was highly favorable toward Israel and its policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet when the Palestinian uprising began in December 1987, American media strenuously criticized Israel's response to the violence. Did this barrage of critical commentary diminish the support that Americans traditionally gave Israel? Surprisingly, perhaps, it did not. And in that sense, we may say, the uprising failed to achieve one of its main purposes.

The Goal of the Uprising

The Palestinian uprising added a new and very different form of violence to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several months, masses of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza demonstrated and rioted against twenty-one years of Israeli occupation. They blocked roads, set fires, threw stones, and tossed fire bombs at Israeli troops and civilians. These riots were not planned in advance by leaders who had adopted a detailed strategy of action with clearly defined goals. But the riots had a purpose nonetheless: to use the media, primarily television, to shake public opinion, primarily in the United States and Israel. Pictures of unarmed civilians, including women and children, challenging the heavily equipped and highly regarded Israeli army were expected by the leaders of the disturbances to create deep sympathy for the Palestinians, especially in America. The hope was that this sympathy would in turn generate so much pressure on Israel that it would withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza.[1]

In its underlying expectations, this strategy was not foolish. The American media did indeed devote substantial time and space to the

[1] See Hanna Siniora, "The Hope for Peace and a Homeland: A Palestinian View," *Middle East Insight*, March-April 1988, pp. 13-17.

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disturbances.[2] And the coverage was in fact highly critical of Israel. According to a study of 375 stories about the unrest, aired on the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening newscasts between December 9, 1987, and April 4, 1988, Israel was the target of twice as much negative judgmental reporting as the protesters.[3] Nine out of ten sources criticized Israel's treatment of the Palestinians.

Palestinians hoped that such coverage would change American opinion on issues the Palestinians considered vital. Was this goal realized?

The Palestinians would have succeeded if the American public had turned against Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza. They would have succeeded even more if the American public's tradition of strong support for Israel had been eroded by greater sympathy for Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular. Palestinian success in the arena of public opinion would also have required a favorable American attitude toward U.S. recognition of, and negotiations with, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Above all, perhaps, success would have meant a U.S. citizenry that desired to see Israel withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, and an independent Palestinian state established there under PLO leadership.

Thus, the question of whether the Palestianian uprising succeeded becomes to a certain extent the narrower question of whether certain shifts have taken place in American public opinion. To determine the answer, all available surveys of American opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict conducted between the end of December 1987 and the beginning of May 1988 were collected and processed.[4] The data were then integrated into meaningful patterns and located within long-term opinion trends.[5]

[2] From December 9, 1987, until April 4, 1988, the three major U.S. television networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, ran 375 stories about the riots, averaging over three per day. *The New York Times* published 242 stories, an average of two a day, and a total of 4,276 column inches of text. *The Washington Post* also printed about two articles per day, one-fourth of them on the front page, totaling over 300,000 words. See "Top 30 stories," *The Tyndall Report*, January, February, March 1988, (New York: ADT Research, 1988.); *Media Monitor*, May, 1988, p. 2; and *Yediot Aharonot*, May 23, 1988.

[3] *Media Monitor*, May 1988, p. 3.

[4] The following 1988 surveys were used in the preparation of this study: CBS News/*New York Times* (CN): May 9-12, 1988, size of sample (n) = 1,382. Gallup (GP): 1. February 3-4, 1988, n = 613, Margin of Error (MOR) = ±5 percent; 2. February 26 - March 7, 1988, n = 1,003, MOR = ±3.2 percent; 3. May 2-8, 1988, n = 1,011, MOR = ±5 percent. Harris (HS): January 20-26, 1988, n = 1,250, MOR = ± 3 percent. Hart/*Chicago Tribune* (CT): April 21-23, 1988; (n) = 1,204 voters; MOR = ± 3 percent. *Los Angeles Times* (LA): March 26 - April 7, 1988, (n) = 1,110, MOR = ± 4.1 percent. Marttila and Kiley (MK): April 18-24, 1988, (n) = 1,017 voters, MOR = ± 3.1 percent. Penn and Schoen (PS): 1. January 20-24, 1988, (n) = 810, MOR: = ± 4.5 percent. 2. April 19 - May 1, 1988, (n) = 800; MOR = ± 4.5 percent. Roper(RR): 1. February 13-27, 1988, (n) = 1,990; 2. April 16-29, 1988, n = 1,982. *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman (TY): 1. January 3-6, 1988, (n) = 1,804, MOR = ± 3 percent. 2. January 27-28, 1988, (n) = 594, MOR = ± 4 percent. Wirthlin (WN): March 9-11, (n) = 1,000, MOR = ± 3 percent.

[5] Eytan Gilboa, *American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986).

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The Riots and Israel's Response

Palestinians described the disturbances in the West Bank and Gaza as nonviolent acts of disobedience against Israeli occupation. Israelis described the same events as another round of Arab-Israeli warfare, although more subtle and sophisticated. How has the American public perceived the unrest? Which version, the Palestinian or the Israeli, has been accepted?

For several months after the outbreak of the riots, the American public was divided about their proper characterization. In a March-April 1988 poll, the largest group of respondents, 42 percent, said the disturbances were "acts of war against the government of Israel," while 34 percent thought they were "acts of civil disobedience." About a quarter chose the "not sure" answer.[6]

Americans blamed chiefly the PLO and the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza for the violence, and were divided on other important dimensions of the uprising.

Who was responsible for the violence? Surveys conducted in January and May 1988 suggested three actors: the PLO, the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel. At two different points in time, the PLO and the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza were held mostly responsible for the violence.[7] In January, 43 percent of the sample blamed the PLO for the violence, while the local Arabs and Israel were each held responsible by 16 percent of the respondents. In May, 38 percent still blamed the PLO, 14 percent blamed Israel, and 11 percent blamed the local Arabs.

Several surveys have also examined public perceptions of the reasons behind the uprising. Respondents to a Harris survey of January 1988 were divided fairly equally on the following statement: "Palestinian Arabs have real grievances and have not been stirred up by the PLO as the Israelis claim." Thirty-nine percent of the sample agreed with this, while 37 percent disagreed.[8] Penn and Schoen offered a similar choice: "legitimate grievances" versus "mobilization for political reasons by the PLO." On two different occasions, this poll found the public divided and uncertain about the

[6] *Los Angeles Times* Poll, No. 149, March-April, 1988, Question 32 (Q. 32). Selected findings of this poll were reported in Robert Scheer, "U.S. Jews for Peace Talks on Mideast," *The Los Angeles Times*, April 12, 1988.

[7] Penn and Schoen Associates, Survey No. 1165, January 1988, Q. 34; and Survey No. 1210, May 1988, Q. 14. For more details see Mark J. Penn and Douglas E. Schoen, "American Attitudes Toward the Middle East," *Public Opinion*, May-June 1988, pp. 45-48.

[8] The Harris Poll, No.9, 1988; January 31, 1988, p.3.

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TABLE 1
HAS ISRAEL'S RESPONSE TO THE UPRISING BEEN TOO HARSH?

Date (1988)	Too Harsh	About Right	Too Lenient	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Jan. 3-6	50%	23%	6%	21%	(TY)	(a)
Jan. 20-24	36%	29%	12%	23%	(PS)	(b)
Jan. 27-28	42%	17%	12%	29%	(TY)	(a)
Feb. 3-4	43%	32%	17%	8%	(GP)	(c)
Apr. 16-29	28%	26%	11%	34%	(RR)	(d)
Apr. 19-May 1	32%	26%	11%	30%	(PS)	(b)
May 9-12	34%	22%	10%	34%	(CN)	(e)

Questions:
(a) In your view, are Israeli soldiers using too much force or about the right amount of force in responding to the protests of Palestinians living on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?
(b) As you may know, there have recently been demonstrations by Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza against the Israeli occupation of those territories. From what you know, has Israel responded to those demonstrations too harshly, not harshly enough, or has their response been appropriate under the circumstances?
(c) Some people feel Israel has been too harsh in dealing with the Palestinian riots. Others feel Israel has used only enough force to prevent further rioting. Which comes closest to your own point of view — that Israel's handling of the riots has been too harsh, too lenient, or about right?
(d) Turning to the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, do you think the Israeli government's response to the Palestinian uprising has been too harsh, too lenient, or about right?
(e) What do you think about the way Israel is handling the current Palestinian protests on the West Bank? Is Israel too harsh, too lenient, or is Israel handling the protests about right?

SOURCE: For 1988 polls in this and other Tables, see footnote #4.

causes of the violence. In January 1988, 39 percent thought the reasons were political, while 33 percent said they were legitimate. In May, the corresponding results were: political reasons — 33 percent; legitimate reasons — 28 percent.[9]

The Israeli response to the riots received considerable attention in all the surveys. But the question most often asked did not concern the use of force as such. It concerned the amount of force used by Israeli troops. Nevertheless, Table 1 reveals that only a single poll, conducted at the beginning of January 1988, found an indisputable tilt against Israel on this question. The other polls reveal a public substantially divided on the question. Surprisingly, perhaps, four of the seven polls in Table 1 show that a plurality of the respondents thought Israel's use of force was "appropriate" or "not harsh enough."

The preceding data and analysis suggest that Americans blamed chiefly the PLO and the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza for the violence, and were divided on other important dimensions of the uprising. They were not sure whether the riots were acts of war or acts of disobedience, whether the reasons for the violence were le-

[9] Penn and Schoen, January 1988, Q.35; May 1988, Q.15.

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gitimate or not, and whether Israel's use of force against the demonstrations was appropriate or too harsh.

Sympathy for the Parties to the Conflict

American sympathies for Israel vis-à-vis the Arab countries have been monitored since the establishment of Israel in 1948, and during this time Americans have always sympathized much more with Israel.[10] But the level of sympathy for each side has clearly been influenced by dramatic events in Israel and the Middle East. For example, the lowest pro-Israeli score (32 to 28 percent) was recorded in September 1982 during the war in Lebanon, and immediately after Christian Lebanese had massacred Palestinians in Beirut.[11] On the other hand, the highest pro-Israeli ratios (64 to 14 percent, and 61 to 10 percent) were found in 1985 and 1986 after several vicious Palestinian and Arab terrorist attacks on Americans and Israelis.[12] How were Americans sympathies distributed in 1988? and were they affected by the Palestinian violence?

To answer these questions, we might begin by asking whether American sympathies changed *during* the riots. As can be seen in Table 2, the Penn and Schoen polls done in January and May registered similar scores, while Roper polls done in February and April show a gain for Israel of seven percentage points. Therefore, it could be said either that American sympathies toward Israel did not change during the riots, or that they were better for Israel after the initial phase.

Yet, how do these scores compare with the pre-uprising results? Only an answer to this question can indicate whether the Palestinian unrest changed American sympathies in the long-term context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

If one compares 1988 scores (minus the April reading of 61 percent) with the record readings of 1985-86, then there is no doubt Israel lost a certain amount of sympathy in American public opinion. But the question is whether this comparison is sufficient to determine the possible effects of the uprising on the "sympathy index."

[10] For the pre-1982 scores, see Gilboa, *American Public Opinion*, pp. 26, 47-48, 90-91, 127-28.

[11] The 32-28 percent pro-Israeli ratio was found only in the Gallup Poll. Other polls including the *Washington Post*/ABC News Poll and the Roper Poll found much less decrease in American sympathies for Israel. See Eytan Gilboa, "Effects of the War in Lebanon on American Attitudes Toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Middle East Review*, Fall 1985, pp. 32-35.

[12] A Harris poll conducted in October 1985 found the public more sympathetic to Israel than to the Arab nations by 64 to 14 percent, *The Harris Survey*, No.92, 1985. In June 1986 a *Washington Post*/ABC News poll found a similar ratio of 62 to 13 percent, Charles R. Babcock, "U.S. Israeli Ties Stronger Than Ever," *The Washington Post*, August 5, 1986. Finally, in a Gallup poll of September-November 1986 the score was 61-10 percent in favor of Israel, J.E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1987* (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), p.23. See also Eytan Gilboa, "Terrorism and Trust: How We See the Middle East," *Public Opinion*, November-December 1986, pp.52-55.

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TABLE 2
DO AMERICANS SYMPATHIZE MORE WITH ISRAEL OR THE ARABS?

Date (1988)	Israel	Arabs	Neither	Unsure	Both	Poll	Q
January	47%	15%	13%	17%	8%	(PS)	(a)
February	30%	12%	25%	23%	9%	(RR)	(b)
March	49%	17%	26%	8%	—	(WN)	(c)
April	51%	12%	18%	19%	—	(LA)	(d)
April	61%	13%	—	26%	—	(MK)	(a)
April	37%	11%	26%	16%	11%	(RR)	(b)
May	44%	13%	15%	22%	6%	(PS)	(a)

Questions:
(a) Thinking about the Middle East conflict, are your sympathies more with Israel, or more with the Arab nations?
(b) With regard to the situation in the Middle East at the present time, do you find yourself more in sympathy with Israel, or more in sympathy with the Arabs?
(c) In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations?
(d) At the present time, do you find yourself more in sympathy with Israel or more in sympathy with the Arab nations?

Evaluation of "sympathy scores" since 1967 shows that both the lowest pro-Israeli ratio of September 1982 and the highest ratios of 1985-86 were aberrations in the long-term trend. The 1982 low score lasted only three months. By January 1983, the pro-Israeli scores had returned to the prewar levels. The highest scores of 1985-86 lasted longer, but in 1987, before the uprising, they were already dropping back to the long-term averages.[13] Thus, the lowest and the highest pro-Israeli scores were influenced by special dramatic circumstances and therefore could not serve as valid criteria for any evaluation of the 1988 results. A comparison between the 1988 scores and the long-term averages could better reveal if there were any changes in the distribution of American sympathies for Israel and the Arabs following the recent uprising.

Two of the pollsters listed in Table 2 conducted sympathy polls before 1988; their results show no change in the distribution of American sympathies. The February 1988 score (30-12 percent) is worse for Israel than the same poll of the previous year (48-8 percent), but the last April score (37-11 percent) is very similar to the scores of the last several years.[14] Similarly, the first April 1988 score, 51 to 12 percent, is very similar to the 1979 result of the same poll: 49 to 12 percent in favor of Israel.[15] Overall, the pro-Israel sympathy scores in Table 2 are similar to the long-term averages. The Palestinian uprising has not altered the distribution of basic American sympathies for Israel and the Arab countries.

[13] For example, compared to the 64-14 percent pro-Israel score in his October 1985 poll, Harris found a 58-8 percent pro-Israel score in February 1987. *The Harris Survey*, No.14, 1987.
[14] Roper Reports, 88-3, p.41.
[15] *Los Angeles Times* Poll, No.18, November 1979, Q.53.

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TABLE 3
DO AMERICANS SYMPATHIZE MORE WITH ISRAEL OR THE PALESTINIANS?

Date (1988)	Israel	Palestinians	Neither	Don't Know	Poll	Q
March	43%	26%	22%	8%	(WN)	(a)
April	55%	22%	—	23%	(MK)	(b)
May	43%	20%	20%	17%	(GP)	(c)

Questions:
(a) Now, thinking about the recent Israel-Palestinian conflicts, specifically, the riots and the protests in the occupied territories and the Gaza strip, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Palestinians?
(b) And thinking about the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians today, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or the Palestinians?
(c) In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or more with the Palestinian Arabs? (Asked of aware group, 58 percent of the sample)

Images of the PLO and the Palestinians

In the past Israel faced a coalition of Arab forces, including a Palestinian element. From 1948 to 1982 the Palestinians played only a minor role in Arab-Israeli wars and peacemaking, while in 1982, Israel fought Syria and the PLO in Lebanon. But in 1988 only Israel and the Palestinians were involved. Thus, the question is how the riots affected, if at all, the images of the Palestinians and the PLO in American public opinion.

The PLO has never been popular among Americans.[16] A comprehensive survey conducted in the fall of 1980 revealed that Americans ranked the PLO below all the Arab states, and its chairman Yasir 'Arafat the lowest of all Arab leaders.[17] At that time the popularity ratings of the PLO and 'Arafat were even lower than those of Libya and Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. Even the unpopular 1982 Israeli war in Lebanon, the siege of PLO headquarters in Beirut, the pictures of 'Arafat kissing children in the streets, and the forcible expulsion of PLO fighters from Lebanon did not improve the PLO's image and 'Arafat's popularity in the eyes of American public opinion.

But Americans have always distinguished between the Palestinians and the PLO, and the number of Americans expressing sympathy with the Palestinians has always been much higher than the number sympathizing with either the PLO or the Arab countries.[18] For example, during the 1982 war in Lebanon a 57 to 30 percent majority held a favorable opinion of the Palestinians. But an overwhelming majority (77 to 11 percent) held an unfavorable view of the PLO, and a 69 to 17 percent majority held an unfavorable opinion of 'Arafat.[19]

[16] Eytan Gilboa, "Trends in American Attitudes Toward the PLO and the Palestinians," *Political Communication and Persuasion* 3 (1985), pp. 45-67.
[17] Shelley Slade, "The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll on American Attitudes," *Middle East Journal*, Spring 1981, pp. 143-62.
[18] Gilboa, *American Public Opinion*, pp.183-84.
[19] "Scalometer Rating," *Gallup Report*, September 1982, pp. 27-29.

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These trends have not changed during the Palestinian uprising. The image of the PLO has remained highly negative. In January 1988, half of those familiar with the PLO (72 percent of the sample) held an unfavorable view of this organization; only 9 percent of the sample held a favorable opinion.[20] An almost identical result (52 percent unfavorable; 11 percent favorable) was found in a March-April poll.[21] 'Arafat's image has also remained very negative. In an April survey, 79 percent of the sample held an opinion of 'Arafat that was unfavorable (42 percent) or very unfavorable (37 percent). Only 7 percent held a favorable view.[22] In sum, the 1988 favorable opinion ratings of the PLO and 'Arafat were as bad or worse than those of earlier years.

By contrast, Americans have continued to demonstrate sympathy for the Palestinians. When an early March "sympathy" question pitted Israel against the Arab nations, the score was 49 to 17 percent in favor of Israel. But when the term "Palestinians" replaced the term "Arab nations" in the poll, the score was only 43 to 26 percent in favor of Israel (compare Table 3 with Table 2). Like differences were found in an April survey. "Israel versus the Arab nations" yielded a pro-Israel score of 61 to 13 percent, while "Israel versus the Palestinians" yielded a pro-Israel score of 55 to 22 percent. A similar pattern appeared in several earlier polls.

The PLO has so negative an image in the United States mainly because it is associated with international terrorism. Aware of this handicap, the PLO has attempted, in the last decade, to conceal its direct involvement in acts of terror.[23] But these attempts have not always been successful. In the *Achille Lauro* incident, for example, the PLO and 'Arafat denied any responsibility for the hijacking of the ship. However, statements made by the terrorists during the incident revealed direct PLO sponsorship.

The PLO's image as a terrorist organization has not changed during the Palestinian riots. In a January 1988 survey, 66 percent of those familiar with the PLO said it "is a terrorist organization," while only 17 percent said "it is a national liberation movement."[24]

In addition, the PLO interest in a settlement with Israel has been questioned by the American public. Harris polls from 1977 and 1978 found that only between 9 and 13 percent of the samples thought the PLO "really wants peace."[25] In March 1982, another poll

[20] Penn and Schoen, January 1988, Q.14.

[21] *Los Angeles Times* Poll, March-April 1988, Q.48.

[22] *A National Survey of American Voters: Attitudes Toward the Middle East*, Marttila and Kiley, Boston, Mass., April 1988, p.2.

[23] For a description of PLO cover organizations such as Black September, Black June, and Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, see Aryeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Arnon-Ohanna, *PLO Strategy and Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p.146.

[24] Penn and Schoen, January 1988, Q.16.

[25] Surveys by Harris cited in *The Washington Post*, April 10, 1978.

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found just 11 percent of respondents saying the PLO was a "force for peace"; 75 percent said it was "a force for war."[26] 'Arafat's intentions were rated no better. In a February 1985 poll, only 9 percent of the sample felt 'Arafat "sought peace"; 43 percent said he "blocked peace efforts."[27]

At the end of January 1988 many Americans still did not think the PLO and 'Arafat were interested in peace with Israel. A poll conducted at this time presented the following question: "From what you know, are Arafat and the PLO sincere about wanting to make peace with Israel?" Only 18 percent of the sample said the PLO was sincere; 65 percent said it was not sincere.[28] Similar results appeared several months later in another survey. This time, 15 percent of the respondents thought 'Arafat was "seeking a peaceful settlement," while 71 percent said he was trying to "block peace efforts."[29]

The PLO's claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinians has never been accepted by the American public.

The PLO's claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinians has never been accepted by the American public. Polls conducted in 1978 and 1982 indicate that substantial majorities (63 versus 14 percent; and 65 versus 25 percent respectively) did not think the PLO represents the "point of view of a majority of Palestinians."[30] A similar result was found in January 1988: By a margin of 61 to 23 percent, those familiar with the PLO said it "does not represent the Palestinian people."[31]

American public opinion, then, perceives the PLO as a terrorist organization that does not represent most of the Palestinians and is not interested in peace. Is this fundamental negative attitude translated into public support for the long-standing American and Israeli refusal to negotiate with the PLO?

U.S. and Israeli Negotiations with the PLO

The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have referred all calls for a negotiated settlement to the PLO. Yet the United States and Israeli governments have, in turn, refused to negotiate with this organization. In a Memorandum of Agreement, signed in September

[26] ABC News/*Washington Post* Poll, No.0114 Y March 1982, Q.69.
[27] Survey Research Organization, February 1985.
[28] Penn and Schoen, January 1988, Q.27.
[29] Marttila and Kiley, April 1988, p.16.
[30] "Opinion Roundup," *Public Opinion*, August-September 1983, p. 36.
[31] Penn and Schoen, January 1988, Q.15.

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TABLE 4
SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZE THE PLO?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Aug. 1979	27%	65%	8%	(HS)	(a)
Oct. 1981	25%	60%	15%	(NBC)	(b)
Aug. 1982	26%	57%	17%	(NBC)	(b)
Apr. 1988	30%	62%	8%	(MK)	(c)

Questions:
(a) Even though they have official status in the U.N., the U.S. is right not to recognize the PLO or talk with them, until they recognize the right of Israel to exist.
(b) Do you think the U.S. should formally recognize and have direct diplomatic relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization — that is the PLO — or don't you think so?
(c) Do your think the U.S. government should recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization, also known as the PLO, as the official representative of the Palestinian people or should not recognize the PLO?

SOURCE: For pre-1988 polls, see Gilboa, *American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Table 5-3, p. 187.

1975, the United States made a specific commitment to Israel not to negotiate with the PLO until that organization accepts U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and recognizes Israel.[32] As of this writing, the PLO has not met this condition unambiguously.

How do Americans feel about the resulting impasse? As can be seen in Tables 4-6, pollsters have employed a variety of questions to determine American attitudes toward U.S.-PLO contacts.

Polls conducted since 1979 indicate consistent opposition to American recognition of the PLO. The scores have fluctuated only slightly, and in April 1988 one poll found that about two-thirds of the sample opposed (while 30 percent favored) U.S. recognition of the PLO.

A more diffuse group of questions, examining attitudes toward U.S.-PLO talks, are presented in Table 5. The results demonstrate continuously divided opinions.

During the Israeli-Egyptian peacemaking process, the public opposed U.S.-PLO negotiations, mainly because the PLO vehemently attacked and criticized President Carter and Egyptian president Anwar as-Sadat. On the other hand, during the 1982 Israeli war in Lebanon, the public favored U.S.-PLO talks by a slim plurality. An identical plurality was found in a January 1988 poll. According to the last result in this table, that of April 1988, the public was divided fairly equally over U.S.-PLO talks. Support for U.S.-PLO contacts has been found only when the pollster's question emphasized peace or resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as the goal of the talks (see Table 6).

[32] The secret memorandum was first published in *The New York Times*, September 17 and 18, 1975.

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TABLE 5
SHOULD THE UNITED STATES NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Dec. 1979	34%	42%	24%	(YH)	(a)
Aug. 1981	34%	47%	19%	(HS)	(b)
Aug. 1982	48%	42%	10%	(GP)	(c)
Jan. 1988	48%	42%	10%	(PS)	(d)
Apr. 1988	39%	40%	21%	(CT)	(e)

Questions:
(a) Some people say we should negotiate with the PLO, even if Israel objects. Do you think the U.S. should or shouldn't negotiate with the PLO?
(b) The PLO should not be dealt with, because they are armed by the Russians and are trained in terrorist tactics in Russia and Libya.
(c) Should the United States talk directly with the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people or not?
(d) Do you favor or oppose the U.S. having direct contact with the PLO?
(e) Do you favor or oppose direct negotiations between the U.S. and the PLO?

SOURCE: For pre-1988 polls, see Gilboa, Table 5-3, p. 187.

The responses to the questions in Table 4 might be logically inconsistent with the responses in Table 6. By definition, negotiations entail recognition and a granting of legitimacy. But perhaps the questions in Table 6, with their emphasis on a settlement, suggested to the respondents a change in the ideology and practice of the PLO toward the United States and toward Israel — a change that could in turn justify U.S. recognition. The responses in Table 6 could also be explained by a typical Western rational approach to conflict resolution, according to which, conflict resolution depends on communication between enemies. The United States itself practiced this principle in Vietnam when it negotiated with the Viet Cong, although with long delays and great difficulty.

At any rate, Americans clearly distinguish between the PLO's message and practice — a message and practice that Americans re-

TABLE 6
SHOULD THE UNITED STATES NEGOTIATE FOR PEACE WITH THE PLO?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Jan. 1988	55%	35%	9%	(PS)	(a)
Mar. 1988	53%	26%	21%	(GP)	(b)
Apr. 1988	52%	34%	14%	(LA)	(a)
Apr. 1988	62%	35%	3%	(MK)	(a)

Questions:
(a) Which of the following two opinions is closer to yours: The U.S. shouldn't negotiate with the PLO because they are terrorists and they refuse to recognize the right of Israel to exist. Or: In order to *bring about peace* in the Mid-East, we should be willing to talk to all parties involved in the conflict, including the PLO. (Should talk = yes, shouldn't = no)
(b) As you may know, the U.S. does not currently deal directly with the PLO. Do you favor or oppose direct talks between the U.S. and the PLO *as a way to help resolve* the conflict over the Gaza and the West Bank?

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TABLE 7
SHOULD ISRAEL NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Feb. 1981	26%	31%	43%	(TY)	(a)
Jan. 1988	43%	46%	11%	(PS)	(b)
Mar. 1988	58%	16%	26%	(GP)	(c)
Apr. 1988	63%	17%	20%	(CT)	(d)
Apr. 1988	27%	44%	29%	(RR)	(e)

Questions:
(a) Do you think Israel is doing the right thing or the wrong thing in refusing to negotiate with the PLO?
(b) The Arabs say they will only negotiate with Israel if Arafat and the PLO are part of the process. The Israelis have refused because they refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist and have repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel. Given this, do you think Israel should or should not negotiate with the PLO?
(c) As you may know, Israel does not currently deal directly with the PLO. Do you favor or oppose direct talks between Israel and the PLO as *a way to help resolve the conflict* over Gaza and the West Bank.
(d) Do you favor or oppose direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the PLO?
(e) Israel has agreed to meet with local Palestinian representatives, but refuses to negotiate with the PLO, claiming that it is a terrorist organization. Do you think Israel is right or wrong in refusing to negotiate with the PLO?

SOURCE: For 1981, see Gilboa, Table 5-4, p. 188.

ject — and a perceived need to communicate with the PLO if such communications could be conducted within a peacemaking framework. And, it should be noted, 1988 scores in Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 resemble earlier results, which means that the uprising has not affected American attitudes toward U.S.-PLO talks.[33]

But has the uprising affected American opinions on Israel-PLO talks?

Responses to the questions in Table 7 indicate that until the 1988 disturbances the American public was divided on the issue of Israel-PLO talks.[34] In 1988, two of the four polls found considerable support for Israel-PLO negotiations; in one survey the opinions were equally divided, and in the last, a plurality of the sample justified the Israeli position.

But Americans have insisted, as can be seen in Table 8, on a condition for Israel-PLO talks. The April *Chicago Tribune* poll followed up its Question (d) in Table 7 with Question (a) in Table 8. The result was telling. While a very large majority of respondents (63 to 17 percent) said that they favor Israeli-PLO negotiations, they also said by an even larger majority (63 to 12 percent) that they insist on the PLO's public recognition of Israel as a condition for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. A similar view was found

[33] Gilboa, *American Public Opinion*, pp. 189-91.
[34] Gilboa, *American Public Opinion*, Table 5-4, p.188.

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TABLE 8
IS RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY THE PLO A PRECONDITION FOR PEACE?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Apr. 1988	63%	12%	25%	(CT)	(a)
Apr. 1988	75%	15%	10%	(MK)	(b)

Questions:
(a) Do you favor or oppose: Insist the PLO publicly recognize Israel as a condition for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians?
(b) The PLO charter calls for the destruction of Israel. Do you think that the PLO will have to publicly renounce this policy and recognize Israel's right to exist before peace can be achieved, or that peace can be achieved without the PLO's recognizing Israel?

in the answers to Question (b) in Table 8. These attitudes, it may be noted, reflect the official policy of the U.S. government and the views of several political groups in Israel.

A Palestinian State

The Carter administration suggested a "national homeland" for the Palestinians as an essential element of a permanent solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.[35] The term, however, is vague and could mean an independent Palestinian state or an entity linked to Jordan. The Reagan administration has opposed both a Palestinian state and an Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. In September 1982 President Reagan called for a solution to the Palestinian problem within a Jordanian context.[36] This is also one of the main elements of the peace plan developed by Secretary of State George Shultz, and presented to the leaders of the Middle East during his visits to the region in the first part of 1988.[37] While the major political parties in Israel have wide differences of opinion over the future of the West Bank and Gaza, and over the solution to the Palestinian problem, all oppose an independent Palestinian state. Israeli public opinion has also overwhelmingly opposed this solution.

But how does American public opinion view the idea of such an independent state following the Palestinian unrest? Table 9 shows that, as a general idea, the concept won wide approval both in 1980 and 1988. Substantial majorities of the two samples were in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state *somewhere.*

But when the idea of an independent Palestinian state was presented in the specific context of the West Bank and Gaza, approval and support sharply declined. Questions (b) of Table 9 and (a) of Table

[35] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 1977*, part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 386-87.
[36] Ronald Reagan, *U.S. Involvement in Mideast Peace Effort: "A Moral Imperative,"* U.S. Policy Statement Series, September 1, 1982. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Information Service, 1982).
[37] Letter from Secretary of State Shultz to Israeli prime minister Shamir, March 4, 1988. It was leaked to the Israeli daily *Yediot Aharonot* and published on March 6, 1988.

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TABLE 9
SHOULD A PALESTINIAN STATE BE ESTABLISHED SOMEWHERE?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Jul. 1980	71%	12%	17%	(HS)	(a)
Jan. 1988	72%	12%	16%	(TY)	(b)

Questions:
(a) The Palestinian people are now homeless and deserve their own independent state just as much as the Jews deserved their own homeland after World War II. (Agree = Yes, Disagree = No)
(b) Do you favor or oppose giving the Palestinians a homeland of their own someplace in the Middle East? (Aware group = 72 percent)

SOURCE: For 1980 poll, Gilboa, Table 5-7, p. 196.

10 appeared in the same poll, and we can see therefore that Question (a), which specifically mentioned the West Bank and Gaza as the site of a Palestinian homeland, caused a drop of 30 percentage points in the "for" column and an increase of 10 percentage points in the "against" column. When made concrete in this way, the idea of a Palestinian homeland lost appeal. Other scores in Table 10 reveal an even more closely divided opinion on the idea of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

What happens when the idea of a Palestinian homeland is made even more concrete? As noted above, West Bank and Gaza Palestinians have referred all calls for a negotiated settlement to the PLO. But Table 11 indicates extremely strong opposition in America to the idea of a state under the PLO.

This view has also been found in two earlier polls (1975 and 1980). Thus, when the Palestinian state solution was mentioned in connection with the PLO it received the least support, only between 11 and 15 percent. However, as Table 12 suggests, the public would be more willing to approve a Palestinian state if the PLO recognized Israel and stopped terrorism.

TABLE 10
SHOULD A PALESTINIAN STATE BE ESTABLISHED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Jan. 1988	42%	22%	36%	(TY)	(a)
Mar. 1988	35%	23%	42%	(GP)	(b)
Apr. 1988	38%	23%	39%	(CT)	(c)
Apr. 1988	43%	42%	16%	(MK)	(c)

Questions:
(a) Do you favor or oppose giving the Palestinians a homeland of their own on the West Bank or the Gaza Strip?
(b) Do you favor or oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank?
(c) Do you favor or oppose the setting up of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza?

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TABLE 11
SHOULD A PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK BE RULED BY THE PLO?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Jan. 1975	11%	54%	35%	(HS)	(a)
Jul. 1980	15%	53%	32%	(HS)	(b)
Jan. 1988	13%	57%	31%	(PS)	(c)

Questions:
(a) Israel should give up the occupied Palestinian Arab territory and let Arafat rule it. (Agree = Yes, Disagree = No)
(b) Arafat and the PLO should be given the West Bank and allowed to form an independent Palestinian state.
(c) Thinking about the Palestinian problem, do you think there should be a Palestinian state set up in the West Bank and in Gaza under the PLO, should there be a Palestinian state federated with Jordan, or does there not need to be a Palestinian state?

SOURCE: For pre-1988 polls, see Gilboa, Table 5-7, p. 196.

This leads to an obvious conclusion. Americans have had reservations about a Palestinian state largely because they are uncertain about the dangers that such a state would create for Israel.

As Table 13 demonstrates, about half of the American public believed in January 1988 that a Palestinian state would be a threat to the security and even to the existence of Israel, while a quarter to a third thought it would not be a threat.

In sum, despite the uprising, Americans have not altered their views about the Palestinian state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly when this idea was given concrete expression in terms of a West Bank location and a PLO leadership. However, as was the case with Israel-PLO negotiations, the key for making the state so-

TABLE 12
SHOULD ISRAEL PERMIT A PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK IF THE PLO RECOGNIZES ISRAEL AND RENOUNCES TERRORISM?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Aug. 1980	39%	21%	40%	(RR)	(a)
Aug. 1981	39%	21%	40%	(RR)	(a)
Aug. 1982	39%	30%	31%	(RR)	(a)
Apr. 1988	57%	27%	16%	(MK)	(b)

Question:
(a) If the PLO agreed to recognize Israel as a Jewish state and also stop its military raids on Israel, do you think Israel should agree to the idea of a homeland for Palestinian refugees on territory now held by Israel, or don't you think they should agree to such a Palestinian homeland?
(b) If the PLO agreed to recognize the existence of Israel and also stopped its military / terrorist raids on Israel, do you think Israel should agree to the idea of a Palestinian state on territory now held / occupied by Israel, or don't you think they should agree to such a Palestinian homeland / state?

SOURCE: For pre-1988 polls, see Gilboa, Table 5-7, p. 196.

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TABLE 13
WOULD A PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP THREATEN ISRAEL'S SECURITY?

Date	Yes	No	Don't Know	Poll	Q
Jan. 1988	54%	25%	21%	(TY)	(a)
Jan. 1988	47%	33%	20%	(PS)	(b)
May 1988	41%	26%	33%	(PS)	(b)

Questions:
(a) If the Palestinians are given a homeland on the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, do you think that Israel's security as a country will be seriously threatened, somewhat threatened, or not threatened at all?
(b) If a Palestinian state were created on the West Bank and in Gaza, would that be a threat to Israel's existence, or would it not be a threat?

lution an acceptable option to the American public is PLO recognition of Israel's right to exist and a cessation of Palestinian terrorist activities.

Conclusions

The Palestinians and the PLO hoped that the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza would tilt American public opinion to their side at the expense of Israel. In view of the extensive media coverage of the uprising, and the criticism of Israel's response, one might suppose that this goal was achieved. But empirical evidence from available surveys of American attitudes toward the Middle East does not confirm this supposition.

According to the data presented and analyzed here, the violence did not alter in any significant way fundamental American opinions on key Israeli-Palestinian issues. At a very general level, Americans expressed more sympathy for and had more concern with the plight of the Palestinians. But these feelings were not translated into greater support for the main demands of the PLO and the Palestinians.

Americans tended to blame the PLO and the Palestinians for the violence, were not sure whether it was "an act of war" or "an act of civil disobedience," had questions about the reasons for the disturbances, and were not sure whether the Israeli responses were adequate or too harsh. Despite some criticism of Israeli conduct and behavior, Americans continued to sympathize much more with Israel than with the Arabs.

The distinction between the Palestinians and the PLO was also sharpened. Americans continued to view the PLO as a terrorist organization, not representative of the Palestinians, and not interested in peace. Consequently, Americans continued to oppose U.S. recognition of the organization, but more strongly advocated U.S. and Israeli talks with the PLO within a peacemaking framework.

Realistically, American and Israeli negotiations with the PLO could have only one ultimate goal — an independent Palestinian state, and Americans did not change their views about this idea. The

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opinion data concerning U.S. and Israeli negotiations with the PLO (with regard to a Palestinian state) revealed what Americans felt to be the key for such an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. The key was a major change in the PLO's ideology and practice: recognition of Israel and cessation of terrorism.

The absence of any major shifts in American public opinion toward Israeli-Palestinian issues may have several explanations. First, Israel has enjoyed a solid base of public support in the United States, built over four decades and apparently capable of sustaining considerable pressure. Deeply held beliefs do not change overnight and even dramatic events like the uprising have only limited effects on such attitudes. At this level, the media may have less influence on public opinion than thought, at least as far as Israel and the Middle East are concerned.

Then too, the position and role of American leaders no doubt influences U.S. opinion. President Reagan has not publicly criticized Israel's handling of the uprising, nor has he supported the demands of the Palestinians. Secretary Shultz's new peace plan has been fully endorsed by at least half of the Israeli government, i.e., the Labor party led by Shimon Peres, while the PLO and the Palestinians have sharply criticized it. Indeed, despite enormous American efforts, Palestinian leaders refused even to meet Shultz during his frequent visits to the region.

Finally, however, Americans have always advocated a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict through peaceful means, and have been dismayed by the seemingly endless violence. They have had no set preference for any long-term solution, but have merely been possessed by the general feeling that Israel, under certain conditions, should be ready to satisfy some of the national aspirations of the Palestinians. Foremost among these conditions is a major change in Arab and Palestinian attitudes toward Israel's right to exist in peace in the Middle East.

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

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

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Afghanistan
THE DECIMATION OF A PEOPLE

by Marek Sliwinski

In the decade since April 1978, when a coup d'état established a communist regime in Afghanistan, the Afghans have suffered a trauma. By the end of 1987, approximately 9 percent of the population had been killed by war, a figure that ranks among the highest in recent history, surpassing even the 8.6 percent death rate suffered by the Soviet Union during World War II.[1] Projecting this death rate on a total prewar population of between 12 and 15.5 million, the number of Afghans killed by the war is probably close to 1.25 million, although it may be as high as 1.5 million or as low as 1 million.[2] In the original and literal sense of the term, Afghanistan has been decimated.

This is one major conclusion that emerges from a survey conducted last year by Gallup Pakistan.[3] The survey investigated a representative sampling of the Afghan families inhabiting Pakistan's 318 refugee camps;[4] in the absence of a full-fledged demographic census, it is the best that can be hoped for. The data thus obtained provide unprecedented insight into the social, demographic, and ecological consequences of the war in Afghanistan.

Chronology

Over the ten years from 1978 to 1987 inclusive, the Afghan war saw different levels of conflict, and we can infer when these different levels were reached from the death rates suffered by refugees at

[1] Quincy Wright, *The Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 664.

[2] The size of Afghanistan's population is subject to dispute. See Jadwiga Pstrusinska, "Movements of Population in Afghanistan since 1978." Paper presented at the Second European Seminar of Central Asian Studies, University of London, April 7-10, 1987. See also, Central Statistics Office (CSO), *Statistical Year Book, 1358* (Kabul: October 1981). The survey assumes that the Afghan population remained roughly static during the war, with births equaling deaths.

[3] The survey, conducted by the author in August 1987 with Gallup Pakistan, was sponsored by the French secretary of state for human rights, Médecins sans Frontières, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, the Swiss International Catholic Child Bureau, and the Bureau International Afghanistan (Paris). For details on the methodology used in the survey, see the Appendix.

[4] Because of tribal war in the district of Kurram, interviews could not be conducted in the five camps situated there.

Marek Sliwinski, lecturer at the University of Geneva, is working on a book about the demographic effects of war in Afghanistan.

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different times. This inference is based on the observation that exodus (*hijrat*) is both a defense against danger and a time of danger. Specifically, the year of exile generally corresponds to the year of the destruction of the family home, and this markedly increases the likelihood of death and injury. During the exodus, caravans of refugees crossing the desert country are extremely vulnerable to aerial attack. Therefore, during the year of *hijrat*, human losses among refugee cohorts appear to be 2.3 times as high as among those who are still in the country. This coefficient enables us to project the losses of refugees on the entire population of Afghanistan.[5]

In this way, it becomes apparent that the Afghan war has had four or perhaps five phases of intensity. Interestingly, these phases correlate closely with changes in the top leadership of the Soviet Union (see Figure I).

The first phase was the two-year period of the civil war (1978-79), before the Soviet invasion. It is characterized by a large exodus from Afghanistan but relatively few war-related deaths: about 40,000 deaths in 1978 and 80,000 in 1979. Because the population of Afghanistan before the war was 12 to 15 million, this means the Afghan deaths numbered 3 per thousand in 1978 and 6 per thousand in 1979.

During the second phase of the war, starting immediately after the Soviet invasion, the rate of war-related deaths increased to 7 per thousand, and stayed there throughout the Brezhnev era. The third phase, the Andropov-Chernenko phase, saw the war mount in scale. Deaths related to the war reached 11 per thousand Afghans during the tenure of Andropov, and 16 per thousand during the short interregnum of Chernenko. Under Gorbachev, the scale of the war initially continued at a very high level: 13 deaths per thousand. The results from 1987, not yet completely tabulated, may indicate the beginning of a fifth phase. In this latest period, the number of military engagements fought has increased,[6] but the proportion of deaths seems to be noticeably lower, about 9 war-related deaths per thousand Afghans. The arming of the *mujahidin* (resistance fighters) with Stinger and Blowpipe missiles probably explains this latest development.[7]

An analysis of the proportion of those injured in each phase (rather than those killed) generally confirms the preceding conclusions, though two discrepancies arise. First, the highest rate of injuries

[5] This same phenomenon — the highest losses being suffered by refugees — was observed during World War II. See Ministère Federal des Expulsés, Réfugiés et Sinistrés de guerre, *Quelques faits relatifs au problème des expulsés et refugiés allemands* (Bonn, 1966).

[6] *Afghanistan Report. A monthly analysis of military activities* (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies), November 1987, p. 80 (advance copy).

[7] The losses of Soviet aircraft increased markedly from September 1986 (when they were twenty-seven) to October 1986 (when they were seventy-three). This increase probably corresponds to the introduction of Stinger missiles. See *Afghanistan Report*, September 1986, p.24; and ibid., October 1986, p.23.

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FIGURE 1
PERCENT OF AFGHAN POPULATION KILLED BY WAR
(by year and cumulatively)



NOTE: The Afghan year begins in late March, on a day that varies year to year from the perspective of the West's Gregorian calendar. The year 1355 thus corresponds approximately to the period from April 1978 to April 1979.

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comes not in the Chernenko period, but at the beginning of the Gorbachev tenure. Second, there is no decrease in injuries during 1987. These facts may indicate that the recently increased scale of battle has caused more injuries but has not resulted in more fatalities, which are caused mainly by the use of powerful arms against the civilian population. This leads to an important conclusion: the better-equipped *mujahidin* effectively protect the civilian population by forcing the enemy to fight armed forces. In addition, the presence of anti-aircraft weapons obviously constitutes a factor in protecting the civilian population.

Looking at the rate of exodus during each phase of the war, we see that it was determined by more than just the degree of danger at a given moment. *Hijrat*, particularly at first, was undertaken not only in response to war, but also as a religious obligation — leaving the country profaned by the infidels.[8] This helps explain the marked trend toward *hijrat* during the April 1978-December 1979 period, when human losses were still relatively limited. The period after the Soviet invasion shows a significant increase in the exodus, which then rapidly diminishes. Presumably, the population adapted to the war, through processes of auto-selection and learning. Auto-selection divided the population into two parts: defeatist and bold, with the one choosing exile to avoid the war and the other choosing resistance to change the situation.[9] A learning process also presumably took place among those who stayed, allowing them to minimize the dangers of war. Yet these mechanisms only partly explain the decline in refugees during the first years of the war. In addition, as noted below, the first four years of war left the southern regions of Afghanistan, those most convenient to Pakistan, quite depopulated.

The Demography of Destruction

In addition to analyzing differences in the Afghan war by year, the survey also analyzed its differing impact on the sexes and on various age groups within the Afghan population (see Table 1). Looking at human losses classified by sex prompts an important conclusion: the losses are much higher among males than among females. Among males, losses rise gradually with age, attaining a maximum in the range of thirty-one to forty, then decreasing slightly. Among females, the tendency is not so regular, but there is a significant increase in war mortality after the age of forty.

The direct participation of men in battle is not the only explanation of these differences. In Afghan society, the man assures the

[8] On this, see Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 105-109.

[9] Marek Sliwinski, "Stabilité de la décision dans les conditions frustrantes" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Grenoble, 1977).

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TABLE 1

WAR-RELATED DEATHS, 1978-1987
(per thousand Afghans; by sex and age)

	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	Over 60	All Ages
Males	31	59	173	224	220	207	173	134
Females	28	36	33	21	68	46	70	38
Both Sexes	30	48	115	140	147	126	130	90

link between home and the outside world, going to work or to the market. Women generally stay near the house, occupied with the education of children and agricultural activities.[10] Afghan houses, built of hard-packed clay, probably offer good protection against small caliber projectiles. Thus, it seems likely that the probability of death increases with the frequency of trips away from home. This may also be why the percentage of women killed increases markedly at the end of the age of fertility when home obligations become less important. Older women have more opportunity to get away from the house, and this constitutes a heightened exposure to danger.

When we look at non-fatal casualties, the proportion of Afghans incapacitated by the war is 31 per thousand; the proportion of slightly injured is 75 per thousand among the interviewed householders (mostly males) and 50 per thousand among their family members. These figures may seem extremely low when compared with the proportion of those killed (90 per thousand). But several considerations must be borne in mind. First, when powerful weapons are used against a civilian population that lacks anti-aircraft defenses or air raid shelters, chances of survival are low. Second, in precarious hygienic conditions, without medical assistance, even less-serious injuries can cause death by infection. Third, when injuries do turn out to be temporary, a people accustomed to extremely hard conditions of life may forget them and therefore not report them to the survey takers.

TABLE 2

BOMBING VICTIMS AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL CASUALTIES
(by sex and age)

	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	Over 60	All Ages
Males	7.3	4.9	2.7	3.8	4.3	4.6	6.1	40.9
Females	6.0	7.8	7.6	9.2	8.1	7.8	7.8	76.7
Both Sexes	6.7	5.8	3.2	4.2	5.0	6.5	6.6	45.8

Interestingly, some of the patterns seen in the death rates among males and females are reversed when we look at bombing casualties among those groups (see Table 2). Aerial bombing of combatants,

[10] Marie O. Terrenoire, "Guerre d'Afghanistan. Image de femmes," *Central Asian Survey*, July 1987, p. 81.

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civilians, and fleeing refugees was reported to be the cause of 46 percent of deaths or incapacitation. (Other causes were bullets, 33 percent; artillery shelling, 12 percent; mines, 3 percent; exhaustion, 2 percent; and miscellaneous, 4 percent.) Most victims of aerial bombings belong to the non-belligerent population. They were women, boys under fifteen years old, and men over fifty-five. These categories constitute 52 percent of such victims. In addition, of course, not all men between fifteen and fifty-five years old are belligerents. Thus, non-belligerents constituted approximately 80 percent of the victims of aerial bombings.

In fact, the efficacy of aircraft against guerrillas and potential guerrillas seems to have been relatively limited. Among male casualties thirty-one to forty years of age, 38 percent of casualties were victims of bombs; among female casualties thirty-one to forty, fully 92 percent were hit by bombs. But when we compare war-related deaths within that age group, we find a ratio of only 1 female per 10 males killed by the war.

Two surveys based on quotas of women and children neatly corroborate the conclusions of the main (random) survey. Among refugee school-children, nine to fifteen years old, 15 percent lost their fathers to the war, and 4 percent lost their fathers to natural causes. By the standards of Afghan society (where any child who loses a father is considered orphaned), 19 percent of these children were orphans. To interpret this finding we must factor in the relatively smaller chance of including an orphan in a sample, since the average number of children in a monogamous family is 6.33 if the father is alive, 5.57 if he died of natural causes, and 4.27 if he died in the war. When we do this, we can see that the 19 percent figure for children orphaned by war correlates closely with the figure for parent-aged males killed by the war (see Table 1).

Survey results also suggest that close to 35 percent of all refugee women ever married have been widowed, three-fifths by the war. (A large age discrepancy between most husbands and wives accounts for the 40 percent widowed by natural causes.) This means that of all refugee women ever married, 20 percent have been widowed by the war, and this again correlates closely with the approximately 20 percent of adult men killed by the war.

Some of the data concerning the mortality of Afghan children are difficult to explain at first glance (see Table 3). The mortality rate for infants under one year was slightly higher within Pakistan, after *hijrat* from Afghanistan, while the mortality rate for children in all other age categories was markedly lower in Pakistan. One possible explanation for this anomaly is the intense and unhealthy concentration of population in the refugee camps. Differences of climate are important as well: Afghanistan is mountainous and cool; Pakistan

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TABLE 3

CHILDHOOD DEATHS AMONG AFGHANS BORN 1972-1987
(in percent, by country of residence and age at death)

Age	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Difference	Effective Difference
Under 1	14.4	17.1	−2.7	2.7
1-5	9.8	4.2	+5.6	5.6
6-10	4.6	0.8	+3.8	3.8
11-15	3.8	0.4	+3.4	3.4
Total	32.6	22.5	+10.1	15.5

is tropical. Too, the hardships of *hijrat* have repercussions on the health of infants. Given that *hijrat* is an effect of the war, this higher death rate experienced by infants under one year of age, living in Pakistan, should also be considered a cost of the war. Thus, the cost of the war to children should be reckoned not at 101 deaths per thousand, but at 155.

It should be noted, however, that mortality among Afghan children in Pakistan has steeply declined since large-scale vaccination campaigns began in 1984.[11]

A comparison of the sex and age distribution of the Afghan population in 1979 and of the refugee population in 1987 shows a profound difference, one that will influence the social and political

TABLE 4

AFGHAN POPULATION (1979)
AFGHAN REFUGEE POPULATION IN PAKISTAN (1987)
(by age and sex, in percent)

	AFGHANISTAN 1979			PAKISTAN 1987		
Age	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
0-10	16.5	15.8	32.3	16.3	16.8	33.1
11-20	11.7	11.1	22.8	12.7	12.9	25.6
21-30	8.4	8.0	16.4	8.2	6.9	15.1
31-40	6.0	5.6	11.6	4.5	4.2	8.7
41-50	4.0	3.8	7.8	3.2	3.7	6.9
51-60	2.6	2.4	5.0	2.2	2.9	5.1
61-70	1.5	1.3	2.8	1.6	1.6	3.2
71-80	0.7	0.4	1.1	0.7	1.0	1.7
Over 80	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.6
Total	51.5	48.5	100.0	49.8	50.2	100.0
Ratio: males/females		1.062			0.992	

SOURCE: For the population of Afghanistan in 1979: *Statistical Year Book, 1358* (1981).

[11] Bruce Campbel, "Primary Health Care within the Afghan Refugee Setting," Annual Seminar on the Afghan Refugee Health Programme, Rawalpindi, *Proceedings XII*, December 1986, p. 65.

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TABLE 5

ETHNIC MAKE-UP: AFGHANISTAN (1978 AND 1987) AND REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN (1987)
(in percent)

Ethnic Group	Afghanistan 1978	Afghanistan 1987	Pakistan 1987
Pathans	39	22	85
Tajiks	26	34	6
Hazaras	10	14	Z
Uzbecks	10	14	Z
Turkmens	3	4	1
Other	12	12	8

NOTE: Z signifies an ethnic representation under 1 percent. The ethnic composition of the Afghan refugee population in Iran is assumed to be similar to the ethnic structure of Afghanistan in 1978.

future of the country (see Table 4). The ratio of males to females was 1.062 in Afghanistan in 1979, 1.0 among the refugees fleeing their country, and 0.992 in the refugee camps in Pakistan in 1987. War mortality among men is the first reason for this difference. When refugees account for their family members, we find that among those family members remaining in Afghanistan, males outnumber females two to one.

As for the age distribution, there is a disproportionate number of both the young and the old in the refugee population, not because they have grown more numerous but because of a deep deficit in the number of Afghans between twenty and fifty years old. This deficit affects both women and men, but men far more. After the war, therefore, certain traditions will probably be set aside to allow women and youths to assume various occupational and other roles.

Emigration and Ethnicity

A comparison of the ethnic structure of Afghanistan in 1978 and 1987 also illustrates the war's destruction of Afghan society (see Table 5). Before 1979, Pathans constituted the largest group, making up 39 percent of the population, followed by Tajiks with 26 percent. Yet this proportion is not preserved among refugees in Pakistan, where Pathans make up 85 percent of the population and Tajiks only 6 percent. The ethnic composition of the refugee population in Iran is unknown, but Pathan tribes also predominate along the Iranian border. Consequently, we presume that Pathans make up the dominant group among Iranian refugees.

These data suggest that ten years of war have reduced the proportion of Pathans in Afghanistan from 39 percent to 22 percent of the population. In their place, Tajiks have become the most important

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ethnic group, growing from 26 percent of the population to 34 percent.[12]

The new dominance of Tajiks and other northern ethnic groups is of more than ethnographic interest, however. The proximity of the Soviet Muslim republics populated by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens provides the Soviet authorities with the linguistic and cultural means to influence the now-dominant Afghan ethnic populations. At some point, the strong linguistic and ethnic affinities across the Soviet-Afghan border may even furnish a pretext for the annexation of these provinces. In fact, in 1980, Moscow annexed the strategically important Wakhan corridor. Although this has never been officially admitted, it is recounted in the poetry of the Kirgiz.[13]

The Geography of Destruction

Statistically, the Gallup data cover more than 80 percent of the population of the provinces of Afghanistan, and justify some observations about how the war has affected different parts of the country.

Unsurprisingly, the most afflicted parts are the northern provinces of Afghanistan, bordering the Soviet Union (see Table 6 and Map 1). The inhabitants of Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan, and probably Badakshan suffered the highest war casualties, with more than 16 percent of the population killed or incapacitated. Clearly, the *mujahidin*'s capacity for defense is limited by the region's distance from sources of supply and its proximity to the Soviets' sources of supply. Also, the land in the north is a steppe, which provides few natural shelters against aircraft attacks.

The sheer length of the refugee route to the Pakistan border has also increased the number of victims from northern provinces. And it has meant, as well, that not many inhabitants of the northwestern and central parts of Afghanistan are among the refugees, who come mainly from the provinces bordering Pakistan (see Table 7). But this discrepancy has been decreasing over time, as refugees increasingly arrive from distant regions.

Afghan provinces differ in another way. The exodus of refugees reached a peak in different years according to province (see Table 6 and Map 2), and this suggests that the depopulation of Afghanistan has resulted from a conscious, ordered, and planned Soviet policy (see Table 8).

[12] Sayed B. Majrooh, Sayed M.I. Elmi, *The Sovietization of Afghanistan* (Peshawar: Printing Corp., 1986), p. 181; Jean-Charles Blanc, *Afghanistan et sa population* (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1976); Bernard Dupaigne, "Les peuples d'Afghanistan," in *Afghanistan. La colonisation impossible* (Paris: CERF, 1984).

[13] Robert Dor, "Les chants des Kirgizes de Pamir Afghan," *Central Asian Survey*, 4 (1985), p. 83; and Rosanne Klass, ed., *Afghanistan — The Great Game Revisited* (New York: Freedom House, 1987), pp. 126, 267-68.

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TABLE 6

WAR DEATHS AND YEAR OF MAXIMUM *HIJRAT*
(by province and region)

	War-related Deaths as a Percent of Local Population	Year of Maximum *Hijrat**
I. Pakistani Border Region		
Provinces		
Ghazni	7.9	1978
Helmand	8.3	1980
Kunar	7.7	1978
Nargarhar	4.8	1979
Paktia	4.4	1979
Paktika	5.4	1979
Kandahar	7.4	1980
Zabul	3.2	1979
Region I taken as a whole	6.1	1979
II. USSR Border Region		
Provinces		
Badakshan	(NA)	(NA)
Badghis	(NA)	(NA)
Baghlan	11.5	1983
Balkh	9.8	1986
Faryab	13.5	1986
Jozjan	10.8	1986
Kunduz	15.1	1986
Samangan	14.1	1983
Takhar	(NA)	(NA)
Region II taken as a whole	12.7	1986
III. Iran Border Region		
Provinces		
Farah	6.9	1987
Herat	(NA)	(NA)
Nimroz	(NA)	(NA)
Region III taken as a whole	(NA)	(NA)
IV. Central Region		
Provinces		
Bamian	(NA)	(NA)
Ghor	(NA)	(NA)
Urozgan	4.3	1980
Region IV taken as a whole	(NA)	(NA)
V. Kabul Region		
Provinces		
Kabul	10.6	1983
Kapissa (Panchir)	15.8	1985
Laghman	3.9	1983
Logar	9.1	1979
Parwan	6.1	1985
Wardak	3.9	1984
Region V taken as a whole	8.2	1983
Afghanistan taken as a whole	9.0	1979

NOTE: *From April of the given year to April of the following year.
(NA): Data are not available.

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MAP 1
PERCENTAGE OF WAR-RELATED DEATHS BY PROVINCE



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TABLE 7

PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATION; AFGHANISTAN (1979) AND PAKISTAN (1987)

	1979 Afghan population by province (in percent)	Afghan population in Pakistan, by province or origin (1987, in percent)	1979 provincial population living as refugees in Pakistan (1987, in percent)
I. Pakistani Border Region			
Provinces			
Ghazni	4.6	5.6	30.0
Helmand	3.7	4.5	30.0
Kunar	1.8	8.0	over 90.0
Nangarhar	5.3	6.7	32.0
Paktia	3.5	14.4	over 90.0
Paktika	1.7	2.8	53.0
Kandahar	4.0	10.3	65.0
Zabul	1.3	4.4	85.0
Region I Population taken as a whole	25.9	56.7	60
II. USSR Border Region			
Provinces			
Badakshan	3.5	Z	Z
Badghis	1.6	Z	Z
Baghlan	3.5	7.6	51.0
Balkh	4.8	5.7	30.0
Faryab	4.1	Z	Z
Jozjan	4.2	1.5	10.0
Kunduz	3.9	9.2	59.0
Samangan	1.9	1.7	22.0
Takhar	3.7	Z	Z
Region II Population taken as a whole	31.2	25.7	20

From 1978 to 1981, the Soviets gave priority to isolating the resistance movements by creating a cordon sanitaire along the Pakistan border, and consequently this strip was depopulated by aerial bombings. In fact, the inability of the Afghan government to achieve this goal on its own was probably a major factor behind Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. If the fundamental structures of the communist state were to be established, clearing the northern and central zone around to the capital was the next goal, and that was indeed the main task during 1982-84. Then came control of trunk roads and railways, linking the central area with the Soviet Union. These steps could not be achieved without expelling or exterminating the indigenous population.

The establishment of communist power in Afghanistan has also led to a dramatic depopulation of the agricultural regions and an increase in urban population. In fact, 97 percent of the refugees in Pakistan are of rural origin. This, too, is probably not accidental. The

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TABLE 7 (continued)

III. Iran Border Region			
Provinces			
Farah	1.7	Z	Z
Herat	5.5	Z	Z
Nimroz	0.7	Z	Z
Region III Population taken as a whole	7.9	Z	Z
IV. Central Region			
Provinces			
Bamian	1.9	Z	Z
Ghor	2.4	Z	Z
Urozgan	3.2	Z	Z
Total Region IV	7.5	Z	Z
V. Kabul Region			
Provinces			
Kabul	13.3	2.7	7
Kapissa*	2.1	Z	Z
Laghman	2.2	Z	Z
Logar*	1.8	3.4	47
Parwan	5.4	Z	Z
Wardak*	2.7	Z	Z
Region V Population taken as a whole	27.5	6.1	9
Afghan Population taken as a whole	100.0	100.0	27

NOTE: Z means that the rate of refugees from these provinces is probably lower than 1 percent.

* The data in the first column (on Afghan population) should be viewed with caution. These three provinces were omitted from the *Statistical Year Book* and their inhabitants considered nomads. Estimates of the number of inhabitants of these provinces are based on earlier data: Ministry of Planning, *Population and Manpower Resources in Afghanistan 1345-1350* (Kabul, 1967).

SOURCE: Central Statistics Office, *Statistical Year Book, 1358* (Kabul, October 1981).

disintegration of agricultural communities, traditionally hostile toward communism, constitutes the sine qua non for the stability of the communist regime. But, as officials in Kabul have been quoted as saying, in effect, "if only 1 million people were left in the country, they would be more than enough to start a new society."[14]

When seen against other sources, the data of the Gallup study allow us to describe the main features of the rural depopulation. Since 1978, one-third of the Afghan population has fled the country;[15] 9 percent have been killed in the war; and 11 percent have become

[14] Edward Girardet in *U.S. News & World Report*, December 12, 1983.

[15] Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (UNHCR), Rapport sur les activités d'assistance du HCR en 1978/79 - 1986/87 (Geneva: United Nations, 1979 - 1987).

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

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TABLE 8

MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS 1984-1987
by geographic region

	1984 Number (%)	1985 Number (%)	1986 Number (%)	1987 (Apr.-Oct.) Number (%)
Pakistan border	602 (100)	887 (147)	1739 (289)	1966 (327)
USSR border	449 (100)	332 (72)	627 (140)	894 (199)
Iran border	107 (100)	184 (172)	329 (307)	266 (249)
Central region	63 (100)	48 (76)	109 (173)	105 (167)
Kabul region	491 (100)	572 (116)	1103 (225)	1219 (248)
Total	1712 (100)	2013 (118)	3907 (228)	4450 (260)

NOTE: 1984 = 100 percent

SOURCE: Data compiled from *Afghanistan Report,* March 1984–November 1987.

TABLE 9

FATE OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION, 1977-1987
(in percent)

Year	Agricul-turalists	Urbanites	Killed	Displaced Persons (within Afghanistan)	Refugees (outside Afghanistan)
77-78	85.0	15.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
78-79	76.1	15.9	0.3	1.9	5.8
79-80	64.5	16.7	0.9	4.4	13.5
80-81	57.2	17.6	1.6	5.8	17.8
81-82	50.9	18.5	2.2	7.0	21.4
82-83	46.5	19.3	2.9	7.7	23.6
83-84	40.1	20.2	4.1	8.8	26.8
84-85	34.7	21.0	5.6	9.6	29.1
85-86	30.6	21.9	6.9	10.0	30.6
86-87	25.7	22.8	8.1	10.7	32.7
Apr.-Oct. 1987	23.2	23.7	9.0	10.9	33.2

internal refugees — displaced persons with no regular means of survival. The agricultural population of Afghanistan declined from 85 percent before 1978 to 23 percent in 1987, and the urban population rose from 15 percent to 24 percent, tripling in the region of the capital[16] (see Figure 2 and Table 9). This means that the total number of the war's victims probably exceeds the estimates here, for these estimates do not take into account casualties suffered by refugees who remain within Afghanistan (most of whom go to Kabul or other main cities).

The ecological consequences of this agricultural depopulation will certainly be disastrous. With the great majority of farmers exiled,

[16] Foundation Biblioteca Afganica, *Die Menschenrechte und die Flüchtlinge* (Liestal, Switzerland: Biblioteca Afganica, 1985).

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FIGURE 2
THE AFGHAN POPULATION IN 1977 AND IN 1987



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an increasing and sometimes irreversible erosion and desertification of entire regions is taking place. Decreasing agricultural production is inevitable.[17]

The Future

The consequences of the war in Afghanistan are thus not limited to immediate human losses. Yet it is difficult to forecast the long-term consequences. Among refugees, the proportion of unemployed men has increased from 3 percent in pre-Soviet Afghanistan to 51 percent. The proportion of unskilled workers has increased from 4 percent to 31 percent, as men formerly engaged in agriculture take employment as common laborers. The list of professions, however, also shows an entirely new position: *mujahid* — the resistance fighter.

Among refugee women, deprived of agricultural occupations, living at a subsistence level and condemned to inactivity, the situation is worse; among widows it is often tragic. According to the Afghan tradition of *levirat*,[18] the wife of a deceased man becomes a member of the family of his brother. But this custom is not fully respected amid war and exodus, especially if the woman lacks many children. These women live in "camps of widows," in near-total isolation from the world, a situation completely contrary to Afghan tradition.

As for children, it is worth noting that more than 15 percent of today's Afghan refugees were born in Pakistan and have never seen the land of their ancestors. They benefit from a better level of education than their parents received, but their future is troubled. If the Afghan conflict is not resolved, these second-generation refugees will become an even more intractable problem for the region.

One last point concerns the ever-growing exodus, mentioned above, from the northern parts of Afghanistan. Until very recently, this pointed to the most likely outcome of the war: a partition of Afghanistan into two states — a communist-dominated north and a resistance-dominated south. With the assassination of Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq, the most ardent resistance supporter in the region, another scenario has become possible: the end of aid to the resistance, and the effort's consequent demise.

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[17] Francis D'Souza, *The Threat of Famine in Afghanistan* (Afghan Aid, 1984); and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, *Agricultural Survey on Afghanistan* (preliminary version), Peshawar, May 1988.

[18] Parvin Ali, "La situation des veuves et des orphelins dans les camps des réfugiés afghans." Paper presented to the Colloque Internationale sur le Problème des Réfugiés Afghans, Geneva, November 4-6, 1983.

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A Note on the Survey Methodology

In an effort to reflect the main features of Afghanistan's prewar population, as recorded in the 1979 census and reported in the *Statistical Year Book, 1358,* the survey's sample was picked according to two methods: 70 percent were chosen at random and 30 percent were chosen by quota. The random selection produced a typical sampling of refugees, while the quota was to give over-representation to those categories of the Afghan population that are relatively rare among refugees (such as those from Badghis, Herat, Ghor, Takhar).

The survey questionnaire listed all family members of interviewed households living in April 1978, the date of the communist coup. "Family" was defined as the first degree of kinship: the father, mother, brother, sister, and children of the interviewed person. The survey then updated the list, asking for information about everyone who had been born into the family since that time, and every family member who had died, together with the precise causes and circumstances of death. Other questions concerned migration routes, socioeconomic status, and ethnic background.

The census covered 1,963 nuclear families and provided data on the fates of 18,680 people. Two other investigations of 585 women and 408 children gave further data on 3,211 children and 816 parents. The conclusions here are based on an analysis of 23,700 sample cases.

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Afghanistan
THE NEXT ROUND

by Barnett R. Rubin

The Accords on Afghanistan, signed in Geneva on April 14, 1988, have at best begun, not ended, the resolution of that country's conflict. It is not only that the departure of all uniformed Soviet troops remains incomplete and uncertain. It is, far more important, that a civil war rages on, and millions of Afghan refugees still cannot return home to rebuild their land and their lives.

This is not the fault of the accords; disengagement by foreign powers is all that they were meant to achieve. Soviet troops are supposed to withdraw by February 15, 1989; Pakistan and the United States were supposed to cease aiding the Afghan resistance (the *mujahidin*) by May 15, 1988. In a last minute flurry of direct superpower talks, however, the United States insisted on "symmetry," that is, on its right to aid the *mujahidin* as long as the Soviets arm the communist-dominated government in Kabul. While the Soviets never accepted this view, they signed the agreement knowing the U.S. interpretation, and aid to the *mujahidin* continued after May 15.

What the April accords did not attempt to achieve directly was internal peace. That is the next step. And it will come to Afghanistan only with the establishment of a broad-based government enjoying both general domestic support and good relations with its neighbors.

In fact, Diego Cordovez, the U.N. under-secretary-general for special political affairs who mediated and largely crafted the accords, always argued that the accords were just the "first track" of the peace process, which would also require a "second track."[1] This second track would involve the Afghan resistance (which did not participate in the Geneva talks and rejected their results), and would ultimately lead to a change in government. To promote that second track, Cordovez has presented a proposal for a National Government of Peace and Reconstruction.

Publicly, Washington's position is that any Afghan regime not dominated by Soviet-supported Communists will be acceptable, and

[1] On August 1, 1988, Cordovez left his position as U.N. under-secretary-general to become foreign minister of his native Ecuador. He remained the U.N. secretary-general's personal representative on Afghanistan until late November.

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that the only condition for such a government is the departure of Soviet troops. Privately, though, most American officials expect either a descent into anarchy or a bloody victory by the fundamentalists, and they have denigrated Cordovez's proposal in press leaks.

Background

This view — that the future of Afghanistan can be settled only in blood — accords with Western stereotypes of Afghans as vengeful tribesmen and religious fanatics. A closer look at Afghan history and culture, however, suggests that there may be less violent ways to re-establish Afghanistan's sovereignty and nonalignment. Anyone hoping to support such processes through diplomacy, of course, will have to understand something about Afghan history and the main sources of political legitimacy in Afghanistan's past: the tribes and Islam.

From the establishment of the Afghan monarchy in 1747 to its overthrow in 1973, Afghan rulers used various combinations of tribal and Islamic procedures to legitimate their power. Originally, tribal legitimacy was derived from successful conquest (de facto sovereignty) and ratified by a *Loya Jirga* or Great Council of the Afghan tribes. This *Loya Jirga*, whose armed members constituted the main military force of the state, developed from the more commonplace institution of the *jirga*, a council of adult males within the tribes, which meets to solve a specific problem or resolve a dispute.[2] The first *Loya Jirga*, in 1747, chose Ahmad Shah Durrani as the first king of the Afghan tribes.

Afghanistan effectively entered the modern nation-state system by signing the Treaty of Gandamak with Great Britain (in 1879) and ending the Second Anglo-Afghan War (in 1880). Since then, its rulers have had access to bases of power other than tribal military prowess. They have drawn resources from the international system in the form of foreign subsidies and aid, as well as taxes on foreign trade, and used these resources with mixed success to build up a professional military separate from the tribes. Hence, the *Loya Jirga* has at times become an institution subordinate to the state rather than a genuine means of expressing the will of the tribes. Leaders have been able to pick the tribal representatives and have thus used it to ratify predetermined policies, much as leaders elsewhere have used referenda. Babrak Karmal and Najibullah, for instance, presided over several carefully controlled meetings they called *Loya Jirgas*.

Even so, the *Loya Jirga* sometimes represented real political power. This was the case with the *jirga* convened by the then king, Zaher Shah, in 1964. Rather than act as a rubber stamp for the

[2] For a description of *jirga* procedure, see Fredrik Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans*, London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, (London: Athlone Press, 1959).

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parliamentary constitution that had been prepared by a drafting commission of intellectuals, the representatives of the nation's tribes, ethnic groups, and clergy engaged in substantive debate concerning the constitution's provisions, and partly rewrote it before passing it.[3] This *Loya Jirga* thus set a positive precedent for adapting the institution to modern conditions.

Along with tribal sanction, legitimacy in Afghanistan has also required Islamic sanction, institutionalized in decrees issued by leading *'ulama* (religious authorities). This sanction was not hard to get, however, for Sunni *'ulama* traditionally granted legitimacy to any de facto ruler who was a Muslim. Further, they did not claim that the Qur'an and *shari'a* (Islamic law) alone must be the source of all law, that the forms of the state or social relations were dictated by Islam, or that the *'ulama* themselves should rule.

As Afghan governments developed modern state institutions and expanded the educational system, the problem of legitimacy continued to develop. Afghan kings still had to satisfy the tribes and the Islamic authorities, but increasingly they also had to win sanction from a new class: the secular, Westernized intellectuals, on whom the modern state depended. These intellectuals developed ideologies and political organizations that would enable them to seek power, but the ideological quest simultaneously polarized them. Some turned to Marxism, some to fundamentalist Islam, and others to variants of nationalism, socialism, and liberalism.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which developed into a pro-Soviet Communist party, found its base among some of these intellectuals (including military officers). The strength of the leftists among Soviet-trained military officers enabled this party to seize power in an April 1978 coup, but it soon lost its chance to legitimate itself more broadly, when it tried to monopolize power, attack Islam, and transform society through state terror. In any case, the notion that a government is legitimate because it produces economic or social progress, of which the Marxist-Leninist notion of revolutionary legitimacy is but one variant, is limited to the narrow stratum of intellectuals. Even the PDPA now claims to have abandoned its monopoly on power and its revolutionary ideology, asserting legitimacy on the basis of a *Loya Jirga*, traditional Islam, and nationalism.

Other intellectuals, meanwhile, rejected Marxism and looked to a new, more activist Islam, one that also rejected tribalism and the quiescent Sunni tradition. In doing so they were able to ally with elements of the *'ulama* who were also becoming politicized. These groups claimed that Islam requires an "Islamic state," that is, a state

[3] See Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 565-87. (This material appears only in the first edition.)

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whose institutions derive from the purest principles of Islam. It is important to emphasize that the leaders of such fundamentalist groups are generally not *'ulama*, but young intellectuals with a secular education who seek, in this form of Islam, a path to legitimate power. The clearest indication of their focus on seeking power (not a goal of the traditional *'ulama*) is their preferred form of organization — the Islamic political party. These fundamentalists are also divided between radicals, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of the Hezb-e Islami, who seek to replace traditional structures with the Islamic party, sometimes violently; and moderates such as Yunus Khales (leader of a party also called the Hezb-e Islami) and Burhanuddin Rabbani of Jamiat-e Islami, who build alliances between their parties and traditional leaders.

But, contrary to some impressions held in the West, Afghans are not divided between fundamentalists and Marxists. For example, the resistance also includes groups who favor political institutions based on Afghan national traditions, with varying types and degrees of reform. (Virtually all oppose restoration of the monarchy.) Affiliated with these groups are those intellectuals who favor liberal or nationalist views and who have chosen participation in the struggle over exile in the West.[4] The other parties would agree to a modified *Loya Jirga*.

The Diplomatic Impasse

The premise of the Geneva talks was that negotiations among foreign participants would lead to their disengagement, permitting the Afghans to work things out by themselves. Of course, this premise did not prevent all the outside parties from trying to make changes in the Kabul government as side bargains or as preconditions of one sort or another.

Up until April 1983, Pakistani foreign minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan insisted only that Pakistan would not sign an agreement with a government headed by Babrak Karmal, but appeared to make no further demands. The Soviets quietly indicated that "Karmal would not be a problem." The U.S. State Department, however, was deeply skeptical of any agreement that did not provide for more thoroughgoing changes, and by October 1983 Yaqub stated that, to succeed,

[4] The resistance has many factions, often reflecting religious, ethnic, or political divisions. In Peshawar, Pakistan, an alliance of seven parties is held together under pressure from the governments of Pakistan and the United States. In Iran, there is an alliance of eight Shi'a parties (Afghanistan is about 20 percent Shi'a), although two of the most important Shi'a organizations in the resistance are not members of that alliance. These are the Shura (council) of Sayyed Beheshti and the Harakat-e Islami (Islamic Movement) of Ayatollah Mohseni. Affiliation with parties can also be pragmatic, however, since the parties function as transmitters of arms, refugee relief, and other forms of patronage.

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a peace agreement would require an Afghan government that could carry at least some of the resistance with it.[5]

As the negotiations advanced, Afghans too began to jockey for power. At first, the only positive attempt to begin building a new, legitimate government was made by the exiled former king of Afghanistan, Zaher Shah, who has lived in Rome since 1973. In mid-1983, when it seemed that Soviet leader Yuri Andropov might successfully negotiate a Soviet pullout, Zaher Shah issued a public declaration calling on Afghans to unite to form a body that could represent them.[6] Together with him, some former ministers and diplomats of the old royal government of Afghanistan, tribal leaders, and some supporters of the moderate resistance parties developed plans to hold a *Loya Jirga*. In response, however, radical fundamentalists in the resistance denounced these efforts as an attempt to restore the "corrupt monarchy." The Pakistani and Saudi Arabian governments were also hostile to the nationalist orientation of the former king and his associates; the negotiations were stalemated, and the plan for a *Loya Jirga* was shelved.

The next proposal came from Moscow. In a major speech on Soviet Asian policy delivered on July 28, 1986, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called for the formation in the near future of an Afghan government "with the participation in it of those political forces which found themselves outside the country" — a reference to exiled resistance leaders, refugees, and the former king. On December 30, 1986, after returning from a trip to Moscow where he was accompanied by the entire Kabul leadership, Najibullah announced details of a proposal for "national reconciliation."[7] Essentially, the Kremlin gave the Afghan Communists a year to build themselves a stable base of power with the help of Soviet troops. In early 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops would begin. As Gorbachev reportedly told Najibullah during the latter's visit to Moscow, in July 1987, "I hope you are ready in twelve months because we will be leaving whether you are or not."[8] During that same visit to Moscow Najibullah stated at a press conference that he would be willing to resign if it were in the interests of Afghanistan.[9]

In theory, the national reconciliation program envisaged a coalition government composed of all political elements, including the exiled resistance parties. For the first time, the Afghan Communists recognized the legitimacy of other organized political currents and offered them representation. The regime approved a law for the registration of multiple political parties. In November 1987, a meet-

[5] Selig S. Harrison, "Inside the Afghan Talks," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1988, pp. 42-49.
[6] *Le Monde*, June 22, 1983.
[7] *National Reconciliation: Documents* (Kabul: State Printing House, January 3, 1987).
[8] *The Washington Post*, April 17, 1988.
[9] TASS, Moscow, July 21, 1987.

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ing the regime called a *Loya Jirga* adopted a new constitution that renamed the government the Republic of Afghanistan. Statements by *'ulama* legitimizing the government were prominently featured. Najibullah publicly appealed to major resistance commanders (some of whom his government had previously sentenced to death in absentia) to join the government. The Communists hoped to attract former royalist forces, tribal forces, and major resistance commanders by exploiting their war-weariness and offering them attractive positions. They hoped to legitimate their government by manipulating traditional symbols such as the *Loya Jirga* while maintaining an effective monopoly of power.

The effort was doomed, as the resistance responded unanimously in the negative. It contested the legitimacy of the *Loya Jirga*, claiming it was unrepresentative, and denied that the *'ulama* who supported it were authoritative or, in some cases, actually *'ulama*. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had not agreed to withdraw, and driving out the Soviets and their Kabul agents was one of the few goals the entire resistance agreed upon.

Nevertheless, the PDPA tried to implement the new constitution. It organized electoral procedures in some areas it controlled, and on June 18, 1988, President Najibullah announced the formation of a new government. Most of its members were said not to be members of the PDPA, though they did not come from the opposition movements either. Prime Minister Hasan Sharq, for example, although not a party member, had been closely linked to Najibullah's Parcham faction and had served the regime as ambassador to India, one of its top diplomatic posts.[10]

As Kabul, under strong pressure from the Soviets, proclaimed the policy of "national reconciliation," negotiators confronted the question of how, if at all, to link the formation of a broader government to the Geneva accords. From the announcement of the national reconciliation program in December 1986 until October 1987, the Soviets said they would present a definitive, short timetable for troop withdrawal only after a "government of national reconciliation" capable of maintaining stability had been established in Kabul. The U.S.-Pakistani position turned this around, calling for a short timetable and a "date certain" for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, after which could come national reconciliation.

The Cordovez Proposal

Faced with this impasse, Diego Cordovez made his first attempt at a "second track," outlining a way to bring the resistance into talks and begin movement toward national reconciliation. In July 1987,

[10] Information Division, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations, Special News Bulletin, June 20, 1988.

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Cordovez drafted a proposal for a U.N.-sponsored meeting of representatives of all Afghan parties. The meeting was to include the seven major Sunni parties who belonged to the resistance in Peshawar, Pakistan; resistance commanders; refugee and tribal leaders; the former king and his supporters; and the PDPA. The meeting, taking the form of a national *jirga*, was to choose an interim government in which "no party would be assured a predominant role."[11]

Cordovez recognized that a genuinely broad-based Afghan government would deny a major role to the PDPA — which would at most come away with an unknown party member being designated minister of sports. Since Cordovez realized that the resistance would not recognize the Kabul regime as the government of its country, the PDPA was to participate as one Afghan party among many, and there was no formal participation by the regime. In effect, the PDPA, under Soviet pressure, was to assist in the process of negotiating its own demise in order to provide the Soviets with a face-saving out. Such participation seemed to meet the minimal demand of the Soviets, and it seemed necessary for any negotiated change of government.

But Cordovez's insistence on the participation of the PDPA aroused suspicions that he aimed at perpetuating that party's power. It also violated the widespread patriotic feeling that the PDPA was guilty of treason. And the whole proposal, based on the nationalist idea of an "all-Afghan" meeting or national *jirga*, ran counter to the beliefs of the fundamentalist parties, which denied any political role to "anti-Islamic parties."

Nor did the Soviets formally assent to Cordovez's proposal, though they did encourage him to use it as a basis for discussion. The United States and Pakistan did not oppose the proposal, but saw it as premature — first came a firm commitment to a quick Soviet pullout, then discussion of the Afghan successor government. According to Selig Harrison, the Washington and Islamabad governments worried that by making agreement among the Afghans a condition for Soviet withdrawal, Moscow might shift the onus for its continued presence in Afghanistan onto the *mujahidin*.[12]

Cordovez nevertheless circulated his proposal. Blocked by the Pakistanis from getting direct access to the Afghan leaders in Peshawar, he brought the proposal to their attention through intermediaries and through informal talks with some members of the delegation of the resistance parties that attended the U.N. General Assembly session in the fall of 1987. Responses ranged from negative to noncommittal. The participation of the PDPA in the meeting (though not necessarily in the subsequent government) was the major

[11] Harrison, "Inside the Afghan Talks," p. 54.
[12] Ibid.

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problem. In addition, though, even moderate forces open to some form of compromise saw no reason to jeopardize the tenuous unity of the resistance before the Soviets had even committed themselves to withdrawing from Afghanistan.

The Kremlin Retreats

After these consultations, Cordovez met in his U.N. office with a high-level Soviet official, to whom he explained that there was no possibility of progress toward a coalition government without a firm Soviet commitment to withdraw. Cordovez soon received word that Moscow had decided to propose a short timetable for withdrawal, making no conditions about progress on the second track. On October 30, 1987, Soviet deputy foreign minister Yuli Vorontsov confirmed this decision to U.S. deputy secretary of state Michael Armacost in Geneva. In a dramatic speech on February 8, 1988, Gorbachev himself proposed a ten-month timetable and explicitly stated that there was no link between the withdrawal and national reconciliation. The impasse was broken.

Gorbachev's speech met Washington's demand for a short timetable and a "date certain" for withdrawal, and it stole a march on his reluctant clients in Kabul; but it was also aimed at countering a new position taken by Pakistan, or at least by President Zia ul-Haq. When he realized that the Soviets were about to meet the Americans' demands for a timetable, Zia seemingly reversed his position and stated that he did not want to sign the agreement without the formation of an interim government.[13] Under strong Pakistani pressure, and despite continuing sharp differences over the form of a future government of Afghanistan, the alliance of Peshawar-based resistance groups announced on February 25 that it had agreed on a formula for an interim government. But it was not until June 19 that the alliance could agree on even a partial cabinet.

The alliance's proposed government consists almost solely of officials of the Peshawar parties and is dominated by radical fundamentalists. It contains no resistance commanders from inside Afghanistan, no representative of the Shi'a resistance parties, and no important independent intellectuals or technocrats. Predictably, the proposal has met with a cold reception from the Afghan refugees and resistance commanders.[14]

[13] The civilian government of Pakistan, however, led by Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, preferred to go ahead and get the Soviets to sign off on their commitment to withdraw without waiting for Afghans to reach agreement about their future. So did the United States. The government of Pakistan eventually dropped Zia's demand for an interim government. Junejo's effectively cutting Zia out of the decision to sign the accords contributed to Zia's decision to dismiss his government on May 29 and support continued military aid to the *mujahidin* after May 15.

[14] "Un gouvernement introuvable," *Défis Afghans*, February-June 1988, pp. 14-15.

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Excluding so many, this government was based on the notion held by, for instance, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the radical fundamentalist Hezb-e Islami (Islamic party), that the alliance of the seven Peshawar parties by itself constitutes a source of Islamic legitimacy.[15] To further legitimate this so-called interim government, he and some other fundamentalists in the resistance, supported by the Pakistan military, intended that the *mujahidin* capture Qandahar, Jalalabad, or another major provincial center during the first phase of Soviet troop withdrawal, and establish a base for the government on Afghan territory. At that point, he hoped, their regime would gain international recognition from Muslim countries and the West, thus qualifying it for international assistance. To determine the ultimate distribution of positions among the parties, elections would be held in the refugee camps and the *mujahidin*-controlled areas of Afghanistan. As the resistance leader closest to the Pakistani authorities, Gulbuddin would obviously have benefited from such elections, since a disproportionate amount of the balloting would have taken place within Pakistan. Thus the political officer of the fundamentalist Jamiat-e Islami, whose Persian-speaking base is poorly represented in the predominantly Pashtun refugee camps, argued against holding elections in this manner.[16]

This elaborate scenario came to naught in the short run, for Gulbuddin and his supporters had not made the military and political preparations needed to take and hold cities. The Kabul regime managed to retain control of these cities through the pullout of the first half of the Soviet contingent. By November, however, with the consolidation of resistance control over several smaller provincial capitals and increased pressure on Qandahar and Kabul, the resistance leaders in Peshawar announced a plan to hold elections to a 400-member *shura* (council) by the end of the Soviet pullout.

After the signing of the Geneva agreement, the four state parties to the accords granted Cordovez a mandate to assist Afghans in the formation of a broad-based government, and he went public with his effort. In a widely noted article in *The Washington Post* on May 8, he predicted that, after the evacuation of most of Afghanistan by the Soviets, which would occur with the departure of the first half of their troops, the Afghan people would "face, once again in their history, a moment of truth."[17] He held that the Afghans would confound those who thought they were capable only of fighting. They

[15] See Bernard Delpeuch, "Questions à domicile: Entretien avec Golbudin Hekmatyar," *Défis Afghans*, February-June 1988, pp. 16-21.

[16] See Mohammad Es'haq, "Prospects and problems of Mujahideen elections," *AFGHA-News*, July 15, 1988, pp. 6-7.

[17] Diego Cordovez, "The Afghans Can Work This Out," *The Washington Post*, May 8, 1988.

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would find a way to resolve their differences through such traditions as the *jirga*.

A National Government of Peace and Reconstruction?

In pursuit of that goal, Cordovez continued to consult with Afghans to find some way both to include the PDPA and yet, in effect, to remove it from power. Abdul Haq, the most important resistance commander around Kabul and an affiliate of the faction of Hezb-e Islami led by Yunus Khales, accepted an invitation to come to U.N. headquarters in New York on June 21. He engaged in several days of intense discussions with key aides of Cordovez.[18] Out of these and other meetings developed a proposal for the formation of a "National Government of Peace and Reconstruction." Cordovez took this with him during a ten-day visit to Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan starting June 30.

Cordovez argued that it was necessary to try a new approach, for neither Kabul's plan for "national reconciliation" nor the alliance's "interim government" had gathered significant support. He suggested two stages: a "cooling off" period and a *Loya Jirga*. In the first, "leaders of all existing political parties would agree to postpone their active struggle as a patriotic sacrifice." During that period, Cordovez suggested:

> One possible course of action would be for a National Government of Peace and Reconstruction, consisting of Afghans of recognized independence and impartiality, to take office in Kabul on 1 September 1988 and for a *de facto* ceasefire in place between contending Afghans to become effective on that same date.[19]

Cordovez did not emphasize the obvious: he was suggesting the PDPA quit the government in the interests of peace.

The new government would then prepare for the convening of a *Loya Jirga* under rules acceptable to all parties. It would meet not later than March 1, 1989 (two weeks after the end of the Soviet troop withdrawal) to draw up the charter for the new government of Afghanistan.

This plan tried a new tack. It separated the departure of the PDPA from the establishment of a permanent new government. Instead of seeking a way for the PDPA and the resistance to serve in the same government, Cordovez suggested an interim government that would exclude both. Members of this Government of Peace and Reconstruction would most likely be intellectuals and former ministers and diplomats, men who could be considered reasonably impartial.

[18] *The New York Times*, June 22, 1988; S. J. Masty (a pro-resistance journalist close to Abdul Haq), "The U.N. May Win One in Afghanistan," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 20, 1988.

[19] "Notes used by Under Secretary-General Diego Cordovez, Representative of the Secretary-General, on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan during a Press Conference held in Islamabad on Saturday 9 July 1988," mimeograph, p. 3.

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The second step in Cordovez's plan, convening a *Loya Jirga,* pointed to the need for a formula acceptable to both sides. The regime had tried to use this symbol, but had failed. It was also popular among the moderate and traditionalist parties, as well as among resistance commanders and refugees. Abdul Haq, for instance, had suggested holding a *Loya Jirga* at the United Nations.[20] The *Loya Jirga* could provide a link to the past and it would be understood by the masses. It could also resolve the question of the participation of the PDPA, for individual members of the PDPA could participate as members of their tribes or ethnic groups.[21]

On October 21, frustrated that the Afghan political situation remained deadlocked, Cordovez revealed that he had called on Zaher Shah to take a more active role in encouraging a domestic settlement. He also named three prominent former officials as examples of those who might promote such a settlement: Abdul Samad Hamid, a former deputy prime minister living in West Germany; Abdul Satar Sirat, a former minister of justice living in Saudi Arabia; and Abdul Wakil, a former minister of agriculture working for U.S. AID in Pakistan.[22]

Second Thoughts in Moscow

Is Cordovez's mission a naive effort to find a compromise solution to a battle that can only be decided by force? American officials who denigrate it in press leaks seem to think so, and so did the late President Zia. Certainly, it has flaws and omissions, and a decade of war makes it easy to argue that more war is the only answer. Still, significant sectors of Afghan opinion, including traditionalist resistance parties and important commanders from at least one moderate fundamentalist party, support the initiative (or a close variant thereof). Furthermore, contrary to assumptions that were widespread only a year ago, half of the Soviet Union's troops have departed from Afghanistan. Perhaps this makes it permissible to indulge in some optimism.

Looked at closely, the proposal may seem naive because it calls on Najibullah simply to step down; obviously, he will not do so voluntarily. This proposal can test, however, whether the Soviets will accept or even encourage the formation of a non-communist government in Afghanistan. Such a Soviet policy is necessary for any genuine resolution to the conflict, but it would contradict decades of experience with Soviet treatment of communist-controlled regimes on the USSR's borders. Some critics of the accords argue that Soviet determination to maintain its client party in power in Kabul has not

[20] "United Nations Special Envoy's Cease-fire Proposal," *Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin*, July 1988, p. 4.
[21] S. J. Masty, "The U.N. May Win One in Afghanistan."
[22] *The New York Times*, October 22, 1988.

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wavered, and that the accords, by depriving the resistance of external aid, will enable Moscow to accomplish this goal without having to commit its troops.[23]

At least some Soviet analysts, however, do not share such an optimistic assessment of the Kabul regime's capabilities. For instance, Soviet general Kim Tsagolov, who had extensive experience in Afghanistan, has stated that he is not confident the regime can survive after the Soviet withdrawal. He predicts at least a temporary victory by the Islamic movements, and does not urge that Soviet forces should intervene to prevent it. Of course, other military men disagree.[24]

Furthermore, the Soviet party and government have engaged in a critical evaluation of their effort in Afghanistan, which is now seen as a failed product of the policies of the Brezhnev era. A letter circulated by the Central Committee to all party members in May 1988 characterized the sending of Soviet troops to Afghanistan as the result of a series of miscalculations and errors.[25]

Official Soviet analysts have drawn three main lessons from Afghanistan. The first is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to establish a stable socialist or "socialist-oriented" state in a "backward" country by imposing the rule of a militarized Marxist-Leninist party. This conclusion derives from other experiences in the Third World as well.

Second, the failure of overwhelming force to subdue such a seemingly weak, disorganized opposition has provided a sober lesson in the limits of military power. In an authoritative article in the Communist party's theoretical journal, *Kommunist*, *Izvestia* commentator Aleksandr Bovin has compared the Soviet experience in Afghanistan to that of the United States in Vietnam and Iran, all situations where, he writes, "power becomes powerless."[26]

Finally, Soviet commentators assert that foreign-policy decision making must be opened up to wider participation. Contrary to the claims made since 1980 that the decision to send Soviet troops to

[23] Rosanne Klass, "Afghanistan: The Accords," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1988, pp. 922-45. Some observers have argued that the November 5 Soviet announcement of a "pause" in their withdrawal confirms that the Soviets have no intention of abandoning the Kabul regime. Moscow's statement, however, carefully refrained from casting doubt on its commitment to the February 15 withdrawal deadline.

[24] See the interview with Tsagolov (by Artem Borovik) in *Ogonyok*, July 23-30, 1988, pp. 25-27. For translation of a condensed text, see "Will Kabul Fall After Soviet Withdrawal?" *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, September 14, 1988, pp. 1-5. The same issue of *Current Digest* includes replies by military men who disagree with Tsagolov. The possibility of the fall of the Kabul regime was a constant theme in discussions about Afghanistan that this author had in Moscow in June 1988.

[25] *The New York Times*, June 17, 1988.

[26] Aleksandr Bovin, "Novoye Myshleniye — Novaya Politika," *Kommunist*, June 1988, p. 124. A Soviet diplomat in Paris also compared Gorbachev's decision to de Gaulle's decision to withdraw from Algeria. (Jean-Paul Gay, "Entrevue à l'Ambassade Soviétique," in "Pour la Paix en Afghanistan Il Faut Négocier avec la Résistance," supplement to *Défis Afghans*, February-June 1988, p. iv.)

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Afghanistan was made "with unanimity" after broad discussion, the party now claims that the decision was made in haste and secrecy by only five people. This group supposedly did not consult academic institutes, the Central Committee staff, or the embassy in Kabul before making the decision.[27]

The implications of these lessons, which are repeated and elaborated in the Soviet press, are clear. First, the problems of the PDPA are not due solely or even primarily to "external interference," but to fundamental social causes found in the nature of the Afghan social formation and the PDPA itself. Second, its problems cannot be overcome through the application of military power.

Ruling out direct military intervention does not mean that the Soviets consider they have no vital interests in Afghanistan. Rather, they have defined them less ideologically and concluded that they can better protect these interests in other ways.

Ruling out direct military intervention does not mean that the Soviets consider they have no vital interests in Afghanistan. Rather, they have defined them less ideologically and concluded that they can better protect these interests in other ways. The many policies aimed at making the Afghan state and economy structurally dependent on the Soviet Union may well be attempts to protect these interests *regardless* of the political complexion of a future government.

The Cordovez Proposal's Virtues

Indeed, despite continued official support for the government of Najibullah and his policy of "national reconciliation," a commentary in *Izvestia* by Aleksandr Bovin has spoken positively of Cordovez's proposal, Zaher Shah, and the *Loya Jirga*.[28] Furthermore, at the request of the Soviet Union, direct talks between Soviet diplomats and the resistance are tentatively scheduled to begin in Islamabad in late November. The initial subject of discussion is limited to Soviet prisoners of war, but the two sides could also discuss political issues, as the resistance prefers.

[27] Interview with former official of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU who was working on Afghanistan at the time. On the earlier claims see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 915-37, and Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983), pp. 163-68. This author was told that the decision was made by Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov, and "two people who are still alive," presumably Gromyko and Shcherbitsky.

[28] *Izvestia*, July 14, 1988.

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Cordovez's plan might protect the Soviets from the embarrassment of seeing their clients routed, or even massacred. It also reduces the chances of the radical fundamentalists directly assuming power. Perhaps to keep their options open, without endorsing Cordovez's plan, the Soviets have encouraged his efforts and have facilitated his contacts with Kabul.

If the Soviets refuse to have Najibullah step down, the *mujahidin* and their supporters can still gain politically by the U.N. proposal. Meanwhile, pursuing negotiations does not mean abandoning other aspects of the struggle. Abdul Haq has shown this by intensifying the military pressure on Kabul even as Najibullah has argued for exploring possibilities of a domestic political settlement.

When Cordovez presented the plan to Najibullah in Kabul on July 7, the official reception was muted. In private, the PDPA leader reportedly commended him and told him to proceed. Kabul's initial public reaction was a vaguely worded statement from the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry:

> Propaganda of some foreign mass media on formation of a coalition government on a broader basis in Afghanistan . . . are in contradiction with the stand of the Republic of Afghanistan in this regard . . . . We are of the conviction that the views and schemes which are not feasible cannot help this process [of negotiation and dialogue] and cannot envisage the high interests of the people of Afghanistan.[29]

This is a mild statement by a sitting government, a member of the United Nations, which has been asked by the U.N. under-secretary-general to resign. Further, as *mujahidin* military pressure became more intense, he issued more urgent appeals for "well-intentioned assistance in achieving a domestic settlement."[30]

Cordovez's plan received a mixed reception from the Afghan resistance. The eight Shi'a parties based in Iran offered Cordovez their support (and harshly criticized the Peshawar interim government). On the other hand, the four fundamentalist parties in the Peshawar alliance out-voted the three moderate parties, and so the alliance there did not meet with Cordovez. But then the leaders of two moderate parties, Sayyed Ahmad Gailani (alliance spokesman at that moment) and Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, issued positive statements on their own. Abdul Haq asked to speak to Cordovez's delegation; he did not do so only because of scheduling problems. Jalaluddin Haqqani, the key commander of the border tribes of Paktia province, sent a delegation of support to Cordovez's Islamabad hotel suite. A number of tribal leaders from the refugee camps also met with him, and others attempted to.

[29] Information Division, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations, "Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry on a Coalition Government," Press Release, July 14, 1988.

[30] *The New York Times*, August 15, 1988.

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Opinions within the resistance, however, are not simply divided between pro and con. Some commanders, as well as other persons, have argued that the proposal is a step in the right direction but needs to be modified or refined. Abdul Haq, as noted above, has suggested that the United Nations convene a *Loya Jirga* outside Afghanistan, perhaps at the General Assembly when it is in session. Jamiat-e Islami, in its rather mild rejection of the plan (which it said "seems impractical") noted that even during a cease-fire, the secret police and militias controlled by the PDPA might continue to work to the disadvantage of the resistance.[31]

Foreign Sponsors

Splits in the resistance make the actions of its foreign supporters particularly important, for the way they give aid largely determines the military strengths of the resistance parties.

Pakistani military intelligence has distributed American and other aid to the *mujahidin* in accord with the belief, challenged by many other observers, that the Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was the most effective military organization against the Soviets. This party also had an association with Pakistani intelligence going back to 1974, (when Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto first authorized aid to the Afghan fundamentalists), because it was considered to be most amenable to Pakistani interests. It also received personal support from President Zia. To the extent that this pattern continues, it strengthens those who oppose the U.N. plan or other plans involving a *Loya Jirga*.

Furthermore, the United States and Pakistan insist that the parties can receive aid only if they remain in the alliance and conform to its decisions. Hence the moderate leaders who favor Cordovez's initiative cannot act on their views without losing their foreign aid.

To be sure, if the ideology of fundamentalist Islam has actually gained widespread support among the Afghan people in the course of the war, then the conflict cannot be moderated through traditional means. But if the strength of the fundamentalist parties reflects more their role as favored conduits for arms aid from Pakistan, then they are likely to lose their influence as the peace process continues. For this very reason, they may try to disrupt it.

The Pakistani government also has prevented more active participation by another force, the ex-king of Afghanistan, Zaher Shah, whom many refugees favor over the party leaders. A survey found

[31] "Cordovez's proposal seems impractical," *AFGHANews*, August 1, 1988, p. 4. Jamiat also argued, however, that the *Loya Jirga* was not an institution capable of dealing with conflicts such as that between "Islam and atheism." Its leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, supports a "reformed *Loya Jirga*," but only after the defeat of the Kabul regime. See "Prof. Rabbani promises equal opportunities for women," *AFGHANews*, September 15, 1988, p. 6.

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that 72 percent of male refugee respondents favored him as a future leader,[32] and the ex-king, as Cordovez recently revealed, would be central to the formation of the government of Peace and Reconstruction. Since early 1987, however, Zaher Shah has been unsuccessfully requesting permission either to visit Pakistan or to send his representative there. Pakistan has consistently refused to grant a visa to him. At one point, Pakistan did agree to allow his representative to come, but imposed such restrictive conditions (virtual confinement to a hotel in Islamabad) that he refused to take up the offer.

This is not to say that either Washington or Islamabad unalterably opposes the Cordovez plan. Just as the Soviets are still trying to preserve as much as possible of the PDPA's power, Washington and Islamabad still hope to accomplish their preferred goals: a clear military defeat of the Soviet Union's clients (the main American interest) and the victory of those fundamentalist groups backed by Pakistan (the main Pakistani interest). If, after a certain time has passed, it seems that the *mujahidin* are not going to be able to win a quick military victory, Pakistan and the United States might shift their policy. The outcome of the November national elections in both countries might also lead to a policy change, especially in Pakistan.

Foreign powers alone, of course, cannot make a success of the U.N. proposal for a Government of Peace and Reconstruction — or of any other proposal. Nor can they determine the form of government for Afghanistan, as the Soviets tried and failed to do. As Naim Majrooh recently warned:

> Those friends of the Afghans who do not have a clear understanding of Afghan society, its customs and traditions, but who prefer to pursue their own interests, are taking the risk of damaging hitherto friendly relations. By attempting to influence the Afghans by offering selective assistance at a time of need they may prolong the war.[33]

What the friends of the Afghans can and should do is help create some of the conditions for the Afghans to make their own choices. They can do so by publicly encouraging Afghans to respond to the U.N. proposal for a Government of Peace and Reconstruction, and by supporting the search for a domestic settlement.

[32] "What Do the Afghan Refugees Think? An Opinion Survey in the Camps," *Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin*, July 1987, pp. 2-8. Although the methodology of the survey is flawed, the result is so overwhelming that the poll has some validity.

[33] "The Formation of a Broad-Based Government Should be the Aim of Afghan Resistance," *Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin*, August 1988, p. 4.

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WHAT'S STILL WRONG WITH THE WORLD BANK?

by Doug Bandow

A trillion dollar international debt overhangs the Third World, threatening the economic future of the world's poor and the fiscal solvency of the West's banks. A dozen developing countries are behind on their interest payments to private creditors, and the largest debtor among them, Brazil, stopped servicing its $68 billion commercial debt in 1987. Largely in response to Brazil's moratorium, Citibank added $3 billion to its loan-loss reserves, a move followed by many other major financial institutions. Although Brazil eventually resumed paying interest — after negotiating $5.2 billion in new credit — American banks have begun to write down their Latin loans.

This debt crisis — involving scores of sovereign states, hundreds of private financial institutions, and several multilateral organizations — cannot be solved by any one party. Almost all participants, therefore, look to the World Bank for guidance. And indeed that institution's president, Barber Conable, declared in September 1986: "the Bank's role is to lead."

Unfortunately, Conable's record of leadership inspires no confidence. He devoted months to a Bank reorganization plan, irrelevant to the problems of international development, but has so far done nothing to transform a lending program that subsidizes failed political-economic systems. His only obvious priority has been to get more money: $74.8 billion to be exact, a near-doubling of the Bank's lending capability. Yet none of the Bank's supporters, including the Reagan administration, has explained how piling bad, new loans on top of bad, old ones will end the debt crisis. Indeed, to judge by the last twenty years, a richer Bank will contribute to the problem, not to the solution.

The McNamara Years

The World Bank — originally the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), but later supplemented by a soft-money affiliate, the International Development Association (IDA) — was established in 1944 to help reorder the world's postwar economic

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system. At that time, according to economists Edward Mason and Robert Asher, the Bank "thought of itself as a temporary institution bridging the gap until international capital markets would revive."[1] It was a "lender of last resort," intended to supplement private lending.

In those early years, the Bank focused on underwriting the foreign-exchange costs of large infrastructure projects thought necessary to promote private investment. Although the bulk of Bank funds was committed to foreign governments, the institution refused to back industrial enterprises that were not intended for transfer into private hands. Moreover, the Bank did not reflexively hike its lending from year to year. Its 1948-49 annual report observed that "money alone is no solution .... Perhaps the most striking single lesson which the Bank has learned in the course of its operations is how limited is the capacity of the underdeveloped countries to absorb capital quickly for productive purposes."

Twenty years ago, however, Robert McNamara transformed this institution into an international extension of America's Great Society. During his tenure as Bank president (1968-1981), total Bank lending jumped from $954 million to $12.3 billion, nearly a thirteenfold increase. Admitted one official near the end of the McNamara years: "We're like a Soviet factory. The push is to maximize lending. The ... pressures to lend are enormous and a lot of people spend sleepless nights wondering how they can unload projects. Our ability to influence projects in a way that makes sense is completely undermined."[2]

Not that McNamara was particularly interested in making projects financially sound. *Forbes* magazine reported that he "seemed almost obsessed with redistribution of income" and shifted Bank priorities from investment projects to social welfare programs.[3] Loans for social services — education, population control, "urbanization," and so forth — jumped from 3.6 percent of pre-1968 lending to 14.5 percent of 1981 loans. Counting agricultural support, which increasingly turned from goals like irrigation to the more nebulous "rural development," the percentage of Bank resources going to the global "Great Society" more than tripled under McNamara, increasing from 13.3 percent to 45.1 percent.

During these years, the Bank barely acknowledged the existence, much less the critical importance, of private enterprise. For instance, in 1975 the Bank announced the overriding "need, at the national level of government, for a strong commitment to rural development policies," but expressly refused to try "to dictate the design of such

[1] Edward Mason and Robert Asher, *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 458.

[2] Quoted in Ann Hughey, "Is the World Bank Biting Off More Than It Can Chew?" *Forbes*, May 26, 1980, p. 127.

[3] Ibid., p. 123.

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programs." Thus, the Bank simply subsidized the various statist schemes of borrowers, such as the monopoly marketing boards that systematically create and aggravate food shortages throughout Africa by seizing farmers' crops at below market prices.

Even more tragically, the Bank supported all manner of social engineering schemes. According to the Bank's 1975 annual report, it provided $10 million to the Tanzanian government to assist "the half million inhabitants of Kigoma Region to resettle in *ujamaa* villages" — Julius Nyerere's forced collectivization program that brutalized peasants and destroyed the country's agricultural economy. Incredibly, the Bank increased its overall lending to Tanzania in the 1970s even after internal studies criticized that government's draconian policies.

In general, throughout the 1970s, the Bank committed roughly 80 percent of its funds to government-owned businesses, often called parastatals. Although its 1980 annual report acknowledged economic setbacks in developing nations as a result of their state-run economic strategies, the Bank still did not advocate privatization. Instead, it concluded that "it will be necessary to rationalize the policy framework of parastatal entities and revamp institutional relationships so that public enterprises might achieve the objectives for which they were created."

The Reagan Years

With the appointment of A. W. Clausen to the Bank's presidency in 1981, the institution's rhetoric changed dramatically. In a 1985 speech, Clausen observed that: "In their dialogue with governments, aid organizations, both multilateral and bilateral, have been less concerned with promoting private sector growth than with assisting the development of an effective public sector. That emphasis, in my view, is misplaced; aid agencies ought to be taking, and must take, a more balanced approach."[4] He and his successor, former U.S. congressman Barber Conable (who became president in 1986), even spoke of their willingness to tackle what had been the great unmentionable — borrowers' domestic economic policies, such as price controls, regulation, distorted financial policies, and protectionist labor rules.[5]

When judged by actions, however, Bank priorities appear to be virtually unchanged. First, lending continued to increase sharply, rising $6.9 billion between 1981 and 1988, 56.4 percent over seven years. When its loans dipped in 1985, for the first time since 1968, the Bank reacted as though profoundly embarrassed, explaining in

[4] A.W. Clausen, "Promoting the Private Sector in Developing Countries: A Multilateral Approach," address to the Institute of Directors, February 26, 1985, p.3.

[5] See, for example, The World Bank, *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 9.

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its annual report how economic conditions, program difficulties, and borrower problems prevented it from lending more. Second, this cornucopia of funding continued to be misspent. An internal Operations Evaluation Department audit in 1987 conceded that "the Bank's drive to reach lending targets" had resulted in "poor project performance."[6]

The problem, however, goes deeper than bad projects. Many countries simply should not borrow as much as they do, nor undertake as many projects as they do. The Bank's 1984 World Development Report repeatedly scored investment policies in developing countries. It singled out Brazil, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Peru, and Turkey for having "overambitious or inefficient investment programs." Yet that same year Brazil borrowed $1.6 billion for ten different projects, while the other four countries together collected an equivalent amount. If these states truly had "overambitious or inefficient investment programs," why did the Bank pump one-fifth of its resources into them?

The explanation for such perverse lending lies in flawed Bank policies, which have consistently caused the Bank to subsidize deleterious borrower programs and debase the standards for international commercial lending. Four such flawed policies stand out: (1) a substitution of welfare for development; (2) a preference for state enterprises over private companies; (3) a focus on projects in disregard of borrowers' economic policies; and (4) an uncritical acceptance of statist development theories.

Welfare replaces development. A project may help meet the "human needs" of a recipient state without promoting economic growth. But promoting economic growth is the basic role of a development institution, especially one expecting repayment. Unfortunately, McNamara's successors have used the Bank as he did, to fund the global welfare state. In October 1985, Clausen boasted that "we have greatly strengthened the programs in population, nutrition, and health lending." For example, the Bank lent Bolivia $37 million during 1987-88 for its Emergency Social Fund, essentially a dole. Overall, the percentage of loans going to such projects has fallen in recent years because of an increase in other forms of lending (discussed below). But social programs, including agricultural projects, still account for nearly 40 percent of Bank credit.

For humanitarian reasons the Bank even supported, albeit indirectly, the Ethiopian resettlement program that in the estimation of the French medical organization Médecins sans Frontières has killed as many as 100,000 people. In 1985 the Ethiopian government borrowed $30 million for "relief and rehabilitation services to alle-

[6] The World Bank, *The Twelfth Annual Review of Project Performance Results* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1987), p. 47.

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viate the impact of drought and famine on human welfare," according to that year's Bank report. The money was to finance, among other things, the purchase of trucks. As it turned out, these were the primary means used by the government to forcibly move people from the rebel-held north to the government-controlled south. The Bank issued the loan only after the Mengistu regime promised not to use the funds for resettlement purposes, but the president of the Ethiopian Refugees Education and Relief Foundation, Yonas Deressa, says that "they just take the money and laugh."[7] One Bank employee has called this "genocide with a human face."[8]

For humanitarian reasons the Bank even supported, albeit indirectly, the Ethiopian resettlement program that in the estimation of the French medical organization Médecins sans Frontières has killed as many as 100,000 people .... One Bank employee has called this "genocide with a human face."

In its 1985 *World Development Report*, the Bank attempted to justify its welfare projects on the grounds that they are very long-term development investments. Education and agricultural research yield high returns, the Bank argues, but "these yields may be realized over a period of thirty to forty years, with no returns at all in the early years. This makes them unsuitable for private markets."

Such arguments for state spending on education or research — in excess of what a growing free economy would naturally provide — have been around for decades, even centuries. And, no doubt, financial infusions from abroad can expand local services. But problems arise from such pseudo-investments. Specifically, they lock debtor governments into expensive programs that can be maintained only by additional loans and more debt. In fact, internal World Bank reports have consistently raised "sustainability" as a problem for such projects. For instance, in a 1987 Bank study, the Operations Evaluation Department reported that a lack of local funds had delayed implementation of education projects in Brazil, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Sudan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zaire. More generally, the study concluded that "of the 31 poverty-related projects in 1985, 13 (42%) were failures. This compares to 22 failures

[7] Quoted in Malcolm Gladwell, "Harnessing the World Bank to the West," *Insight*, February 9, 1987, p. 8.

[8] Quoted in James Bovard, "The World Bank vs. The World's Poor," Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 92, September 28, 1987, p. 6.

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(32%) out of 58 projects for the 1980-84 period . . . . (O)f the 47 area development poverty projects evaluated, 24 have been failures."[9]

Both debtor countries and the Bank, therefore, would be better off if the Bank focused on promoting economic expansion and allowed governments and individuals to increase expenditures on these "soft" projects as the local economy expands, something they will do naturally and in a sustainable fashion.

Public companies preferred. In 1987 the Bank acknowledged that "foreign loans have reinforced the heavy public sector bias of African investments."[10] Yet, the bulk of Bank lending continues to go to public enterprises, subsidizing an ever-growing state presence in the economy, and crowding out potential private investment. In fact, just when developing countries urgently need to divest themselves of state companies and parastatals, the Bank has been pumping money into them, allowing borrowers to put off the political costs of divestiture. Last year the Bank poured $2.2 billion into largely state-controlled foreign industrial projects, a dramatic increase over the previous high of $821.1 million in 1986. Mexico alone borrowed $400 million to restructure its steel industry and another $265 million for the government fertilizer monopoly. Hungary received $250 million to improve its pharmaceutical and phosphate industries. China, Ghana, India, Jordan, and Pakistan also collected Bank loans for public industrial projects.

Public telecommunications companies are often favored recipients for Bank loans. In 1987, for instance, Tanzania borrowed $23 million to remove "bottlenecks and imbalances" in its telephone system, while in 1985 the Ethiopian Telecommunications Authority borrowed $40 million to "improve service quality." But when it comes to bringing in dollars, no field can compare with energy. In 1985 the Bank committed fully one-quarter of its lending funds for oil and gas development. Energy and power loans ran to $3.7 billion in 1987 and $2 billion last year. In exchange for its loans, the Bank frequently demanded administrative changes in what are generally inefficient enterprises, but the Operations Evaluation Department reported last year that "most utilities became ever more reluctant to implement in due time the frequent tariff adjustments generally foreseen in the loan and credit agreements." The Philippines, for example, received seven power loans over two decades, but consistently refused to reform its pricing policies as requested by the Bank.

Development finance companies (DFCs) constitute another major class of recipients. Most are state-owned, owe their existence primarily to "an initial World Bank commitment, and continue to

[9] *Twelfth Annual Review*, p. 29.

[10] Keith Marsden and Therese Belot, "Private Enterprise in Africa," World Bank Discussion Paper No. 17 (1987), p. 5.

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exist largely as favored channels for Bank financing."[11] Yet under the supposedly market-oriented Conable regime, DFCs absorbed $1.7 billion in credit last year and $2.3 billion in 1987. These loans not only increased the power of statist governments, they also wasted money: a 1983 audit revealed that nearly half the DFCs had at least 25 percent of their loans in arrears. In 1986, the Bank calculated that DFCs spent as much as $540,500 to create a single job.

Given such lending policies, examples of which could be multiplied endlessly, it is no wonder that an internal Bank study found Third World states have done little to shed public enterprises, despite their professed intentions.[12]

Projects undermine reform. The third of the Bank's flawed policies is to focus on individual projects regardless of their wider economic context. As a result, the Bank props up economic sectors that are failing because of government policies, subsidizes slow growth, and worsens the debt crisis.

And the Bank knows what it is doing. In 1980, Ghana borrowed $29.5 million to help train farmers, and Tanzania received $77 million for four different agricultural projects. A year later, the Bank reported that the collapse of agricultural production and exports in Ghana and Tanzania was due to heavy taxes on farmers. Nevertheless, the Bank then lent Tanzania $6.8 million "for the rehabilitation of the coconut industry."

The Bank has a curious lending philosophy which it puts into effect around the world: deploring borrowers' overall policies while underwriting projects rendered ineffective by exactly those policies.

A 1987 Operations Evaluation Department study of two decades' worth of rural development programs — accounting for roughly 50 percent of all the Bank's projects — found a failure rate of 37 percent. Average rates of return fell below projections, cost overruns were pervasive, and two-thirds of the projects had problems with basic design as well as staff and management.[13] Yet the reason for this mess is not hard to find: 54 percent of agricultural projects between 1979

[11] David Gordon, "Development Finance Companies, State and Privately Owned," World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 578 (1983), p. 7.

[12] Elliot Berg and Mary Shuley, "Divestiture in Developing Countries," World Bank Discussion Paper No. 11 (1987).

[13] Private observers have also sharply criticized specific Bank projects in this field. See, for example, Sheldon Annis, "The Shifting Grounds of Poverty Lending at the World Bank," in Richard Feinberg, et al., *Between Two Worlds: The World Bank's Next Decade* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1986), p. 91; Robert Repetto, "Skimming the Water: Rent-Seeking and the Performance of Public Irrigations Systems," World Resources Institute Research Report No. 4, December 1986.

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and 1984 were adversely affected by price controls and similar statist economic interventions.

The Bank has a curious lending philosophy which it puts into effect around the world: deploring borrowers' overall policies while underwriting projects rendered ineffective by exactly those policies. Stanley Please, who once served as a senior adviser to the Bank's senior vice president, complains that "in country after country and year after year, the Bank had continued, during the 1970s and earlier, to have active and, in most cases, rising programs of project lending to agriculture and industry in the very countries in which it was asserting to the governments that their policy frameworks were distorted — not marginally distorted but distorted in major ways."[14]

In many cases, Romania for one, the Bank has consciously decided not to try to change borrower policies, even if they are "substantially different from Bank norms."[15] The Bank's loans to Ethiopia, a country where the government has consciously wrecked the economy, are truly inexplicable. It is hard to think of a state that more urgently needs to reform its policies toward agriculture — forced collectivization, nationalization of crop stockpiles, and so on. Yet the Bank doubled lending after the communist coup in 1974, and has pumped $527 million into Ethiopia's economy since 1984. With that kind of support, the Mengistu regime has little need to abandon its disastrous course.

State planning preferred. Finally, since very shortly after its creation, the Bank has backed statist development strategies. "By the time the World Bank made its first loan outside Europe in 1948," write Bank staffers Baum and Tolbert, "it found many developing countries committed to or already engaged in some form of centralized economic planning."[16] The Bank did little to try to change those policies, and consequently it has proved incapable of fulfilling its professed goal of "developing effective growth-oriented programs" and assisting "its borrowers to undertake reforms."

The most important cause of the Bank's acceptance of Third World statism has been its staff's belief in the "structuralist" theory of development. Stanley Please reflected on his two decades at the Bank in 1983: "as a committed socialist ... I was surprised and shocked by the emphasis which the Bank at the time gave to the public sector in general and to the government in particular. Here was an institution which had the reputation of being ultra free-enterprise and market-oriented, yet had more confidence in the rationality, morality and competence of governments than I ever

[14] Stanley Please, *The Hobbled Giant: Essays on the World Bank* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 25.

[15] *Twelfth Annual Review*, p. 100.

[16] Warren Baum and Stokes Tolbert, *Investing in Development: Lessons of World Bank Experience*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 20.

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had."[17] Naturally, given such a perspective on the staff level, attempts by Bank executives to promote capitalist policies and impose market-oriented conditions on loans have largely failed.

Nor are such efforts likely to improve much in the future. The Bank itself, after all, is a public institution and tends to favor its kind. One senior Reagan administration official complains that "it's hard to expect a government-owned multilateral body not to be primarily responsive to other governments and take the view that government-sponsored, government-owned, government-guaranteed projects are the best thing going. Because there is that bias, you have to fight to develop a private sector."[18]

Is Barber Conable the man to lead such a fight? "Obviously," he has said, "while I have some prejudice in favor of market resolution of difficulties, an institution like the World Bank cannot take a rigid position on such things."[19] This suggests that, despite the harm caused by statist economic intervention in borrowing countries, the Bank will continue to engage in "institution building," which often means strengthening the very agencies that hold back development. The government of Ethiopia, for example, has exacerbated a famine by collectivizing peasant farmers. Yet, in 1987, the Bank lent Ethiopia $39 million for, *inter alia*, augmenting its Ministry of Agriculture! Other beneficiaries of Bank financing that year were Ghana's agricultural bureaucracy, China's Ministry of Chemical Industry, Guinea-Bissau's Ministry of Rural Development and Fisheries, Tunisia's Agency for Energy Conservation, and Zaire's economic planning agencies.

Last year, too, much of the Bank's $4.5 billion in loans for agriculture and rural development went to government ministries and industries. Chad got $18.6 million for livestock production, while other funds flowed to China, Colombia, Hungary, Madagascar, Mexico, Tanzania, and so on. Undoubtedly, some good will come out of some of these projects, but the countries would benefit far more from expansion in private agricultural enterprises, which the government agencies funded by the Bank are more likely to impede than promote.

Many Third World leaders admit that their efforts at centralized economic planning have failed, but these converts to capitalism are often longer on rhetoric than on action. And where sporadic liberalization does occur, as it has in a number of African countries, it takes place in spite of Bank loans that ameliorate the impact of misguided domestic policies.

[17] Stanley Please, "A Candid Look at Yesterday," *The Bank's World*, September 1983, p. 7.

[18] Quoted in William Neikirk, "The World Bank: Can It Overcome Conable's Debacle?" *The International Economy*, October/November 1987, p. 35.

[19] Quoted in Bovard, "The World Bank vs. The World's Poor," p. 21.

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As for applying free market principles to projects in spheres traditionally governmental, the Bank's record is what one might expect. It has played little role in drawing private sector investment toward activities such as providing transportation and electric power. Former Bank economist Gabriel Roth points out that private, unsubsidized buses operate in Calcutta today, and that a private firm was generating electricity in Caracas almost a century ago.[20] Even the Bank, in its 1987 annual development report, recognized the importance of the largely illegal, unregulated private sector in Peru; in the capital city of Lima, for instance, most residents shun the official transportation system for competing private bus lines, many of which are illegal. Nevertheless, Bank loans go to public transit and power companies.

Can Project Loans Bring Policy Reforms?

Unfortunately, even if the Bank itself were genuinely committed to a market-oriented development strategy, it has few tools with which to impress that view on venal autocracies and fractious democracies throughout the Third World. What the Bank has undertaken, therefore, is a much-publicized "policy dialogue." In plain English, it offers advice. It calls its advisory duties "as important as its role as a lender" and, not surprisingly, claims the process has had a "positive influence."

But an internal review found that "the change in the character of the country policy dialogue had been hindered by a variety of factors, and that the link with lending was still not as close as desirable."[21] Perhaps the most fundamental problem is that, given the pressure on Bank managers to lend, much of the Bank-borrower "dialogue" is over how much to increase lending and to which state enterprises.

Moreover, attempts to back words with action often fall victim to the limitation that project loans can have only project-related conditions, and thus cannot change overall economic policies. As the Bank admitted last year, its twelfth annual project review "confirms past experience that formal covenants on individual projects alone have been of limited value in influencing sectoral or economy-wide policies, or even in maintaining agreed policies."

Part of the reason, no doubt, is that the Bank seldom enforces the agreements. Observes a Bank audit: "Where failure to comply with covenants has occurred, the Bank has generally been complai-

[20] For many other examples of how the private sector in the Third World delivers what are traditionally thought to be public services, see Gabriel Roth, *The Private Provision of Public Services in Developing Countries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[21] The World Bank, *World Bank Annual Report 1982*, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1983), p. 37.

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sant. Vagueness of covenant requirements, however, has generally saved both Borrower and the Bank from the embarrassment of deciding what to do."[22]

Although the Bank has increasingly encouraged economic reform through so-called sector and structural adjustment loans (discussed below), still roughly three-fourths of the 1988 loans were project-specific. And that figure is unlikely to come down much in the future, for the Bank says it "remains a development institution that commits the majority of its funds in support of specific investment projects." But as long as credit is extended through project loans, with merely project-specific conditions, the overall impact of the newer, well-publicized policy-based lending will be small. After all, why should countries abandon politically popular policies when the Bank is willing to underwrite them indirectly?

Over the last nine years, for example, Mexico has borrowed from the Bank $7.3 billion — $1.1 billion in 1988 alone — for purposes other than economic adjustment. But as one internal Bank assessment delicately put it, the Mexican government has been "reluctant to accept repeated Bank offers of project and sector help" in terms of "rationalizing public sector investment, subsidies, and the state enterprises."[23]

Finally, in 1987, Mexico accepted a policy-based, $500 million loan to support "the government's long-term objective of gradually opening up the Mexican economy." But the Bank continues to underwrite that country's bloated parastatals, effectively rewarding the government for its counterproductive statist policies. In fact, two of Mexico's three adjustment loans last year went to subsidize the government's inefficient steel and fertilizer enterprises, which have bled the country dry. By reducing the burden these parastatals place on the treasury, the World Bank makes it less likely that the government will pay the political price of selling them off.

Brazil presents an even worse case. Between 1980 and 1988, it received $11.1 billion from the Bank, and last year it arranged $5.2 billion in new commercial financing to pay overdue interest on its debt. Yet in 1986, the Sarney government announced that $6.5 billion from its National Development Fund would be spent on parastatals — this despite the state oil firm's 1987 loss of $170 million. In response to all the Bank's rhetoric about the need to privatize such losers, Brasilia has done little but tell Bank officials that setting policy conditions for loans, conditions such as requiring privatization, would be impolitic. Consequently, of 547 parastatals, the government has liq-

[22] The World Bank, *1985 Annual Review of Project Performance Results* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1986), p. 94.

[23] World Bank internal memorandum from Pieter Bottelier to Distribution, "Mexico — Economic Mission: Back-to-Office Report," October 18, 1985, p. 12.

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uidated just nine and sold seventeen. Meanwhile, the Interministerial Council on Prices still sets prices for many goods and services, and in 1988 the National Assembly approved constitutional amendments limiting interest rates and foreign investment. Observes Richard Feinberg, vice president of the Overseas Development Council: "Brazil has a terrible track record of signing agreements that it doesn't live up to."[24] Nonetheless, it remains one of the Bank's largest customers.

Are Structural Loans the Solution?

By its limited nature, then, project funding undercuts pressure for reform. Would the Bank's pro-market advice have greater impact if loans could avoid this flaw? That is the goal behind sectoral adjustment loans and, even more, structural adjustment loans (SALs), which were created in 1980 specifically for the purpose of promoting policy reform. It is certainly a worthwhile goal, and SALs have become a major weapon for Bank supporters seeking votes in the U.S. Congress for a general capital increase.

But a study by two Bank consultants, Elliot Berg and Alan Batchelder, has concluded that "the theory of reform on which the SAL rests is not clearly spelled out."[25] The practical results of SALs reflect that theoretical inadequacy. A 1986 Operations Evaluation Department review of SALs found that none of the ten major SAL recipients had implemented its reform program on time. Two countries failed almost entirely and four others had serious difficulties in meeting the conditions. The auditors reported that "the impact of the structural adjustment programs on a country's economic performance has generally remained below expectations."[26] Berg and Batchelder were even more negative; the most they could say for SALs was that these loans encouraged Bank staff and borrowing agencies to think about policy reform — meager results for a program that now accounts for nearly one-fourth of Bank lending.

The consultants' report found that SALs had no measurable impact on the gross national product of borrowers, and it is no wonder. SALs suffer from a number of crippling problems: unclear selection criteria, overly complex loan conditions, inadequate monitoring of those conditions, and an unwillingness to cut off countries that fail to perform. As a result, there is little evidence the loans buy much reform.

[24] Quoted in Paul Blustein, "Brazil's High-Stakes Debt Talks: Throwing Good Money After Bad?" *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1988.

[25] Elliot Berg and Alan Batchelder, "Structural Adjustment Lending: A Critical View," Country Programs Department Discussion Paper, No. 1985-21, January 1985, p. 7.

[26] The World Bank, "Structural Adjustment Lending: A First Review of Experience," Report No. 6409, September 24, 1986, p. iv.

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Perhaps the most serious failure of SALs is the almost complete toothlessness of the Bank's policy requirements. Berg and Batchelder conclude that "the SALs seemingly hard and all-encompassing conditionality is largely illusory." States that breach their commitments are not disciplined but instead borrow more funds. The result, writes James Burnham, former U.S. executive director of the Bank, is that policy-based credits have been turned into "unconditional balance-of-payments financing and, in effect, a subsidy to cover up problems caused by a borrower's poor economic policies."[27] In fact, the Operations Evaluation Department has acknowledged that SALs generate "counterpart funds" — money put up by the borrower as part of the loan agreement — which are then used to underwrite public investment programs.

The Bank has shown no interest in reforming the SAL program, and the ever-present pressure to lend ensures that Bank staffers will do their best to ignore even the most dismal performance by a borrower. Berg and Batchelder found that "difficulties of implementation are frequently treated in an extraordinarily cavalier way," and consequently they recommended a shift back toward project lending. The only certain result of SALs (according to an analysis by the Bank) seems to be that they allow the Bank to lend twice as much per staff-hour as project loans. Perhaps that is why most SALs originate with the Bank, not borrowers.

Questionable SAL recipients include Argentina, which in 1986 borrowed $350 million as part of an agricultural sectoral reform program that envisioned replacing a levy on farm exports with a land tax. At the time, this loan was privately described by a Bank spokesman as "among the best examples" of policy conditionality at work — but the land tax proposal was killed, and the loan's policy conditions were never fulfilled.

In late 1988 (after the start of the Bank's 1989 fiscal year), Barber Conable announced a $1.25 billion loan package to Argentina to promote structural economic reforms. Will the result be different this time? Not likely. There is no reason to believe that Argentina is serious about abandoning its statist policies: despite an economic crisis, privatization has gone virtually nowhere and resources continue to be squandered by scores of inefficient parastatals.

IMF officials warn that the Bank has no way of exacting compliance with its reform goals from a country that has never fulfilled its many agreements with the IMF. In response, Barber Conable claims that the Bank can monitor progress by doling out the loans over time; in its 1988 report the Bank claimed that "'tranching,' in which specific, agreed actions must be taken to trigger the release

[27] James Burnham, "The World Bank's Money," *The Washington Post*, April 9, 1986.

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of remaining commitments," had improved the effectiveness of its adjustment loans. Yet in practice the Bank is almost never willing to withhold money, especially from a large debtor. Indeed, the 1986 agricultural loan to Argentina was provided in two tranches, and the Bank board, after a heated debate, approved disbursement of the second payment even though Argentina had failed to comply with the condition that was to trigger its release. Thus, Argentina is likely to use its new Bank loans to pay off the nearly $1 billion in interest that it owes on its commercial loans rather than to promote serious economic reform. Then, when it falls behind in its payments again, it will simply request another Bank loan.

Admittedly, not all recipients have a record on reform as dismal as Argentina's. But sometimes even the most favorable records must be treated with skepticism. In Mexico, for example, the de la Madrid regime claimed to have cut the number of public companies from 1,155 in 1982 to between 600 and 700 in 1987. But none of the largest enterprises have been eliminated and one Mexican newspaper reported the number actually rose from 849 in 1982 to 971 in November 1986.[28]

Moreover, the government's 1987 budget included a 15 percent real increase in state investment, to revive the huge Sicartsa steel project and expand the state fertilizer company, Fertimex. These expenditures were financed by a hike in the corporate tax and, of course, the new international loans negotiated the year before. Subsidies for the largest parastatals rose earlier this year and the government still employs between 1.5 million and 2 million more people than it did in 1982.

But at least in Colombia, Bank spokesmen say, SALs have had a positive impact. The trouble is, that country's government was prepared to try a more market-oriented approach even before SAL loans were arranged in 1985 and 1986. Indeed, the Bank's 1986 press release accurately called the Colombia loan an "endorsement of the government's economic program." As such, these loans may be among the best in the Bank's portfolio, but they were not necessary to induce Bogota to act, and do not prove that more lending will convince governments to adopt reforms against their wishes.

In sum, the notion that additional loans can buy policy change is the fundamental flaw in the theory behind the Baker Plan of October 1985, as well as in the many other initiatives that propose increased lending in exchange for economic reform. Loan recipients must believe reforms are necessary. And with or without increased loans, foreign leaders have a strong motive to reform their economies. If they consistently resist change, it is not for economic reasons, but

[28] U.S. Dept. of Commerce report, "Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for U.S.-Mexico," November 1986, p.13.

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for reasons of politics and ideology — factors that will not disappear with the offer of a few million or even billion dollars in bribes. As the Bank acknowledged in its 1987 review of project audits, conditions "have not by themselves proved effective in changing attitudes about basic policy issues."

Debtors will certainly not make hard decisions if they know they will get new loans anyway. The Bank acknowledges that the "adjustment process" in many borrowing nations has stalled, but it continues to claim the problem is inadequate foreign lending. This is not only untrue, it is the very reverse of the truth. With the Bank planning to hike lending even further through its latest general capital increase, borrowers can safely expect loans whatever domestic policies they adopt. Indeed, in its 1988 report the Bank contended that it had "laid a solid foundation" to further its pledges to help promote international development and reduce poverty "by setting record levels of lending."

The Best Solution: Fewer Loans

The only way to bring global economic policy into line with reality — thus promoting development and reducing poverty — is to reduce lending. That is the course private credit to Third World governments has been following since 1981. But loans from multilateral development institutions, led by the World Bank, rose from $22.5 billion in 1985 to $27.2 billion in 1987. (Government-to-government loans increased over the same period, from $11.5 billion to $13.4 billion).

These new loans, to finance the interest payments on old debt, obscure economic reality. It would be far better to cut off new credit while providing debt relief. The economic effects would be much the same, but the process would more accurately reflect the financial health of both creditors and debtors. It would also stop piling debt upon debt.

There is, however, no reason to promulgate a uniform, international write-down policy like that proposed by Senator Bill Bradley (Democrat of New Jersey). The prospective economic futures of the borrowers vary greatly. Even a major debtor like Mexico has, economist P. T. Bauer estimates, "large, marketable assets" such as its oil monopoly, which may be worth between $35 billion and $40 billion.[29] Encouraging selective write-offs, as well as increased reliance on secondary loan markets and loan-equity swaps, could reduce borrower debt-service burdens without endangering the solvency of Western financial institutions.

[29] P. T. Bauer, "Accounts Receivable," *The New Republic*, June 15, 1987, p. 10.

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An important benefit of ratcheting down lending would be to place greater pressure on debtors — to divest themselves of money-losing parastatals, to open their economies to foreign investment, and to reduce political interference in the economy. Instead of being bribed not to strangle their economies, statist regimes should simply be left to bear the consequences of their disastrous policies. Until now Third World debtors have been treated like drunks who were handed a wad of cash and told to drink no more. They are more likely to do the right thing when the industrialized West stops subsidizing their profligacy, leaving them no other choice.

Until now Third World debtors have been treated like drunks who were handed a wad of cash and told to drink no more. They are more likely to do the right thing when the industrialized West stops subsidizing their profligacy, leaving them no other choice.

A recent example of economic reform forced by necessity is Vietnam, where the government not only changed policy to encourage foreign investment, but the Communist party removed several hard-line members of the Politburo. Similarly, China began its move away from Marxism out of desperation, not because of the availability of SALs from the World Bank. Where genuine political commitment to liberalization surfaces, commercial international loans and private investment are likely to follow, as they did in Ecuador. (Unfortunately, an earthquake in 1987 disrupted the country's oil pipeline, destroying what could have been a showcase for economic reform.) This distinction between trying to buy change and being ready to reward reform is subtle but important.

Further, not only must lending come down and credit be halted to countries with policies that impede economic growth, but more of the remaining credit must be funneled to local private businesses. The goal should be twofold: to reduce the flow of resources to state enterprises that should be divested, and to assist local firms whose access to private capital is blocked by their governments.

To assuage pro-capitalists, the Bank has long pointed to its affiliate, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which theoretically is to lend to private firms without government guarantees. But the IFC is relatively small; in 1987 it lent only $920 million, just 5.2 percent of combined IBRD and IDA credits. Moreover, the IFC lends to many state-controlled enterprises. In fact, reports Washington an-

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alyst James Bovard, the IFC's lending program "shows a growing enthusiasm for investing in Communist countries."[30]

The Bank needs to reform its lending practices in other ways as well. Former Heritage Foundation fellow Bruce Bartlett proposes "limiting lending activities to funds for noncommercial activities that strengthen the framework within which the private sector can operate."[31] In particular, the Bank should no longer back projects for which the borrower should be able to find commercial financing.

"We must be both advisor and catalytic agent in promoting the coordination and cooperation of creditor and debtor, donor and recipient," says Conable. But in recent years Bank officials have thought only in terms of upping loan levels, turning the Bank into an international Sugar Daddy willing to fund almost any statist scheme proposed by a Third World government. It is time the Bank learned to say no.

In the meantime, Congress should refuse to make any further capital contributions. The Bank could maintain lending of roughly $14 billion annually simply by collecting payment on previous loans, which, observes Bovard, is "more than enough to cover good projects to well-managed countries that do not have access to commercial credit."[32] Additional lending by the Bank will only make the global debt crisis worse.

[30] James Bovard, "World Bank Unit's Lip Service to Private Sector," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 21, 1988, p. 38.

[31] Bruce Bartlett, "Barber Conable at the World Bank: New Hope for World Economic Growth," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #501, April 4, 1986, p. 7.

[32] James Bovard, "Behind the Words of the World Bank," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 30, 1985, p. 20.

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

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MARCOS AND HIS CRITICS

A DEFENSE OF MY TENURE

by Ferdinand E. Marcos

The article by Theodore Friend [ORBIS, Fall 1988] is an intelligent, serious, and well-intentioned excursus into the complicated recent history of the Philippines. Necessarily brief, the essay papers over complex issues with broad generalizations. Given the character of the essay, little purpose would be served by attempting to assess the merit of such generalizations. The principal purpose of Friend's discussion is to teach reasonably intelligent Americans something about United States foreign policy. He is convinced that can be accomplished with the generalizations he makes available.

The introductory sections of his essay are intended as background — and as such really warrant little critical review. More important are the claims made in the subsequent sections, for they provide the substance of what Friend considers the rationale for U.S. intervention in Philippine affairs.

In his account, the author suggests that authorities in Manila, instead of imposing martial law in 1972, could have "made an argument for constraining personal liberties to gain the means to further economic, social and educational development" — as though the declaration of martial law was an idiosyncratic and petulant act. Actually, almost all Filipino and American constitutional legal specialists agree that the invocation of martial law in the Philippines in 1972 was undertaken not only in conformity with constitutional provisions, but in response to a growing national crisis. Thus, Rolando V. del Carmen maintains that "Despite strong arguments to the contrary, and long before the case was eventually decided by the Supreme Court, the preponderantly tenable position appeared to be that the declaration of martial law by President Marcos enjoyed constitutional sanction."[1]

Martial law has been regularly invoked throughout East Asia since the end of the Second World War. The governments of Pakistan, India, Taiwan, South Korea, Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia, among others, have made regular recourse to martial constraints in situations of perceived crisis. Rather than recognize the general and protracted character of the regional crises that have given rise to these emergency regimes, Friend seems to argue that martial law was imposed in the Philippines to serve personal ends.

[1] Rolando V. del Carmen, "Constitutionality and Judicial Politics," in David A. Rosenberg, ed., *Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1979), p. 87.

Ferdinand E. Marcos is the former president of the Philippines (1965-1986).

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Then the author proceeds to confuse us. It seems that there was some "genuine national development" under the martial law regime — and that it continued until the late 1970s. It is at least possible that the desire to foster and sustain that development might have served as a motive.

The subsequent failures in the Philippines were shared by other economies in the immediate region. All countries similarly circumstanced began to suffer disabilities. Like the Philippines, most of the countries of Southeast Asia are critically dependent on the export of primary commodities. In the late 1970s, the international prices of those commodities took a free fall. Further, unprecedented increases in oil prices during the 1970s contributed to mounting pressures on oil-importing economies.

By the beginning of the 1980s, Malaysia and Indonesia lapsed into slow, and ultimately negative, growth. In that same period, Singapore, one of the major economic powerhouses of Asia, collapsed into negative growth for the first time in almost four decades.

In dealing with these issues, Friend's allusion to South Korea is hardly instructive. South Korea enjoys a set of comparative advantages distinct from those of the Philippines. South Korea no longer depends on the export of primary commodities. Nonetheless, whatever its advantages, South Korea managed at that time to run up one of the highest debt-per-capita ratios in all of Asia. The economic problems of developing nations in East Asia are far more complicated than Friend would lead us to believe.

There has not yet been an objective assessment of the economic policies, and the economic history, of the Marcos administration. We still await such an account. I believe history will render a much more favorable judgment concerning my efforts on behalf of the Philippines than that tendered by my present detractors. More important here is the consideration that Friend seems to make one individual — me — responsible for the multiple disabilities that afflicted the Philippines for two decades. No one can take that thesis seriously.

Friend supports his implausible thesis by simply repeating every charge made by the political opponents of the Marcos administration. Those charges are important not because they lend plausibility to Friend's thesis, but because they did contribute to the ultimate decision by Washington to intervene in Philippine affairs. In that sense, Friend teaches us something about the factors governing U.S. policy.

The section titled "The Morass, 1975-1983" constitutes the heart of Friend's exposition, for it provides a catalog of alleged abuses that galvanized U.S. policy makers and precipitated intervention. We are told that the Marcos "cronies siphoned off large portions" of huge

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foreign loans; their behavior was characterized by malfeasance, misfeasance, and massive dishonesty. "The resulting corruption, overborrowing, underbidding, dollar salting and gross inefficiencies," we are informed, "sapped the economy." Friend estimates that my own peculations exceeded $5 billion. The evidence he cites for all this is a journalistic account which appeared in *The New York Times* on February 9, 1987.

All of this is said with the confidence of a sleepwalker. The fact is that none of these charges, which are criminal in character, has been made subject to judicial scrutiny. Many of the so-called Marcos cronies are in the Philippines today. They are within the reach of the present administration in Manila. Although presumably possessed of all the evidence necessary to establish their guilt, the Aquino administration has not prosecuted any of these putative malefactors. Private property has been seized; moral declamations have been broadcast; but not one single case has been brought before a court of law. With criminals in such abundance, whose guilt is so evident, one might have expected that at least one of them would have had to face prosecution by this time.

In my own case, I have requested that the present administration in Manila afford me the opportunity to face my accusers in open court — as required by Philippine law. Although the present administration in the Philippines enjoys every advantage, has restructured the courts to its own satisfaction, and presumably has access to all the requisite evidence, it has steadfastly refused my demand for a day in court.

On August 18, 1988, the Philippine Anti-Graft Court, the Sandigan Bayan, approved the request of the Aquino government to "perpetuate the testimony of Baltazar Aquino" against me. At the same time, the court ruled that I had the protected right to defend myself against the witness for the prosecution. All of this seems to have come to naught with the affirmation of the Philippine solicitor general, Francisco Chavez, that "Factually, we do not have the necessary evidence to support filing of a prima facie case [against Marcos.]"

In the only cases pursued with any seriousness of purpose — those conducted by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Japanese National Tax Board — it was found that all appropriated foreign-aid funds were distributed and employed in the Philippines in full compliance with prevailing provisions. The GAO conducted an investigation at the request of Senator Edward Kennedy on the utilization of all U.S. assistance to the Philippines including proceeds of P.L. 480, the Agency for International Development, military sales, and economic support funds. It certified their proper utilization. In its May 2, 1986, report the GAO concluded

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that after its "review of several allegations concerning misuse of U.S. assistance, none of these could be substantiated."[2] The Japanese government's National Tax Board investigated the allegations of malfeasance and reported that "no incriminating evidence was found. . . . The case is now considered closed."

To date, none of the omnibus charges repeated by Friend in his essay has anywhere been adjudicated. That these charges have been repeated ad nauseam in the media and that they have become familiar convictions in prevailing folk wisdom does not make them true. Unfortunately, the wide acceptance of those charges as true created the pressures that eventually resulted in U.S. intervention in the Philippines.

The remaining charges repeated by Friend — that I am personally responsible for the murder of political opponents and the massive derogation of human rights in the Philippines — merit little further comment. These are actionable offenses — and the Philippine courts are fully competent to deal with them.

I have formally requested permission to return to the Philippines where I would be subject to the will and disposition of the courts. To date, the authorities in Manila have refused my request, have failed to indict, and display a singular unwillingness to prosecute.

Beyond all this, there are issues of more general interest that should engage our attention. Friend makes it clear that it was the public perception of what was transpiring in the Philippines during the 1970s and early 1980s that shaped U.S. policy. What is not made equally clear is that public perception in the United States was a product of media reflections on the charges made by the articulate and well-financed representatives of the anti-Marcos expatriates residing in North America. The fact is that the anti-Marcos lobby in Washington was one of the most effective political lobbies in the city. Professor Robert Pringle, an American specialist on Southeast Asia, wrote in 1980 that the spokesmen of the anti-Marcos opposition in Washington exerted "pressure on the Congress out of proportion to their numbers."[3]

The representations made by anti-Marcos spokesmen in committee and subcommittee hearings in the United States Congress were given the widest circulation by the American press; the wildest charges were given credence. The most superficial reading of Friend's account makes evident the effectiveness of the anti-Marcos lobby. Friend recognizes that charges of brutality, oppression, corruption, and gross incompetence have been leveled against almost

[2] Frank C. Conahan, "The Philippines: Accountability and Control of U.S. Economic Assistance." Briefing Report to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, May 2, 1986.

[3] Robert Pringle, *Indonesia and the Philippines* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 57.

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every country in the Third World — and yet, somehow, the Philippines became the singular object of American moral and political outrage.

The fact is that the most important part of Friend's synoptic account is missing. It is that part which deals with the influence of political lobbyists in Washington. There are critically important congressmen in the American legislature — and there are critically important subcommittees within the committees of that body. Publicists who gain special access to those congressmen and those subcommittees succeed in influencing policy in ways that are almost totally unanticipated by the American populace. The recent history of U.S. relations with the Philippines constitutes an unfortunate case in point.

U.S. policy with regard to the Philippines was significantly influenced by a contrived image of Philippine reality. That image was largely the product of a group of publicists now enjoying positions of power and privilege in Manila. There is the suggestion of much of this in Friend's exposition. If his purpose is to make the Philippine experience an occasion to teach Americans something, he might well reflect on the influence exercised in Washington by professional political activists.

Perhaps more important than that is an issue not touched on by the author. Whatever his personal judgment about the administration that governed the Philippines for two decades before 1986, Friend knows that it assured the United States a continued military presence in the archipelago. He must also know that its Filipino opposition made the removal of "all foreign troops from Philippine soil" a cardinal plank of its platform.

If Friend's intention is to provide some assessment of how U.S. interests were served by intervention in Philippine affairs, some reference should be made to the fact that the anti-Marcos opposition had made its anti-American biases very clear much before the events of February 1986. By that time, Corazon Aquino had collected a number of luminaries long known for their anti-U.S. posturing. The late Jose Diokno and former Senator Lorenzo Tanada [4] were only two of the better known. The present president of the Philippine Senate, Jovito Salonga, had also made his own anti-bases convictions very clear long before February 1986. Today he is leader of the opposition to any continuation of the U.S.-Philippine base agreement, and would close Philippine waters to nuclear-armed vessels — an initiative that would seriously compromise U.S. naval and air force projection capabilities in the South China Sea.

[4] Senator Tanada has often made his anti-Americanism clear; for a recent example, see his foreword to Ed Garcia and Francisco Nemenzo, *The Sovereign Quest: Freedom from Foreign Military Bases* (Quezon City: Clartian, 1988).

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Raul Manglapus, an Aquino intimate who now serves as secretary of foreign affairs in her administration, long ago insisted that the United States was an "oppressor" nation, "exploiting" the Philippines for profit. He held that the "patchwork democracy" of the United States ill-served the needs of Asians, and displayed considerable enthusiasm for the verve and dedication of Asia's Communists. Since he assumed the obligations of his present post, Manglapus has welcomed the "embrace" of the Soviet Union.[5] Like Diokno and Tanada, Manglapus opposes the presence of U.S. forward-deployed forces in the Philippines. In fact, most of the present political leadership in the Philippines has expressed a similar opposition — and had expressed those sentiments before the February 1986 coup that changed the history of the Philippines.

All of this could easily have been anticipated in December 1984 when Corazon Aquino crafted a "United Program" designed to unite the anti-Marcos opposition in the Philippines. In that program she announced that under her administration "the Philippines will seek . . . to make . . . Southeast Asia, in general, a zone of freedom and peace, free of all nuclear weapons and free from the domination of all foreign powers. As a consequence, foreign military bases on Philippine territory must be removed."[6] This was followed by a suggestion that "foreign" influence had too long impaired the life and circumstances of the Philippines. There was more than a suggestion that "foreign" economic interests would no longer be welcomed in the archipelago.

In effect, by 1985 several influences shaped U.S. policy toward the Philippines. There was an evident disposition among influential Americans to believe any charge, however outrageous, so long as it was directed against the incumbent administration in Manila. There was also a curious indisposition to listen to anything said by the anti-Marcos opposition about future U.S.-Philippine relations. In the judgment of many Americans, the Marcos administration could do nothing right — and the anti-Marcos opposition could do nothing wrong. The present state of U.S.-Philippine relations is a product of those attitudes.

The strangest feature of all this is that not only have U.S. interests now been placed in serious jeopardy, but all the charges that made my administration a pariah among policy makers in Washington have recently resurfaced as charges against the present regime.[7] The

[5] *The San Francisco Chronicle*, March 25, 1988.

[6] The full text of the "Unity Platform" was published in *Veritas* (Manila), January 6, 1985.

[7] The charges of human rights infractions have been made by the Amnesty International Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights. See Luisita Lopez-Torregorosa, "Aquino Government Linked to Vigilantes in Rights Report," *The Philippines Press, USA* (San Jose, California), July 1988, p.6; Keith Richburg, "Even Under Aquino," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, June 20-26, 1988. Corruption is reported in Phil Bronstein, "Horror Stories About Corruption," *San Francisco Examiner*, June 26, 1988. On the economy, see Francisco S. Tatad, *Philippine Crisis: Strategy for National Survival* (Manila: Committee on National Survival, 1987).

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Aquino government has been charged with serious human rights infractions by Amnesty International, gross corruption by Jaime Cardinal Sin, a failure to deal with the communist insurrection by Aquino's own vice president, Salvador Laurel, and economic mismanagement by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

It has become increasingly evident that the U.S. intervention in the Philippine crisis did very little to further U.S. interests — and little to resolve the internal problems that continue to afflict the Philippines. For his part, Friend wishes to instruct Americans concerning the lessons to be drawn from recent U.S. experiences in the Philippines. The principal lesson he wishes to communicate is that U.S. intervention in the Philippine crisis cannot serve as a "model" for intervention elsewhere. I certainly hope not!

WHAT MARCOS DOESN'T SAY

by Theodore Friend

Apparently, former president Ferdinand Marcos and I agree that American intervention in the Philippines should not be a model for similar steps elsewhere. He is clearly unhappy at being lifted out of the Philippines by an American administration that he saw as his last possible source of substantial support. He argues that American furthering of an Aquino presidency was against Filipino interests, in that it brought about a rudderless and corrupt new regime. He also attempts to show that intervention was not in the interest of the United States, because it has given volume to voices against the American bases and other forms of American presence.

My argument, however, arises from different assumptions and proceeds to different conclusions. I believe that history and circumstances made successful American intervention in the Philippines in February 1986 a unique case. The United States government showed patience and interceded in a limited way. Only at the propitious moment did it exercise timely daring to help oust Marcos, after masses of Filipinos had rallied behind Corazon Aquino. None of that can be applied by formula elsewhere. Cultures and conditions will be unlike.

As for the new Philippine government, its leadership may be only softly charismatic, but its achievements thus far appear to have earned it a full electoral term. The instances of violence and corrup-

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tion are disturbing, but they seem to have been trimmed back from pandemic to endemic levels. The insurgency is in a trough, and the economy is growing again.

The recently concluded interim review regarding the American bases in the Philippines provides an understanding from which, in 1991, either side can make a radical departure, or both may arrive at a new agreement. The United States government, for its part, has made clear that the bases are not its only interest in the Philippines, or even its primary interest. The first priority lies, rather, in the effective functioning of a popularly accepted government.

Ferdinand Marcos is by no means a stereotypical dictator-thug. When, however, he presses with explicit arguments and implicit pleas for a favorable verdict of history on his administration, he may not appear as a great democratic developer either. In any case, some first assessments are owed him.[1]

Criminality in the Marcos Regime

Marcos has always been an astute lawyer who shielded himself with legalisms, many of them contrived. In his riposte to me, he appears to take the view that until and unless the Philippine courts shall find against him on any issue, no historian may arrive at preliminary judgment. Such a stance would, if accepted, have a powerful inhibitory effect on the common sense by which normal people make up their minds and proceed with their lives. A great many facts are still unknown, and much documentary proof is yet unavailable to the public. But as to the way Marcos governed the Philippines, I find in talking with those whom he threw in jail and those whom he appointed to high office little basic difference in recollection.

That the inquiries cited by Marcos have stalled does not mean that all proceedings have proven insignificant. In the Philippines there are thirty-nine civil suits against him, which seek in total $96.17 billion. There are also criminal suits pending there.

Marcos also neglects to mention that there have been impaneled several grand juries in the United States to examine his activities in this country. One in Honolulu recently summoned nine Marcos associates regarding his attempts to buy arms and to obtain an airplane for a surreptitious and hostile return to the Philippines, thereby violating the Neutrality Acts. A grand jury in Pittsburgh investigated massive kickbacks from Westinghouse. No indictment ensued. That does not make irrelevant the judgment of an economist who notes the "particularly egregious example [of] the Bataan nuclear power plant, built by Westinghouse, at a cost three times that of a similar

[1] In addition to the help cited in the notes following, I wish to thank William Rempel, Peter Yost, and Noblesa A. Lande for help with this article; and Stanley Karnow and John Bresnan for criticisms of its final draft.

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plant built by Westinghouse in Pusan, Korea."[2] A grand jury proceeding in Alexandria, Virginia, concluded with guilty pleas to fraud by a key American who implicated seven American subcontractors to the Pentagon, and by Raymond Moreno (an intimate of Marcos's chief of staff, Fabian Ver) who received almost $7 million in kickbacks.[3] Marcos refused to testify.

In a still more comprehensive investigation, a New York grand jury, on October 21, 1988, indicted Marcos for racketeering. The many charges included embezzlement, theft, bribery, fraud, and obstruction of justice. The embezzlement charge concerned more than $100 million taken from the Philippine government and used to buy three buildings in New York City; it also concerned fraudulently borrowing $165 million from American banks to refinance those three buildings and to buy a fourth.[4]

Still other evidence indicates that Marcos fraudulently used Adnan Khashoggi, the Saudi financier, to unfreeze the Marcoses' bank accounts in Switzerland and illegally to transport $25 million to an associate in West Germany. Swiss authorities are conducting criminal investigations.[5] After legal proceedings in Europe, U.S. agents took custody of millions of dollars of art works transferred by Marcos after his arrival in the United States, and offered for sale by Khashoggi off his yacht.[6]

The Italian government is seeking international cooperation in arresting Gliceria Tantoco, once prominent in the retinue of Imelda Marcos, who jumped bail in Italy to avoid extradition to the United States in connection with the racketeering case.[7] Tantoco's husband, Bienvenido Tantoco, formerly Marcos's ambassador to the Vatican, has also disappeared, having jumped bail on unrelated weapons charges. In 1986 in the Tantocos' Appian Way villa, Italian antiterrorist police found a cache that included twelve handguns, two Uzi submachine guns, bulletproof vests, cattle prods, tear gas canisters, various diplomatic license plates, radio transmitters, and spike balls chained to metal sticks.[8]

The ever-mounting evidence not only suggests plunder, stealth, and violence, but also evokes again the query: What might be the total sum of Marcos's wealth? In his reply, Marcos scoffs at the *New*

[2] Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "Debt Crisis and Adjustment in the Philippines," in Jeffrey D. Sachs, ed., *Developing Country Debt and the Third World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).

[3] Information kindly provided me by Peter Yost of Associated Press, Washington, D.C. See also Federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 817 F2d, 1108, May 5, 1987.

[4] United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Indictment SSS 87 Cr. 598, United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et al. (79 pp.)

[5] *The Los Angeles Times*, June 16, 1988.

[6] Ibid., October 12, 1988.

[7] Ibid., March 23, 1988.

[8] "These were certainly not for defensive purposes or protection," said police Captain Ugo Mastrolitto. "The life Tantoco led was not that of a person in retirement." Ibid.

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York Times article which reported the Philippine Commission on Good Government's first estimate of $5 billion. But in the summer of 1988 he conditionally offered, in a signed letter, $5 billion to the Philippine government, if it allowed him to return home.[9] Either Marcos lied about his holdings in the offer to the Philippine government; or he is dissembling about his "peculations" (his word) in his reply to me; or both.

The Filipino Lobby in Washington

When his legalism peters out, Marcos uses the tactic of political insinuation and belittlement. He tries to reduce American intervention against him to "a contrived image of Philippine reality," perpetrated by "anti-Marcos expatriates residing in North America" and "publicists now enjoying positions of power and privilege in Manila." This posture insults both the U.S. Congress and the executive branch. Both are quite capable of being wrong; but neither is susceptible to the easy manipulation he suggests.[10]

Filipino opponents of Marcos were naturally active in Washington. But who among them could bring Marcos down? Ninoy Aquino was murdered. Raul Manglapus worked hard, but feels he was ignored. Jovito Salonga was on the West Coast, without enough money to fly east often. The images of Philippine reality held by key American officials were derived from many sources, including direct personal experience, and their views emphatically converged in the crisis of December 1985-February 1986. In my article I named several whom I thought influential. Let me give further shape to the list: early critics of Marcos included Congressman Stephen Solarz, Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs William Crowe, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz, and Morton Abramowitz, the head of Intelligence at State. Stephen Bosworth, U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, added his voice from 1984 onward. By 1985, Secretaries George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger saw Marcos as the problem. Senators David Durrenberger, Richard Lugar, and Paul Laxalt added powerful momentum at the end. Marcos's friend, Pres-

[9] The letter is in the possession of Allen Weinstein of the Center for Democracy in Washington, D.C. Its contents were verified by Ambassador Emmanuel Pelaez, who transmitted the offer, and subsequently by the Aquino government in the course of rejecting it. *The Los Angeles Times*, July 26-28, 1988.

[10] The point Robert Pringle makes in his book is not to exculpate Marcos, or excoriate his critics, but to demonstrate that the United States was far tougher on the Philippines than on Indonesia in human rights policy, because of different historic relationships. *Indonesia and the Philippines: American Interests in Island Southeast Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), especially pp. 103-18.

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ident Reagan, finally acquiesced in these forces. Nobody duped these men. They knew what they were doing and they did it well.[11]

Degradation of the Philippines, 1966-1986

I do not make Marcos alone "responsible for the multiple disabilities that have afflicted the Philippines for two decades" (as he puts it). To the degree that he centralized political and economic power in himself, of course, he cannot escape personal accountability. But it is not on Marcos's concentration of power that I focus, so much as on his failure. Revealingly, in his reply, Marcos does not point to a single positive development during his stewardship.

Yes, he inherited many problems. But did he work as creatively with the strengths and weaknesses of Philippine national character as did Manuel Quezon? Did he meet insurgency with progress, hope, and forgiveness, as did Ramon Magsaysay? Yes, the Philippines was afflicted by oil shocks and other international surprises. But did the Marcos regime manage as well — half as well? — as the governments of Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan in the same period? One-third as well as South Korea?

Marcos is right that the international economy shifted to the disadvantage of the Philippines in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But instead of using the state, which he increasingly controlled, as an organ of adaptation to those changes, Marcos used his regime as a means to preserve and enhance his own political power; as a means to engorge his friends; and as a means to enrich his family and himself — not by "peculations," but by systematic parasitic robbery.

What was the impact on the national condition? In 1983-84, a group of Filipino scholars at the University of the Philippines found that state borrowings in the four previous years exceeded all prior debts. "What might have been limited failures and corporate tragedies confined to private persons became transformed into a national economic crisis, and the burden of paying the debts of the few was passed on to the entire nation." The narrow social basis of an authoritarian regime, combined with "fear of information," led to grotesque mistakes and aggravated the pain of the poorer classes.[12]

In January 1986, a month before Aquino came to power, Americans heard from senior Marcos officials that there had been "a gross misallocation of resources" over time; that there had been "misinvestment over the last fifteen years"; that new mining enterprises

[11] Sources for the paragraph above include conversations with some of the principals, and with John Bresnan and Stanley Karnow.

[12] Emmanuel S. De Dios, ed., *An Analysis of the Philippine Economic Crisis* (Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1984), p. 58. David Timberman is more trenchant in his language regarding the same phenomena, especially in a section entitled "From Corruption to Kleptocracy," pp. 80-82, from the unpublished manuscript of the forthcoming *A Changeless Land? Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics.*

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were "just junk," that sugar was "a terminal industry," and that the government had acquired 200 to 300 bankrupt corporations that were "non-performing assets."[13]

A pair of economists, American and Filipino, taking a clinical view of the situation, allow that "the Philippines was hit more severely by external shocks than most debtor countries." But they add that a borrowing crisis (the Philippines was the first Asian country to call a moratorium on debt service, in October 1983) was coming anyway because of policy errors and managerial flaws: poor returns from investment, difficulties in mobilizing domestic resources to fund investment, a trade regime that did not sufficiently encourage exports, and a politico-economic environment that "discouraged independent investment, led to capital flight, and eventually crippled much of the productive economy." Their conclusion: "not all" of the actions of the martial law administration "can be characterized as plunder and theft. But, in the latter part of the 1970's . . . the accumulation of wealth became the predominant motive."[14]

The impact of prolonged mismanagement shows up in a decline in overall real family income in the Philippines of 6 to 8 percent from the mid-1960s to 1985. Among families reporting income from farming, among wage workers in agriculture, and among non-agricultural wage workers, declines in real income were much higher, 30 to 40 percent for the same period.[15] The poor suffered the most from flawed policies and crony pillage.

Reflecting on Marcos's political and economic depredations on the Philippines, I cannot avoid assessing the gluttony of the family and its entourage, juxtaposed against the widespread social misery. Bad enough that Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, as a leadership team, were shallow, tacky, and alienated. Far worse, they became insatiable and cruelly corrupt.

The Historical Judgment

Now Ferdinand Marcos expects a "much more favorable [historical] judgment." Let us ask how and why he centralized authority in himself, and what he did with the massive power he obtained. I do not argue that he lacked constitutional sanction for invoking martial law in 1972; he identified the proper provision clearly, and he used it forcibly. I argue that Marcos provided a pretext for invoking

[13] The Asia Society, "The Philippines: Facing the Future. A report of the findings of a study mission to the Philippines sponsored by the Asia Society of New York and the Center for Research and Communications in Manila" (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986), p. 13. See also essays by Bernardo Villegas and Jesus Estanislao in John Bresnan, ed., *Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 145-75, 200-27.

[14] Dohner and Intal, "Debt Crisis and Adjustment in the Philippines," pp. 10, 27.

[15] *The Philippine Reporter*, September 6, 1988, pp. 1-2.

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TABLE 1
ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1966-1986
(Current GNP per capita, in $US)

	1966	1976	1986	1986/1966
South Korea	130	750	2,370	18
Indonesia	40	280	500	12
Malaysia	340	920	1,850	5
Thailand	150	400	810	5
Burma	60	140	200	3
Philippines	200	430	570	3

SOURCE: The World Bank, World Tables 1987, pp. 72-75, 216-19, 248-51, 280-83, 360-63, 448-51.

it — the attack on the defense minister's Mercedes Benz, which Juan Ponce Enrile himself later admitted was a hoax. William Rempel of *The Los Angeles Times* recently obtained copies of more than 2,000 pages of Marcos's handwritten diaries left behind in the Malacanang Palace. They begin January 1, 1970, and immediately reveal his intentions to "liquidate" Communists, "eradicate" all dissenters, and to assume "dictatorial powers." As early as February 4, 1970, he was hoping for an attack on his palace, "so that we could employ the total solution."[16] Eventually he employed it.

What were the results? Did Marcos lead Philippine growth and self-discovery until foully traduced? There may be a case (and my article offered it in summary outline) for Marcos's modest contribution to Philippine developmental momentum, 1966-1972, with limited artificial prolongation during early martial law, 1972-75. But the last half of Marcos's reign, 1976-1986, was a steady descent into catastrophe. Rather than driving Philippine development up toward Korea's, or even Thailand's, Marcosite martial law drove it down toward Burma's.

Not only was Philippine net economic growth, 1976-1986, the worst in the region, but the negative growth of 1983-85 was unparalleled in extent and depth. Food production gains were also the worst in Southeast Asia.

The human corollary of these raw statistics was Philippine underemployment, malnutrition, and deep social malaise.

At the same time Marcos was carrying on, intentionally and adventitiously, a radical de-institutionalization of his country. He had inherited well-developed organs of representative government; a relatively independent judiciary; a civil service that still retained some of its American standards; a small professional military; and an independent press, radio, and television. For them he substituted a legislative echo chamber, a timid bench, a hyper-corrupt bureauc-

[16] *The Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 1988.

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TABLE 2
FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA, 1966-1986

(All food commodities, adjusted for population growth, 1979-1982 = 100)

	1966	1976	1986	Rise in index
Malaysia	62.7	91.4	125.8	63.1
Indonesia	77.1	88.2	118.3	41.2
Burma	86.5	89.3	126.3	39.8
Thailand	85.2	97.5	106.5	21.3
Philippines	83.2	98.6	95.6	12.4

SOURCE: The World Bank, ibid.

racy, a swollen, schismatic and ineffective military, and cowed media.[17] Further, his style of governing throttled free enterprise, free speech, and voluntary social initiatives. Ne Win did worse with Burma and Duvalier with Haiti. But in the long run, Marcos is more likely to earn comparison with them, and not with Indonesia's Suharto or Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew.

In one dimension he may be unrivaled. To charges that he killed major adversaries and critics, he answers that "Philippine courts are fully competent" to resolve such matters. Is this a non-refuting denial, or even a sly confirmation from a man whose return the current Philippine government does not desire?

Rather than eliminate all opposition, Marcos bred it en masse. The New People's Army, the putative cause for martial law in 1972, increased its armed strength perhaps thirtyfold despite — and, in part, because of — Marcos's martial law policies. But neither communist guerrillas, nor anti-Marcos lobbyists, nor American officials finally ended his rule. The agents of his undoing were unarmed Filipinos, ordinary people who were fed up; who stood in the range of his howitzers and sat in the shadow of his tank tracks and would not move until he was gone.

The citizens of the Philippines rendered a key judgment on Marcos in 1986. Some Filipino historians in the future may see him more kindly than I do. Theirs, after all, is a great-hearted and forgiving nation. But I do not believe the evidence can ever be found to see Marcos as a genius of Philippine productivity and creativity.

The symbol of contrary evidence is in a massive tribute to himself north of Manila, the grey stone face of the Marcos Monument overlooking the Marcos Golf and Country Club, off the Marcos Highway. This cement sculpture is the largest portrait in Southeast Asia since Jayavarman VII made himself the central image of Angkor at the

[17] See also William Overholt, "The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos," *Asian Survey, 26* (1986): 1137-63, and especially pp. 1148-49.

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end of the twelfth century A.D. That great Khmer king left "temples and inscriptions of an overwhelming compassion and an overwhelming will."[18] There is however, much more evidence of Marcos's willfulness than of his compassion. Looking at the sculpture, and at the still recovering Philippine society and economy, one is tempted to the strong Tagalog phrase, *makapal ang mukha*. There is no English equivalent, but "shameless" will do.

Ferdinand Marcos wants his niche in history. Legal judgments await him first, and possibly a cot in jail. After that, in time, he may be assessed in a context that includes Batista of Cuba, for terrorism in a nation strategically important to the United States; Peron of Argentina, for weird conjugal autocracy; and Mobutu of Zaire, for personal enrichment that aggravates social scarcity.

[18] David Chandler, *A History of Cambodia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 67.

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Documentation

COUNTRY CREDIT RATINGS

From *Institutional Investor*

Each year, in March and September, *Institutional Investor* magazine publishes its Country Credit Ratings: an attempt to evaluate, quantify, and compare the national credit-worthiness of the world's states. These credit ratings are based on evaluations provided by seventy-five to a hundred leading international banks. For the September 1988 ratings, 112 countries were selected and bankers were asked to grade them on a scale of 0 to 100 — with 0 representing the least credit-worthy countries with the greatest chance of default; 100 representing the most credit-worthy countries with the least chance of default. (Banks were not permitted to rate their home countries.) After the individual responses were received, they were averaged according to a system that, the magazine says, "gives more weight to responses from banks with the largest worldwide exposure and the most sophisticated country analysis systems."

In an accompanying article, *Institutional Investor* noted a few highlights of the most recent ratings. The biggest drop over the last six months was suffered by Panama, which fell 3.8 points owing to its "well-publicized political problems." (The magazine considers a drop or rise of 1 point to be the minimum statistically significant change.) Other big losers included such major countries as the United States, China, Nigeria, and Brazil. Libya achieved the status of biggest gainer "largely by staying out of mischief," while other significant rises were posted by such small countries as Nepal, Honduras, and Swaziland.

As for *Institutional Investor*'s "global average" of national credit-worthiness, September's figure of 38.7 represents "the culmination of a long-term downward trend" and the lowest point for that figure in the ten years that the magazine has conducted its survey. The median figure in the September list of 112 countries is 32.4, shared by the unlikely pair of South Africa and Romania.

— *The Editors*

The country credit ratings on the following page are based on a table published in the September 1988 issue of *Institutional Investor* and are reprinted with permission.

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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR'S
SEPTEMBER 1988 COUNTRY CREDIT RATINGS

Rank	Country	Credit Rating
1	Japan	94.8
2	Switzerland	93.9
3	West Germany	93.1
4	United States	89.7
5	United Kingdom	86.9
6	Netherlands	86.7
7	Canada	85.4
8	France	84.7
9	Austria	82.9
10	Sweden	79.7
11	Norway	79.2
12	Finland	78.3
13	Italy	77.5
14	Belgium	77.3
15	Taiwan	76.8
16	Singapore	74.8
17	Spain	73.4
18	Denmark	71.7
19	Australia	69.2
20	Hongkong	69.0
21	U.S.S.R.	64.7
22	New Zealand	63.9
23	South Korea	63.7
24	China	63.3
25	Ireland	62.3
26	Saudi Arabia	60.4
27	Kuwait	59.1
28	East Germany	57.8
29	Portugal	57.5
30	United Arab Emirates	57.3
31	Thailand	56.0
32	Malaysia	55.5
33	Bahrain	54.6
34	Qatar	54.5
35	Czechoslovakia	54.0
36	Iceland	53.0
37	Oman	50.8
38	India	48.4
39	Greece	47.2
40	Bulgaria	46.8
41	Hungary	44.0
42	Cyprus	43.1
43	Indonesia	42.9
44	Turkey	41.1
45	Algeria	39.1
46	Colombia	37.9
47	Papua New Guinea	37.7
48	Trinidad and Tobago	36.3
49	Venezuela	36.0
50	Israel	34.6
51	Jordan	34.5
52	Barbados	34.3
53	Cameroon	33.6
54	Tunisia	33.5
55	Gabon	33.3
56	South Africa	32.4
57	Romania	32.4
58	Pakistan	31.1
59	Kenya	30.2
60	Mauritius	29.1
61	Chile	28.9
62	Mexico	28.9
63	Uruguay	28.4
64	Brazil	28.4
65	Yugoslavia	28.1
66	Paraguay	26.9
67	Ivory Coast	25.3
68	Libya	25.1
69	Panama	24.8
70	Zimbabwe	24.2
71	Nepal	24.1
72	Philippines	24.0
73	Morocco	23.9
74	Argentina	23.2
75	Egypt	23.1
76	Sri Lanka	22.7
77	Ecuador	21.4
78	Senegal	19.3
79	Syria	19.2
80	Nigeria	19.2
81	Iran	19.0
82	Swaziland	18.6
83	Costa Rica	17.9
84	Bangladesh	17.6
85	Poland	17.4
86	Jamaica	16.0
87	Dominican Republic	15.3
88	Malawi	15.1
89	Seychelles	15.0
90	Iraq	14.9
91	Congo	14.8
92	Honduras	14.5
93	Guatemala	14.4
94	Cuba	13.4
95	Peru	12.9
96	Angola	11.2
97	Liberia	10.7
98	Zaire	10.2
99	Grenada	10.2
100	Zambia	10.1
101	Tanzania	9.8
102	Bolivia	9.7
103	El Salvador	9.2
104	Sierra Leone	8.2
105	Haiti	7.9
106	Ethiopia	7.8
107	Mozambique	7.6
108	Lebanon	7.3
109	Uganda	5.6
110	Sudan	5.6
111	Nicaragua	5.2
112	North Korea	4.5
Global average rating		38.7

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Correspondence

WHY THE U.S. CANNOT STOP SOUTH AMERICAN COCAINE

To the Editor:

Rensselaer Lee's article ("Why the U.S. Cannot Stop South American Cocaine," ORBIS, Fall 1988) is both timely and well-researched .... [This] does not, however, leave his work beyond all question ....

His statistics too are open to debate. Hard data in this area are virtually nonexistent; estimates are at best "guesstimates." But his $3-$5 billion annual trafficker-earnings figure is the lowest I have come across. Again, though, Lee may be closer to the true amount than other analysts, most of whom reap job-related benefits from ever-higher narco-numbers. More open to question are his repatriation estimates. In this regard, I feel he, like Washington policy makers, underestimates both the total repatriated and its impact on source countries. The *traficantes* may in fact be the most "patriotic" entrepreneurs in the region if one measures patriotism by the level of earnings reinvested at home.

One final bit of narco-nitpicking: Lee cites an AID study to the effect that Bolivian coca farmers can earn up to $2,600 per hectare for their leaves. This too is the lowest estimate I have encountered, with most studies pegging the earnings at twice that amount. In the long run, however, the only important fact is that the *campesino* earns *far* more from illicit crops than from the nearest traditional competitor.

This in turn brings me back to my original point. Lee's figures may be open to debate, but not his scholarship. His is the best article yet published on the multiple implications of South American cocaine. I am looking forward to his book and more nitpicking.

Richard B. Craig
Department of Political Science
Kent State University

To the Editor:

Lee presents a very strong argument on the structural barriers preventing a supply-side resolution to the Colombian drug-trafficking problem. However, the picture he paints is much too bleak. The United States must, indeed, curb its voracious social appetite for narcotics if a permanent solution to the drug trade is to be realized.

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However, this will take a long time. Unfortunately for Colombia and the neighboring Andean countries, time is a luxury they can ill afford . . . .

Meanwhile, important steps can be taken to relieve the more pressing pressures that threaten the very social fabric of the Andean countries. There are available policy instruments that, while they will not necessarily end the devastating impact of the drug trade, can reverse the trend. It is important to return some semblance of control to these countries. This is definitely within the realm of possibility.

Moreover, there is a growing recognition among the Andean countries that the economic benefits derived from the lucrative drug trade no longer exceed its harmful effects. The drug problem is no longer solely the problem of the United States but is endangering their own societies as well. In the process, sovereignty issues, which hampered past joint programs with the United States, have taken a back seat to the more urgent concerns of corruption, violence, and domestic drug addiction.

True, violence is historically endemic to Colombian society, but it has gotten way out of hand. The high incidence of violence, directly attributable to the explosive rise in the narcotics business, has even spawned a new group of academics called *violentologos* who specialize in the dynamics of various murdering groups. A study by the private Instituto Ser says Colombia's homicide rate jumped from 16.8 per 100,000 to 52.8 per 100,000 in the past twelve years. This surpasses the peak years of *la violencia* — the notorious civil war of 1948-1958 in which 200,000 people died.

The noticeable increase in domestic drug abuse and its attendant social ills are responsible for rapidly changing the traditional Latin American view that drugs are a U.S. problem. In the Andean region of Bolivia and Peru, child addiction to coca paste has become so prevalent that it is now viewed as a social time-bomb.

The rampant corruption of government institutions and the paralysis of the judicial system have so impaired the national government's ability to function that the value of the democratic process has itself become seriously questioned. It is unmistakably clear that the *narcotraficantes* must be neutralized if these democracies are to survive.

Contrary to Lee's fatalistic assertion, there does exist a collective awareness in Latin America that, unless the narcotics issue is addressed and neutralized, anarchy and military coups await; hence, the determination to do something about it has inexorably followed. For example, Peru's anti-drug czar, General Juan Zarate Gambini, recently asked for, and the State Department sympathetically responded with, the quadrupling of U.S. supplies of military and commercial equipment to fight the *narcotraficantes*. Agents of the Drug

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Enforcement Agency are closely working with Peruvian military officials as well as with Colombian and Bolivian officials in interrupting narcotics processing and distribution centers. Peru's president Alan Garcia is prepared to use herbicides to eradicate coca leaf plants. Only $24 million has been provided for redevelopment purposes. Hardly enough, but future increases appear likely.

In Colombia, the creation of a special (possibly military) court solely responsible for adjudicating cases involving drug traffickers would remove the specter of violence and intimidation that protects them from prosecution. Once in place, extradition proceedings with the United States can function more smoothly.

The U.S. leadership role will no doubt play an essential part in any successful campaign launched against the drug barons. The tendency toward unilateral decision making and public grandstanding cannot continue. Fortunately, discreet cooperation between the U.S. and Andean governments is under way.

An important element in the "war on drugs" would have to include a multilateral assault against governments participating in and benefiting from the drug trade. The *narcotraficantes'* institutional apparatus must — and can — be dismantled. Already, international pressure against Panamanian general Manuel Noriega has paralyzed the traffickers' principal money-laundering center. Sanctions against other guilty states would severely circumscribe their financial options. Discreet but firm pressure would also have to be administered against the Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Haitian governments which deliberately use the drug trade to generate hard currency.

But the United States will have to put its money where its mouth is. So far U.S. aid has not matched the political priority given the issue. Eradication programs must be followed by well-funded crop substitution programs. Extending the Caribbean Basin Initiative's preferential trading system to the Andean countries would provide "narco-workers" with viable economic alternatives to the drug trade. The Andean governments must also be furnished the equipment and logistical support apparatus required to undertake anti-drug operations. The West Europeans may contribute funds as well since they are quickly becoming an additional market for the Andean drug smugglers.

A range of anti-drug policy options are available that could lead to significant achievements. Some are already being implemented. The determination to proceed exists among the Andean states; they really do not have any alternatives. The question remains whether the United States is ready to commit the necessary funding and provide the requisite leadership to assist them. The salience of the

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drug issue during this presidential year suggests that the political pressure exists to support such a commitment.

Lee presents a sobering case against expectations for the success of supply-side drug policies. But there is also a strong case to be made for guarded optimism.

Max Primorac
Research Fellow
Council for Inter-American Security

To the Editor:

I read with great interest Lee's excellent article. However, before we all reach his pessimistic conclusion, there are two additional insights that I would like to offer.

Consider, first, the Soviet bloc's involvement in drug trafficking. Most people, like Lee, do not see the traffickers as being ideologically committed and hence posing a direct security threat. This is also the official U.S. perception. Certainly, the drug traffic is exceedingly complex and Lee's view may very well apply to an unknown percentage of the trafficking operation. But there is another dimension that neither Lee nor the U.S. government addresses.

As explained in detail by Jan Sejna, who was first secretary at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense and secretary of the Defense Council before he defected, the Soviet bloc intelligence services initiated drug trafficking as a strategic intelligence operation in the late 1950s. In the early 1960s, their primary push was into Latin America. Because of its perceived future effectiveness in subverting bourgeois societies, cocaine was singled out for special dedicated operations. By 1967 Soviet-bloc operations had been established in Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Guadeloupe, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, and El Salvador. Sejna had first-hand knowledge of these operations. Often several independent operations were established in major countries, such as Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Argentina. Additionally, the majority of indigenous drug-trafficking operations had been infiltrated by Cuban or Soviet-bloc intelligence agents by 1967. These Soviet operations are described in "International Narcotics Trafficking: The Soviet Connection," (*Journal of Defense and Diplomacy*, December 1986) and in "Drugs, Narcotics, and National Security," (*Global Affairs*, Fall 1987) . . . .

The impact of this knowledge is to challenge the notion that ideology does not enter into the drug-trafficking equation. This also changes, or should change, the assessment of threats, goals, and strategy. It also should have significant effect on U.S. strategy and tactics to combat the trafficking. Indeed, when the U.S. government programs and strategies are viewed from this perspective, most of them

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appear seriously misdirected and, in many instances, counterproductive.

Secondly, in assessing prospects for change, most people examine the obvious benefits which justify the drug industry in Latin America. Their analyses acknowledge that the benefits to the host countries are limited, but then seem to argue that the benefits are so great for the host countries that one cannot blame the countries for tolerating the business. While there is some discussion of costs, these are not truly addressed as offsetting the benefits nor are they discussed in full detail. Moreover, several less tangible costs that are left out of the cost-benefit equation, or treated only in passing, are the negative effect of the cocaine business on the growth of legitimate activities, on the development of normal agriculture and industry that could advance the country, on the health of the citizenry, and on the morals of the people who hold the reins of power. Most people, Lee included, also treat the costs and benefits of the drug trade as if they were part of a natural market process, and forget the strong non-economic forces (intimidation, blackmail, coercion) that may be more responsible for the general acceptance of the business than the economic benefits he lays out so clearly.

Joseph D. Douglass Jr.
McLean, Virginia

The Author Responds:

I would like to thank Messrs. Douglass, Primorac, and Craig for their useful and stimulating comments on my ORBIS article. Let me begin by reviewing the depressing panorama in the main cocaine-exporting countries that faces U.S. policy makers.

The cocaine industry has gained a powerful economic foothold in the Andean countries, especially in Peru and Bolivia. Moving against the cocaine traffic can impose economic hardships on these countries. Also, its economic power has been translated into political power. The traffic in both its upstream (agricultural) and downstream (processing and smuggling) phases has spawned vast interlocking constituencies that limit the scope and effectiveness of anti-drug efforts. Next, in its higher value-added phases, the cocaine industry shares common interests with established economic and political elites. In Colombia, traffickers have formed an alliance with the more conservative social groups — rural landowners, right-wing businessmen, and factions of the military — in a common struggle against guerrilla organizations and their civilian surrogates. (In contrast, coca-growing peasants in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru are aligned with the political left.) Finally, governments and publics in Andean countries do not see narcotics control as a top national priority. Indeed, narcotics control is often seen as conflicting with more important goals such

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as reducing unemployment, maintaining economic stability, and fighting subversion.

Given this grim constellation of factors, I am pessimistic about the prospects of controlling cocaine at the source. On the other hand, existing source-country programs are not useless and should not be abandoned. As Primorac suggests, these policy instruments serve a useful political purpose — they can limit overt political participation by drug barons and "return some semblance of control" to the Andean countries. Vigorous anti-drug efforts can prevent cocaine traffickers from running openly for public office, forming political parties, and mounting warlord-like challenges to government authority.

However, lowering political profile is one thing, cutting exports of cocaine is quite another. I am skeptical about the value of U.S. drug diplomacy and U.S. narcotics assistance programs. U.S. pressure helped put an end to the "cocaine superstate" of Garcia Meza in Bolivia, but Bolivia's cocaine traffic has expanded enormously, under a democratic regime, since the early 1980s. Even if American programs were significantly more effective than they are now (and far more expensive), they would probably have little effect on the consumption of cocaine in the United States. Cocaine traffickers find it all too easy to shift their sources of supply from region to region, from country to country, and, if necessary, from continent to continent. For example, although Operation Blast Furnace made a major dent in Bolivian cocaine production for about ten weeks, drug supplies and prices in the U.S. were virtually unchanged.

The best way to defeat the South American drug lords is simply to stop using their products. There are already heartening first signs that Americans are waking up to the danger of cocaine consumption. According to a recent University of Michigan survey, cocaine consumption among high school seniors and young adults dropped significantly (by 15 to 20 percent) between 1986 and 1987. This suggests that the most effective use of our drug enforcement dollars is to fund programs of demand-reduction, especially education, prevention, and treatment programs.

It should also be noted that no matter how the cocaine problem is resolved — through eradication, demand-reduction, or legalization — there will be some economic hardships for Latin American countries. We must be prepared to help those countries devise healthy economic alternatives to the cocaine industry.

Douglass raises important questions, but he and I appear to disagree on political fundamentals. I do not see the cocaine traffic as an East-West problem. The major trafficking networks in South America are independently powerful political actors. They are not allied with the revolutionary left, and I doubt very much that they receive direction from the Soviets or the Cubans. Soviet-bloc intel-

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ligence services have probably tried to infiltrate the Medellín cartel and other important trafficking coalitions. Yet, the leadership cores of drug cartels, which are often coterminous with extended family organizations, are extremely hard for outsiders to penetrate, as our own drug enforcement people know well. Furthermore, the security and communications systems of trafficking organizations are quite good — better, by many accounts, than those of South American governments. Finally, the social and political networks of most cocaine barons — who tend to be conservative, traditionalist, religious, patriotic, and family-oriented — do not make them especially promising targets of influence for Soviet-bloc agents.

Finally, Richard Craig — a pioneer in the study of the political economy of drug trafficking — points to the Achilles' heel of all analyses of the cocaine trade: the lack of real economic data. We do not know how many hectares of coca are cultivated in South America; U.S. estimates for Peru range from 110,000 to 200,000 hectares in 1988. We do not know the average yield in coca leaves per hectare; the U.S. estimate for Bolivia is 1.4 metric tons per hectare, but Bolivian estimates are substantially higher: 2.3 to 2.8 metric tons. We do not know what quantity of coca leaves is required to make a given quantity of cocaine hydrochloride. The U.S. National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers' Committee uses a conversion ratio of 500:1, but Peru and Bolivia use much lower ratios, 350:1 or even 300:1. We do not know with any certainty the prices that South American trafficking organizations receive for their cocaine. The estimation process is affected by political factors — South American governments may see some advantages in exaggerating their cocaine production, and Washington may see advantages in underestimating it. Interagency disputes in the United States also influence the process. My own "guesstimates," which are derived largely from U.S. government sources, may be on the conservative side, as Craig suggests.

Rensselaer W. Lee III

INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

To the Editor:

I would like to call to your attention an error that appeared in Daniel Pipes's review of Muhammad Muslih's *Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* in the Fall issue of ORBIS. The review refers to the Institute for Palestine Studies as an "arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization." It is not.

The IPS is a private, independent, nonprofit, academic, and public service association established by a group of scholars from the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese University before the PLO even came into being. The application for its incorporation

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as a Lebanese association was filed in the fall of 1962 and granted the following year, whereas the constituent assembly of the PLO did not meet until May of 1964. Moreover, by choice as well as according to its articles of incorporation, IPS is prohibited from affiliating with any political party, government, or organization, and from engaging in any political activity.

Despite the institute's area of interest, it is not a Palestinian but an inter-Arab organization. Its Board of Trustees is composed of scholars, heads of corporations, incumbent and former ministers, and diplomats from fifteen Arab countries. Of its forty-four members, only eight are of Palestinian origin. Of the ten founding members, only two were of Palestinian origin. I should mention that board members include such well known Maronites as Pierre Edde, former Lebanese finance minister and son of Lebanon's first president under the Mandate, and Dr. Edmond Naim, former president of Lebanese University and currently governor of Lebanon's Central Bank. Maurice Gemayal, former planning minister of Lebanon and a cousin of Phalangist party founder Pierre Gemayel, was one of the Institute's founders and served on its board until his death, and former Lebanese president Charles Helou was a board member until his retirement. Current board members include the chairman of the Arab Development Board, Kuwait, the chairman of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce, the minister of education of Bahrain, the minister of information of Qatar, the former foreign minister of the UAE, the minister of pilgrimages and religious endowments of Saudi Arabia, the former prime minister of Tunisia, the former prime minister of North Yemen (currently Yemen's ambassador in Washington), and the former minister of higher education of Egypt. Our English quarterly, published in conjunction with Kuwait University, includes on its Editorial Board both the former and the current ministers of higher education of Kuwait.

IPS publications have received favorable reviews from such figures as William Quandt, William Sloane Coffin, Ian Lustick, Stanley Hoffmann, Ambassador Herbert Eilts, Philip Geyelin, Ben Bradlee Jr., and John Campbell of *Foreign Affairs.* Our quarterly, the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, has counted among its contributors Meron Benvenisti, former deputy major of Jerusalem, Edy Kaufmann, director of Hebrew University's Truman Institute, Mordechai Bar-On, Member of Knesset, Avi Shlaim of Oxford, Don Peretz of SUNY-Binghamton, Herbert Kellman of Harvard, Kathleen Christison, formerly of the CIA, Ambassador Robert Neumann of CSIS, and George Ball. Zbigniew Brzezinski and former French foreign minister Claude Cheysson have granted exclusive interviews to IPS publications. I am sure you would agree that these people would not have been associated with IPS or its publications if it had been "an arm of the PLO,"

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with which the Institute does not have and has not had any institutional, organizational, operational, or financial connection.

We assume that you have confused IPS with the PLO Research Center, which indeed *is* an arm of the PLO and was set up as such several years after IPS was founded precisely because the IPS would not fulfill that function. I should mention that the Israelis themselves are well aware of the distinction between the two organizations. During the 1982 invasion of Beirut, they closed down the PLO Research Center, removing its library, but left the IPS office and library entirely intact.

We are confident that, given your concern for scholarship and accuracy, you will print a prominent correction of this error in the next issue of ORBIS.

Philip Mattar
Executive Director
Institute for Palestine Studies

The Author Responds:

Legally speaking, Philip Mattar is correct. By "arm" of the PLO, however, I meant to imply something other than a legal relationship. Indeed, the utility of the Institute for Palestine Studies lies exactly in its not being formally affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization. This allows deniability; the institute can experiment with positions and attract participation that legal connections to the PLO would prohibit.

I am not alone in this assessment of the IPS. For example, one State Department official is quoted as saying IPS is known as "the unofficial academic wing of the PLO."[1]

I do not blame Mattar for protesting my description of the IPS — it is part of his job to do so; but he should understand why I cannot take his claims of non-affiliation and independence very seriously.

D.P.

[1] Quoted in Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), p. 270.

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The American Association for the Advancement of Science
Invites applications for the 1989-1990

Science, Arms Control, and National Security Fellowships

AAAS will competitively select **outstanding postdoctoral to mid-career scientists, engineers, and other appropriate scholars and professionals** for the 1989-1990 Science, Arms Control, and National Security Fellowships.

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AAAS guides the placement process, provides an orientation program, and coordinates frequent seminars on topics related to arms control and national security.

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All application materials must be completed and received by **January 17, 1989.**
For application forms and additional material, please write to:

Dr. Elizabeth J. Kirk, Senior Program Associate
Science, Arms Control, and National Security Fellowships
American Association for the Advancement of Science
1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005

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WORLD POLITICS
by Adam M. Garfinkle

The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. By Michael Mandelbaum. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 416 pp. $39.50 ($13.95, paper).

In the scope of its concerns, *The Fate of Nations* invites comparison with Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.* In content, however, it comes nearer to being a mirror image. For if Kennedy sees countries driven by internal forces to advance their might abroad, Mandelbaum sees a state's security policies influenced chiefly by the structure of power in an anarchic international system. He holds that strong and weak countries tend especially to respond in this way to the external international environment. As for middle-power states, their security policies are more variable, but not necessarily because they are driven by domestic political culture. States of all strengths can dilute the influence of the inter-state system by collective security pacts.

Mandelbaum chooses three pairs of examples to make his case. His strong state is America from 1945 to 1980; his weak state is China between 1949 and 1976. His middle cases are France in the inter-war period and Israel between 1948 and 1979. For the collective security approach, he cites Britain in the nineteenth century and Japan in the postwar economic order.

Yet even Mandelbaum seems bothered by the rigidity of his thesis, and admits that the "United States is sharply tilted toward the primacy of domestic over international concerns." Because no rigorous rules of evidence are sketched out, the reader does not know if in the author's view the strong thesis is thus qualified, or instead made stronger still for having overcome this inherent tilt.

Perhaps, instead of holding to a strong structuralist thesis, Mandelbaum should have built his work around a question: Under what conditions do external factors dominate a state's security policy? No matter; this is an ambitious book by an able author, and a worthwhile effort.

The International Who's Who 1988-89. London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1988. 1,686 pp. $200.00.

Compiling biographies for 18,000 of the world's notables is a daunting task, and a few oversights are bound to occur. In this latest register, Nancy Reagan, Margot Honecker and Elena Ceausescu all make an appearance, but Raisa Gorbachev does not. Paul Simon, the singer, is profiled; Paul Simon, the U.S. senator, is not. Clearly, celebrity status carries weight. Admiral Stansfield Turner is followed

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by Tina Turner. And even as Queen Elizabeth is listed under "Elizabeth," so Madonna is listed under "Madonna."

One's standing at home, however, does not appear to matter much. Nelson Mandela is here, or rather in "Pollsmoor Prison, Cape Town." Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos are still categorized as "Philippine politicians," but now of Honolulu. There is an entry for one Vellupillai Pirubhakaran, a "Sri Lankan guerrilla leader," which necessarily excludes a forwarding address.

As glimpses into history, the entries vary greatly. Deng Xiaoping's twenty-three lines trace his oscillating fortunes, and with them the turbulent history of the People's Republic of China. Nine of the fourteen lines in Daniel Ortega's biography focus on his career as a "former resistance leader." But the bulk of the entry for Jordan's King Hussein deals with his four marriages and eleven children, breathing not a word of the wars, insurgencies, and assassination attempts that have marked his reign.

Although *Who's Who in America* generally does a better job on Americans, this is a useful and entertaining survey of the rest of the world's VIPs. Kevin J. McNamara

J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker. By Brian Holden Reid. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 295 pp. $32.50.

Major General J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966) is remembered today primarily for pioneering tank warfare during the First World War and expounding fascism in the years leading up to the Second. The totality of his thought, however, has proved elusive. In all, he wrote forty-six moderately successful books, combining brilliant insight with occasional polemical padding. But as his friend Liddell Hart put it, Fuller never took the time to write the "one really great book that would be worthy of [him]."

Nevertheless, Fuller was a military intellectual of considerable significance, and with this fine study the sweep of his thought is at last accessible in one volume. Reid is a superb expositor, at home with Fuller's broad, eclectic intellectual background (for example, the mystic Aleister Crowley had an important, although soon-discarded, influence on the young Fuller), but also with the specifically military aspects of his work. By carefully explaining the military and intellectual background against which Fuller presented his ideas, Reid permits the modern reader to feel the force of their originality. His passing comments on forgotten military debates are another pleasure.

But perhaps Reid's greatest strength is in criticism. With objectivity, insight, and consummate clarity, he dissects and assesses Fuller's brilliant but sometimes quirky views. This literate volume is hard to recommend too highly. A.W.

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Out of Weakness: Healing the Wounds That Drive Us to War. By Andrew Bard Schmookler. New York: Bantam Books, 1988. 370 pp. $21.95.

How deep do the roots of war run? Do they merely reach down to the political-economic level, or do they touch the more fundamental stratum of interpersonal psychology? Schmookler, who advocates the latter view, believes that war is rooted in basic human tensions, based on real or imagined scarcity. This sounds direct enough, until Schmookler goes on to define scarcity more in psychological than material terms. Humans are aggressive, he holds, because they are insecure, overbearing because they are uncertain. Given this thesis, how does one advance peace? Schmookler suggests that behaviors such as respect and courtesy are potentially so abundant that considerate use of them can compensate, at least to some extent, for what is truly scarce. Or, looked at differently: Because war lies in the continuum of human relations, it can be controlled only if people change their behavior toward each other.

Although *Out of Weakness* is one of Bantam's "New Age Books," it is not as silly as some of its companions in that series — *The Case for Reincarnation*, say, or *The Complete Crystal Guidebook*. To be sure, Schmookler waxes mystical as he gets to the end of his book, talking about God and revelation and the "bio-civisphere." He believes that as the world becomes more crowded and "interconnected," people will not be more irritable, but healed. One may doubt this, but who knows? *Out of Weakness* is not as brilliant as its author probably hopes, but it is not bad. Read it late at night.

New Perspectives in North-South Dialogue: Essays in Honour of Olof Palme. Edited by Kofi Buenor Hadjor. Portland, Ore.: International Specialized Book Services, 1988. 368 pp. $53.00.

In death as in life, Swedish prime minister Olof Palme deserves his friends. This memorial volume brings together Fidel Castro, Robert Mugabe, Julius Nyerere, and Oliver Tambo, as well as Neil Kinnock and Swedish prime minister Ingvar Carlsson, to praise Palme's approach to freedom, development, and security. (The presence of Kinnock and Carlsson amid such company raises serious questions about their wisdom, if not their democratic commitment.)

Carlsson's piece is a funeral oration, and as such hardly an occasion to utter critical remarks. Nevertheless, his calling Palme a "champion of peace" does insult the intelligence of those who remember Palme's enthusiasm for showering communist Vietnam with economic assistance. More ingenuous are the words of Castro, Mugabe, and Nyerere, who sincerely appreciated Palme's anti-Western and anti-American beliefs, and here proudly describe him as a fellow-traveller for their less-than-democratic goals. For anyone unaware

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what role Palme played in encouraging leftist Third World dictatorships and their policies of abusive nationalization, this volume by his friends provides a good introduction. Best of all, it should be read in conjunction with descriptions about the regimes Palme embraced.

M.R.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

The Distorted World of Soviet-Type Economies. By Jan Winiecki. Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988. 223 pp. $39.95.

It has been said that the Soviet Union is a Third World state with nuclear weapons, and many scholars before Winiecki have explored the comparison between Soviet-style economies and the economies of some Third World countries. Winiecki's contribution to the development of this analogy is a thorough analysis of the behavior of Soviet managers.

According to Winiecki, Soviet-style economies become an extreme variant of the phenomenon seen in developing countries that practice "import-substitution" (the drive to replace imported goods with locally produced goods). In developing countries, "import-substitution" leads to an impoverishing lack of specialization, as each country tries to produce every good. In Soviet-style economies, the same impoverishment occurs because managers (who are able to ignore the costs involved in producing their own input) engage in a similar "import-substitution," in order to reduce their dependence on uncertain deliveries from other enterprises. The result is that many input items are then produced in such small quantities that important economies of scale are lost. Winiecki's conclusion is that managers in Soviet-style economies act rationally given the system's rules, but the rules themselves insure a highly irrational and undesirable outcome.

It is intriguing that the best analyses of the behavioral foundations of Soviet-style economies — namely, the work of Janos Kornai (who teaches in Hungary) and Jan Winiecki (who teaches in Poland) — come from within the Eastern bloc.

Empirical Macroeconomics for Interdependent Economies. Edited by Ralph Bryant, et al. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988. 332 pp. $37.95.

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Here together are two topics beloved of bureaucrats and government economists: international policy coordination and macroeconomic models. Specifically, the Brookings Institution has assembled some of the most prominent specialists in economic models in order to see how good the models are and what they can tell us about the effect one country's policies will have on another.

Many of the fourteen essays compare twelve principal models of the world economy constructed by such organizations as the University of Pennsylvania, Wharton Econometrics, the IMF, the European Community, and the Federal Reserve. The results are disappointing. Richard Cooper argues persuasively that there is "too much diversity of results among these models for the models to be of much use for policymakers." Peter Isard is even blunter: "the empirical modeling of exchange rates over the past decade has been largely a failure." While trying trying to be upbeat about modeling, three of the editors note that practical constraints require models to be much simpler than reality, and consequently models are constructed in such a way that they inevitably yield the long-term outcome the researcher thinks most likely. As a result, the editors are unable to cite any policy conclusions emerging from their analysis.

The Flight of International Capital. By Brendan Brown. London: Croom Helm, 1987. 447 pp. $49.95.

How would you have followed the ups and downs of World War II's combatants? By listening to government propaganda? By reading journalists' censored dispatches? As it happens, one of the best indicators of a country's military standing at any given moment was the price of its bank notes on the Swiss market. Currency flows are sensitive indicators of changing power relations, as *The Flight of International Capital* demonstrates.

Brown provides an account of politically motivated capital flows between countries in Europe and North America during the period 1930-1985. He does a fine job of handling the mass of detail, including such episodes as the Belgian decision to leave the gold bloc in 1935, the German currency reform after World War II, and the abolition of capital controls in Switzerland in 1949. But Brown's account of the period since 1971, when fixed exchange rates broke down, is less adept. He is at his best describing crises, and floating exchange rates do not produce the same cycle of crisis and resolution as do fixed rates.

As for the lessons of his tale, Brown seems to imply that governments cannot long withstand market forces. But this is dubious. True, Britain had to devalue its currency periodically in the 1960s when the "gnomes of Zurich" speculated heavily against the pound.

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But the more intriguing fact is that London managed a controlled decline of its currency over a period of some thirty years.

Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency. By Ed A. Hewett. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1988. 391 pp. $24.95 ($12.95, paper).

Western critics of the Soviet economy generally look at it through Western eyes: free markets are best, and because the Soviets do not have them their system is inferior. Here, by contrast, is an analysis of the system on its own terms. Oddly enough, the result not only provides a better understanding of the Soviet system's strengths (the security of assured income that Russians prize so highly), it also gives a better grasp of the economy's shortcomings (the poor absorption of new technologies).

Hewett organizes his account around three themes — the decision-making hierarchy, the information system, and the incentive system — showing first how each is supposed to function and then how it actually operates. The basic point is hardly new: the system is inflexible and requires extensive "informal" deals. But the thesis is well-developed for the general reader and Soviet specialist alike.

Hewett also offers a first-rate account of the Soviets' efforts during the last twenty-five years to reform their system. And now, in contrast to the usual Soviet approach of more output, Gorbachev is striving to improve the efficiency of production and the quality of goods. What Gorbachev does not seek is a more open economy, much as the West might wish he did. The Soviet leadership simply wants more growth for each ruble invested and increasing consumer satisfaction from what is produced. But the prospect, Hewett argues, is for limited success in both regards.

Restructuring the World Economy. By Joyce Kolko. New York: Pantheon, 1988. 381 pp. $24.95 ($12.95, paper).

Kolko's work is suitable for one audience only: those who want insight into the Marxist view of today's world economy. Unlike many others of her outlook, she makes no concessions to non-Marxist theories, even when confronted with phenomena such as the stunning economic growth in capitalist East Asian countries and the mediocre (or worse) record of the communist states. Her faith burns bright.

None of which is to deny that Kolko is well-informed and perceptive. Further, Kolko's writing style is simple and direct, eschewing Marxist jargon and academic pseudo-Marxism. The problem, rather, is that she ignores facts and difficulties that do not fit her preconceptions. She decries policies that seek prosperity through the restoration of investment incentives, preferring instead a massive stimulation of demand — in the left-Keynesian tradition. But she fails

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to specify how such a stimulus could be financed without provoking an inflationary spiral. Her discussion of labor argues that in recent years workers' conditions have deteriorated almost universally. That would come as a surprise to people in countries like South Korea where real wages have regularly risen more than 10 percent per year.

Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead. By Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. New York: Basic Books, 1988. 353 pp. $19.95.

Why have Americans been so stymied in trying to do business in Japan? Drawing on seven years as counselor for Japanese affairs at the Department of Commerce and on extensive business experience in Japan, Prestowitz argues that the answer lies less in the protectionism of Japan's government than in the attitudes and institutions of Japanese business.

American businessmen, Prestowitz observes in this lively, anecdotal book, tend to stress individual goals within a context of prescribed rights and rules. The Japanese, by contrast, emphasize harmony and conformity within a context of informal guidance from ministerial bureaucracies. Trade negotiations between the United States and Japan, which focus only on changing rules, therefore work to Japan's advantage. They do nothing to increase Japanese imports, because the barriers to American trade in Japan are based not on laws, but on custom. Some might fault Prestowitz for resting his analysis on anecdotes rather than economic data, but the problem he delineates is hard to quantify. Moreover, his stories cover a wide range of industries and a long span of time, suggesting the incidents he cites are not isolated.

Unfortunately, Prestowitz's recommendations are less impressive than his analysis. In an effort to make the societies more alike, he urges negotiations that focus on results rather than rules, plus a fundamental boost to Japanese consumption and American production. The first idea has disadvantages that Prestowitz does not explore, and the second seems unlikely to be accomplished in the near future.

THE UNITED STATES
by Adam M. Garfinkle

Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy. By D. Michael Shafer. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988. 331 pp. $34.50.

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Can a policy fail if it does not exist? That is the intriguing question raised by Shafer's effort to document the failure of U.S. "counterinsurgency policy" in the Third World. To be sure, Shafer dismantles with convincing and elegant reasoning the half-baked counterinsurgency efforts of the Kennedy era. But even then no doctrine existed beyond the infatuations of a few academics. Certainly, it was never seriously cultivated by professional military men. For most of the latter any such doctrine was and is an unpleasant political obligation. Shafer is attacking a straw man.

Quite often, the author builds his straw men from opinions expressed by Reagan administration spokesmen. While these spokesmen, like their predecessors since 1960, do not have a counterinsurgency doctrine, they have added some sophistication to the examination of insurgency phenomena. Contrary to Shafer's caricature, for example, the Departments of Defense and State do not blame the Soviets for creating insurgent threats in places like El Salvador or the Philippines, but merely for fanning these insurgencies. Such distinctions apparently elude Shafer, who claims that any generalizations about insurgency are necessarily crude. But if there are no valid generalizations, from place to place and across time, then there is no reason to speak about "insurgency" or "counterinsurgency" as such, no possibility of learning from the past, and the author has simply wasted his time. M.R.

From Protest to Policy: Beyond the Freeze to Common Security. By Pam Solo. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988. 214 pp. $19.95.

Solo was a professional activist for a nuclear freeze in the early 1980s and this book is an inside account of the movement, her assessment of its impact, and her views about what peace activists should do next.

As an account of the freeze movement, it is a feel-good book for participants. Solo quotes fellow activists, who laud the freeze movement as a breakthrough in human history, give tongue to every shibboleth of their tribe, and predictably demonize the U.S. government. The freeze's impact? Solo repeats the standard line: public pressure forced the administration against its instincts to take arms control seriously. That the Reagan administration proposed and stuck with the zero option for six years, and eventually won the INF Treaty for its labors — this despite and not because of the activities of the "peace movement" — is left unmentioned.

And what next for the peace brigade? Solo defines her notion of "Common Security" with eight assertions, such as: "True security is reached not by amassing weapons but by restoring our social and economic integrity." How will this Common Security be achieved? Not by "pragmatic and realistic" policies, she writes. "Washington-

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generated realism often has little to do with what the rest of the country is ready for." Solo, of course, presumes to know what the country is ready for and if the country doesn't know what it's ready for, that is because of a "crisis in leadership." Naturally, new leadership must "come from the peace movement." For sheer presumption and tautological reasoning, this book takes the brass ring. It is also a fine example of the intellectual narcissism and monastical mentality of the American "peace" movement.

The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace. By Strobe Talbott. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988. 416 pp. $19.95.

This is Talbott's third book on arms control, each one worse than the one before. *Endgame* (about SALT II) was flawed by its pro-treaty bias and its lack of a broad understanding of arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations. An even more decided good guys-bad guys approach marred *Deadly Gambits* (on arms control in the first Reagan administration), as well as the author's having misconstrued where the real action was and was not. In *The Master of the Game*, Talbott's good guys-bad guys approach has gotten completely out of hand.

In Talbott's construction, Paul Nitze has been a moderate-hawk in an administration of ultra-hawks. He opposed SDI and believed in old-fashioned deterrence and arms control, while Reagan and the others believed in SDI, wanted not to rely on deterrence, and on principle opposed arms control. Through luck and skill, argues Talbott, Nitze transformed the terrible administration of the first term to the more reasonable one of the second. The thesis is a caricature, and the book is riddled with simplifications and misinterpretations made to fit it.

Nevertheless, Talbott's original material makes the book must reading for arms control specialists, and therein lies a problem. A judicious use of the book requires that a reader know almost as much as the author, since it is not always clear what Talbott has misconceived or misunderstood. Because few readers qualify, the author's interpretations are likely to be swallowed along with his data. Thus, Talbott is not merely setting down the historical record, he is helping to create it. *Caveat lector.*

Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers. By Steven Kull. New York: Basic Books, 1988. 341 pp. $21.95.

The deterrent power of nuclear weapons is a centaur concept, half military fact, half psychological dynamic. Consequently, nuclear strategy can alter, plans can be made and undone, all without a shot being fired. Strategic thinking in the nuclear age is suffused with paradox and uncertainty, boldness and fear. Kull looks at these issues

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through the eyes of America's nuclear strategists, of whom he has interviewed dozens. The trouble is, Kull really has no interest in the essence of strategic logic or the people who deal with it. Instead, he exploits his method to showcase his own views: that maintaining a nuclear balance lacks any rationale; that nuclear weapons can never be used; and that nuclear strategy is therefore a contradiction in terms.

Kull is not above misrepresenting those he has interviewed. He implies that all policy makers believe, as he does, that the nuclear balance has no military significance, and that they pretend otherwise only for political effect which, Kull believes, is ultimately futile and dangerous. That is simply untrue. To disparage the idea that American doctrine must be responsive to Soviet planning, he traps his interviewees with unanswerable recursive questions: How do you know Soviet planners are not second-guessing you the same way that you are second guessing them?

Most people who work in the area of nuclear strategy understand that its paradoxes are real, not the psychological primitivisms that Kull implies they are. They also know that there is no stark and simple universal logic to deterrence, but that political culture matters a great deal. It is a pity that Kull did not try to learn more from the people he talked with.

The 1988 Media Guide: A Critical Review of the Print Media. Edited by Jude Wanniski. Morristown, N.J.: Polyconomics, Inc., 1988. 432 pp. $17.95.

The media do not normally receive the same level of scrutiny they direct at other institutions, but they ought to. This annual reference work is an attempt, but unfortunately it is accurately self-described as "a kind of Michelin Guide to the national print media" — that is, more like a book of restaurant reviews than a hard-hitting news analysis.

The heart of the book is its rating of 650 prominent, mostly American, journalists including 221 correspondents assigned to foreign affairs and 45 assigned to national security, defense, or diplomatic beats. The ratings, however, often lack clarity and objectivity. Here, for example, is how the *Guide* begins its rating of *New York Times* Washington reporter Joel Brinkley: "We rapped Brinkley last year for his erratic reporting. This year, he's still erratic, but the bad stuff isn't so awful and the good stuff is getting better." How would the target of such criticism rebut it?

More informative are the 1,000-plus biographical entries for journalists, editors, and publishers. We learn that Jack Anderson was a Mormon missionary before he became a crusading columnist; that Alan Riding, chief of *The New York Times*'s bureau in Rio de Janeiro,

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was born there in 1943; and that James Reston was traveling secretary for the Cincinnati Reds before launching his career in journalism as — what else? — a sportswriter. Kevin J. McNamara

The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia. By Andrew J. Rotter. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988. 290 pp. $29.95.

Linkage always provided the strongest argument for supporting South Vietnam: a defeat in Saigon would imperil Southeast and East Asia, and thereby might damage the security of Europe. Rotter's extensive archival research persuasively demonstrates that such linkage considerations mattered, even as far back as the late 1940s and early 1950s. (His narrative stops with the Korean War.) Southeast Asia had been assigned an important role in American plans for a post-World War II economic recovery not just in the Asian scheme, but for Europe too. For example, it was hoped that, with China closed after 1949, an impoverished Japan would find the markets it needed in Southeast Asia. In addition, colonial rubber plantations in Malaya were expected to generate some of the dollars needed by debt-strapped Britain. From this viewpoint, the long holding operation in Vietnam served a purpose: by the time Saigon fell, the damage could be contained. The immediate neighbors were strong enough to stand, while Europe and Japan were no longer vulnerable.

Rotter's introduction, however, suggests he would disown any such implications, and, like most scholars, simply condemn the American role in Vietnam. Yet his own facts, not to mention the evolution of postwar Asia, seem to vindicate the American role — in conception if not in execution. And this is an inconsistency that eventually must be addressed. A.W.

Reunion: A Memoir. By Tom Hayden. New York: Random House, 1988. 539 pp. $22.50. **Political Passages: Journeys of Change Through Two Decades, 1968-1988.** Edited by John H. Bunzel. New York: The Free Press, 1988. 354 pp. $21.95.

Memoirs from the 1960s tend to come in two varieties: chest-thumping or breast-beating. Here is one of each.

Tom Hayden relives the 1960s as he remembers them, which is selectively. He does not remember encouraging violence at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968 or during the Days of Rage in Chicago in 1969. He does not remember calling for a mass revolutionary Communist party. He does recall a visit to Hanoi in 1965, but his purpose is to confess minor sins to hide major ones. He admits to having been overly romantic about the Vietnamese revolution, but he still holds that "the Vietnamese conducted one of the most remarkable and heroic resistances to foreign intervention

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in the annals of history," as if there were no Vietnamese vs. Vietnamese dimension to the war. Worst of all, the book gives the impression of having been too easily written, as if the author engaged in no personal struggle through putting these years on paper. History falls off Hayden's soul like water off a duck's back.

Political Passages is a very different look back, bringing together the stories of twelve individuals who were left-of-center in the 1960s and are now right-of-center. Unlike Hayden, all of these people have struggled and suffered (some perhaps more than necessary), and all have carved out impressive careers, mainly in literary endeavors. Not all of their accounts are equally interesting, of course, but many have streaks of brilliance. Peter Collier's epistle reads like a sparkling novel. Michael Novak combines personal and philosophical insight with rare balance. And David Horowitz's "Letter to a Political Friend" may be the most effective and moving anti-radical polemic of modern times.

Neither book gets us beyond the personal and the anecdotal, however. Even as the raw material accumulates, the serious analytical work on the antiwar movement and its times has not yet been written.

The Survival of The Adversary Culture. By Paul Hollander. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988. 299 pp. $27.95.

Lionel Trilling invented the phrase "the adversary culture" in the 1950s to describe the psychological and political hostility of Western intellectuals to the bourgeois capitalist society around them. But today few people study the adversary culture, principally because its legions intimidate critics by immediately raising the cries of red-baiting and McCarthyism. That this generally works is itself a reflection of its strength in post-Vietnam America. Indeed, this is Hollander's main thesis: that much of the vocabulary and metaphors of the adversary culture have been mainstreamed into our politics such that the entire spectrum of thought about political issues has shifted leftward. Hollander, however, is not intimidated, and he is clearly not happy with the shift.

The Survival of the Adversary Culture collects essays analyzing the adversary culture's impact on the political discourse in contemporary America. Hollander looks at such subjects as the evolving views of George Kennan, the "sister cities" phenomenon, "durable misconceptions" about the Soviet Union, such as the one that assumes Soviet military might to be based on a forgivable paranoia about the past, the appeal of Latin American revolutionary violence, the phenomenon of political pilgrimage, and the self-flaggelating characteristics of American social criticism.

Though critical of the adversary culture and worried about its influence, Hollander is never shrill or smugly polemical. Unfortu-

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nately, the author limits himself to intellectual matters, and rarely tracks an idea from its origin in the adversary culture to its impact on U.S. policy. But an author cannot be faulted for something he did not set out to do; and he has provided an excellent basis for others to carry the story forward.

EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia. By Vladimir Tismaneanu. New York: Routledge, 1988. 232 pp. $35.00.

Communist regimes rely upon Marxist ideology and its promise of a future utopia to legitimate political power and terror alike. Yet, within Eastern Europe, the irrefutable reality is that Marxism has reached theoretical and psychological bankruptcy. How has this crisis come about? Tismaneanu's slim but substantial volume provides an incisive explanation: Marxism with a human face is just not a possibility, and East Europeans have come to realize it. Tismaneanu agrees with Leszek Kolakowski, the Polish philosopher, that Leninism and Stalinism are inseparable from Marx's original vision.

One particularly useful aspect of Tismaneanu's work lies in the way it compares Western Marxists and peace movements with their East European counterparts. Tismaneanu notes that, over the years, Western Marxism has become "increasingly aristocratic, self-enclosed, ostentatiously radical and attracted to nebulous utopia." The contrast with Eastern Europe's frank return to reality underlines the lack of moral and intellectual equivalence between the two societies.

Perhaps the most important element in this East-West contrast is the inability — or unwillingness — of Western peace activists to appreciate that *peace* in socialist parlance means the Western acceptance of Soviet rule and expansion. By contrast, Tismaneanu reminds us, East European dissidents realize that true peace must include peace with freedom, peace between the individual and the state, as well as between states or blocs.

Tismaneanu's breathtaking knowledge of East European thought, his sure conclusions, and elegant language will undoubtedly launch him as a major figure in the field of Marxist scholarship.

Juliana Geran Pilon

Dreams and Delusions: The Drama of German History. By Fritz Stern. New York: Knopf, 1987. 323 pp. $19.95.

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"We were not all opportunists." So said the German expressionist poet Gottfried Benn of his early sympathy with National Socialism, and Stern takes the words seriously. On the contrary, Stern shows, Hitler's takeover was facilitated by a kind of anti-opportunism: a widespread readiness to engage in sacrificial pageants, yielding the self over to a magic savior who would in return abolish all anguish and anxieties. In this collection of interpretive essays by one of modern Germany's most knowledgeable historians, the discussion of "National Socialism as temptation" stands out. It is an impressive analysis of the roles that histrionics, symbolism, and irrationality played in the triumph of Hitlerism. "The great appeal of National Socialism — and perhaps of every totalitarian dictatorship in this century — was the promise of absolute authority," Stern writes. Through the "dramaturgy of Nationalist Socialist spectacle," many Germans were persuaded to abandon their cumbersome and demanding political freedoms. They found it much easier to let the Führer think for them.

Other essays in this seminal volume explore the fate of German Jewry, Albert Einstein's dreams of peace and reconciliation, relations between Germany and the United States, and the approach of American scholars to the German past. As with Stern's previous studies, the essays included here are a wellspring of moral and intellectual nourishment.

Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge. By Karen Dawisha. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 268 pp. $29.95 ($12.95, paper).

On various occasions, Gorbachev has declared that the Brezhnev doctrine has lost its validity and that the USSR will not intervene to curb East European movements toward democratization. Is this true? How far can political and economic changes go in Eastern Europe until Moscow feels its empire is jeopardized? Dawisha offers an original and well-documented analysis of the system binding the Soviet Union and its vassals. She rightly sees Gorbachev's agenda in Eastern Europe determined by his desire for economic modernization there and in the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev sometimes goes further and seems to promote the idea of European integration, but Dawisha warns that such utterances should not engender wishful thinking. Even the most open-minded Soviet leader will not encourage centrifugal trends. She correctly concludes that "Gorbachev may turn out to be a 'Westernizer' prepared to allow the democratization and liberalization of Eastern Europe within the continued framework of communist rule." But what Gorbachev wants may no longer be the last word. In Eastern Europe, the times of hopeless paralysis seem over. Dawisha rightly notes that Gorbachev's reforms as well as his pledge of "new thinking" in foreign policy have dramatically catalyzed the yearning for a post-Yalta

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world. A new, radical activism might eventually result in uncontrollable mass movements for full-scale political changes. What would happen then?

The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism. By William E. Crowther. New York: Praeger, 1988. 216 pp. $49.95.

Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu enjoys being different. Widely perceived as the Soviet bloc's last hardened Stalinist, Ceausescu has greeted Gorbachev's attempt at "socialist renewal" by stepping up his level of repression. While in other East European states, moderate liberalization has resulted in a compromise between the party-state and the "co-opted" intelligentsia, Romania under Ceausescu continues to practice an extreme form of neo-Stalinist populism, colored with strident nationalism.

Crowther examines the historical and sociological premises of Ceausescu's personal dictatorship. He argues that authoritarian elements within the political culture and the enduring nationalist bent of the political elite result permit Ceausescu to maintain an essentially Stalinist agenda. At the same time, these elements have contributed to the regime's failure to expand its power base, integrate the intellectual-managerial class, or advance toward a post-totalitarian order.

Crowther attempts to answer the question of why Romania alone clings so resolutely to the discredited corporatist mythology at a time when other East European countries with similar legacies of authoritarian right-wing ideologies (Hungary, Poland) have fared much better. But Crowther's careful research suffers from misplaced emphases, most notably on the class model. This leads him frequently to gloss over the inner workings at the top of communist hierarchy, where factional conflicts, attempts to limit Ceausescu's power, and more modern attitudes are increasingly important.

The Prague Spring: A Mixed Legacy. Edited by Jiri Pehe. Perspectives on Freedom No. 10. New York: Freedom House, 1988. 236 pp. $12.50.

Moscow in 1988 seems to have taken up the Prague Spring's 1968 ideal of "socialism with a human face." But both the differences and similarities between the two give cause for concern, as members of the Czechoslovak Reform Movement make clear in this welcome collection of essays. They bring together invaluable information about those who twenty years before Gorbachev tried to rehabilitate the notion of a communism that was not Stalinist.

The Prague Spring attempted to restore the democratic heritage of the Czechoslovak republic, a heritage Russia did not have and the Soviet Union does not have; for this reason, Moscow will always be different from Prague. They are similar in that Dubcek's and Gorbachev's efforts are both limited attempts to reform communism. Unfortunately, as the philosopher Ivan Svitak notes, even during the

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eight months of party-tolerated reforms, an ever-widening gulf separated those who sought democratic rule for society and those party members who sought only a limited democratization of their party's internal processes. This is a lesson worth remembering.

Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954. By George H. Hodos. New York: Praeger, 1987. 193 pp. $39.95.

Following the subjugation of Eastern Europe in the late 1940s, the regimes of those countries imported Stalin's terror methods. Show trials became a crucial component of the totalitarian one-party system; they had the virtue of showing the enemy to be everywhere, even at the heart of the Leninist party. Show trials created a universal climate of fear, turning whole populations into witnesses and accomplices. Hodos, a victim of the 1949 Rajk trial in Budapest, witnessed this perverse game from within, making his book not only a comprehensive history of the great frame-ups in the people's democracies, but also a masterful attempt to explain the logic of self-denunciation by former communist officials. More effective than torture, Hodos shows, was the victims' inability to admit that their own comrades could organize these infernal farces. Having been educated in the cult of the party, most of the accused failed to realize the scope of the moral decay within the communist elites. They had been zealots for so long that their faith could motivate even collaboration in their own damnation and self-annihilation. Hodos writes: "Their moral resistance collapsed; they felt guilty because the party told them they were guilty, and the party was always right." Hodos's book fills in many missing points in the history of Eastern Europe's Stalinization.

Spanish Marxism versus Soviet Communism: A History of the P.O.U.M. By Victor Alba and Stephen Schwartz. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988. 448 pp. $44.95.

Spain's Communist party was, during the Spanish Civil War, a mere instrument of Stalin's desire to establish a Soviet-type police state in Spain. But despite all the documentation, many observers remain reluctant to reconsider their image of the war as a conflict between revolutionary angels and counter-revolutionary beasts. Perhaps this book will help them. With admirable dispassion, the authors describe the rise and bloody end of the Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (P.O.U.M.), a Spanish political group that dared challenge Stalin and pursue an independent, anti-authoritarian leftism. Labeled "Trotskyites" by Stalin's Spanish agents and besmirched by the Comintern's propaganda machine, P.O.U.M. members heroically decided to resist the Communists' attempt to usurp and disfigure the Spanish revolution. They may have been romantic, but they were not driven

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by the power lust of Stalin's lackeys. The massacre of P.O.U.M. leaders in 1937 inspired George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia*, one of the first great documents of anti-totalitarian literature.

The authors dispel all illusions about the Spanish Communists' role or motives in organizing the persecution of the independent Marxists. The P.O.U.M.'s sin was to represent an alternative revolutionary view and to question the Stalinist claim to total power. Indeed, the true architect of the anti-P.O.U.M. terror was Stalin himself. As the authors write, "Stalin was the gravedigger of the Spanish revolution, just as he was that of the Russian revolution."

THE SOVIET UNION
by Nicolai Petro

The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within. By Geoffrey Hosking. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985. 527 pp. $10.95.

Despite the increasing number of surveys of Soviet society, there is generally little to distinguish one from another. They invariably focus on the stars of the Soviet ruling elite, treating the rest of society like bit-part actors playing out a familiar drama. This makes Hosking's contribution especially welcome. While not failing to note key events and people, he brings the common people of the Soviet Union to life by making them the main characters of his book. Thus, the reader gets a sense of the horrendous personal costs of collectivization, Stalin's terror, and the Second World War . . . as well as an understanding of the people's postwar hopes for a more tranquil life. This perspective on the evolution of Soviet society offers students an opportunity to understand the historical roots of the current Soviet reform movement and the aspirations of a people striving for normality. Although completed before Gorbachev came to power, Hosking's survey is still one of the best available.

The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future. Edited by Robert Conquest. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 406 pp. $27.95.

Recent unrest has proven Conquest's interest in nationalism in the USSR prescient. Particularly welcome is the inclusion of Great Russian national sentiment along with other ethnic strivings, rather than in contraposition to them. Essays by Alain Besançon, Vladislav Krasnov, and the late Hugh Seton-Watson highlight the important yet often overlooked distinction between Soviet internationalist "pa-

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triotism" and true Russian patriotism. Several essays discuss themes of Union-wide nationalist concern: religion, language, the fear of demographic displacement or even extinction, and the implications of resurgent nationalism for the outside world.

Unfortunately some national groups — the Byelorussians, Armenians, Georgians, and Azeris — are dealt with only in passing, but one book cannot cover everything.

Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform. By Jerry Hough. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. 301 pp. $19.95.

Hough, a well-informed but controversial observer of Soviet politics, paints a picture of an assertive Gorbachev confidently pursuing his policy of radical reform, with the party elite rooting for him all the way. Indeed, as Hough sees it, the only danger to reform is that intellectuals may let Gorbachev's "democratization" go to their head, and start demanding democracy. As regards foreign policy, Hough argues that Americans have missed the real danger posed by Gorbachev's reforms. A less ideological Soviet Union will be willing to make serious concessions to the Western allies. If the United States opposes such concessions, the West Europeans and Japanese are going to view the United States, rather than the Soviets, as the party preventing a resolution of international tensions.

True to form, Hough comes up with some zingers that are carefully crafted to taunt conservative Kremlin-watchers — lines like: "Gorbachev's program constituted a fundamental repudiation of the essence of the [Bolshevik] revolution." While it is difficult to agree with all of Hough's conclusions, *Russia and the West* is an exciting book because it tries to answer the question of how Gorbachev has emerged. Hough lives up to his reputation as this country's most provocative analyst of Soviet affairs.

Soviet Industry From Stalin to Gorbachev: Essays on Management and Innovation. By Joseph S. Berliner. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988. 306 pp. $34.50.

Soviet leaders wish fervently to revitalize their industries; indeed, improvements in economic productivity will be the principal measure by which Gorbachev's *perestroika* — economic restructuring — will ultimately be judged, as Gorbachev himself acknowledges. In these essays, the fruit of nearly forty years' research, Berliner demonstrates how Soviet reform programs have repeatedly run up against the host of structural problems endemic to centrally planned economies: monetary policy, managerial incentives, bureaucratic organization, and the introduction of new technology. Berliner shows why persistent shortages are fundamental to central economic planning.

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It is therefore startling to read Berliner's conclusion that the cause of the USSR's economic woes may, after all, be only some as-yet-undiagnosed deficiency in the execution of central planning; that ways may yet be found to eliminate its adverse effects. Such assertions are compatible neither with the evidence of his own book nor with some frank testimony of Gorbachev's own economic advisers. How much longer must the citizens of Soviet-style regimes suffer deprivation before "scientific certainty" rules out the possibility of a Soviet economic miracle?

Soviet Politics from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. By Donald R. Kelley. New York: Praeger, 1987. 242 pp. $37.95 ($14.95, paper).

Wouldn't it be useful to have a cut-and-dried account of the political transitions that occurred in Kremlin politics from the end of Brezhnev's reign to the emergence of Gorbachev? Kelley apparently thought so, and that is what his book chronicles. Focusing most of his attention on the Andropov-Chernenko interregnum, he provides the names and biographies of all the important players in the power struggles of the post-Brezhnev years, ending just after the 27th Party Congress. Unfortunately, Kelley's discussion offers little about the broader context of Soviet society, and thus the gravity of the need for change is never fully brought home to the reader. Nor does he offer much analysis. He has produced, rather, a useful reference work for those who need to refresh their memory about exactly what happened during the period of transition between Brezhnev and Gorbachev — a simple but solid, readable, and tightly structured account of maneuvering for power in the Kremlin.

The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Third World. Edited by Roger E. Kanet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 233 pp. $39.50.

Kanet has assembled many of those few Western scholars interested in examining Soviet bloc attitudes and practices in the Third World from the perspective of Sovietology rather than global strategy or ideology.

The advantages and pitfalls of such an approach are made clear in Elisabeth Kridl Valkenier's chapter on Soviet perceptions of revolutionary change in the Third World. After thoroughly analyzing Soviet academic studies of the topic, she argues that since the brief Andropov interlude there has been a clear Soviet disenchantment with Third World "states of socialist orientation." But Soviet academics do not necessarily represent or even share the attitudes and perceptions of Soviet policy makers. Hence, Valkenier's picture of Soviet perceptions may be somewhat unreal, especially given the absence of any attempt to compare expert opinion with actual Soviet behavior.

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Similar problems are apparent in Mark Katz's informative overview of anti-Soviet insurgencies in the Third World. He makes no attempt to see the rise of armed resistance to Soviet Third World ventures as cumulative, but tends to treat each instance as an isolated case. Kanet's introduction is perhaps the most realistic and sensible section. He assesses the growing problems faced by the Soviets in the Third World and at home, but recognizes that the cost of empire is unlikely to result in a Soviet withdrawal from Third World commitments.

Understanding Soviet Politics: The Perspective of Russian History. By Cyril E. Black. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 308 pp. $41.50.

What is the impact of Russian history on the Soviet Union? What limits does it place on aspirations for reform? Black offers a distillation of forty years' thinking on these questions and argues for strong historical continuity between pre-revolutionary Russia and the USSR. Contemporary Soviet politics, efforts at modernization, and intentions toward the West are all best understood by extrapolating from Russian history.

As with any simple answer to a complex issue, Black's thesis ignores evidence that does not fit. He gives a rather one-sided account of Russia as a nation that did not resist the traumatic transition from a traditional, religious, agrarian society into a rapidly industrializing, atheist, world power. But why, if Lenin's polity already embodied traditional Russian values, are we reading today about the urgent need to re-examine pre-revolutionary cultural traditions and values? In the end, Black's adherence to an extreme form of the continuity thesis confirms the common wisdom of his field.

THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

Cambridge Atlas of the Middle East and North Africa. By Gerald Blake, John Dewdney, and Jonathan Mitchell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 124 pp. $75.00.

Three members of the Department of Geography at the University of Durham have collaborated to produce an important reference work on the current state of the region stretching from Morocco to Iran and from Turkey to the Sudan. Using a single map through nearly the whole book, the authors look at natural geography, history, culture, population, economics, transportation, waterways, boundaries, and wars.

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The section on economics is the largest and perhaps the most informative. Map after map highlights several points: the imbalance that results from extreme oil wealth and no other significant economic activity; the way in which Turkey and Israel stand out from all the other countries of the region; and the clustering of economic activity near two seas, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Other, more unexpected facts also emerge: Saudi Arabia has a pre-eminent role in the Middle East's matrix of air routes; and 58 percent of state boundaries follow geometric guidelines, whereas only 35 percent follow natural physical features.

Just one major mistake flaws this fine atlas. A misconceived effort to portray the ethno-linguistic regions of the Middle East falls into the old but still common trap of equating language with ethnicity. The results — treating Arabs and Jews as members of the Semitic "ethno-linguistic group," for example — are as nonsensical as lumping together all English-speaking Americans and calling them Anglo-Saxons.

Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine. By Avi Shlaim. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 676 pp. $40.00.

Is this "the amazing true story of the secret Arab-Zionist agreement that partitioned Palestine"? So says the publisher. But the story itself is familiar to anyone who knows the history of Israel's birth in 1948. Still, if Shlaim reveals little that is unknown, he does bring the details into a single account, making it newly possible to see the 1947-1951 period and all the actors as a whole. Much of the information is fascinating — for example, why the British opposed the creation of an independent Palestinian state and the Israelis favored it; or, how Transjordanian and Israeli leaders nearly agreed to stage mock battles to fool the Arabs. Shlaim also makes a good case for some novel views, for example, that Ernest Bevin had a benign attitude toward Israel's birth.

The trouble with the book lies in its strong anti-Israel animus. Although an Israeli himself, Shlaim makes it his task to discredit those he calls "Zionist historians." Fine. But who is Shlaim to say that, despite David Ben-Gurion's declaration that a Jewish-Arab alliance was one of his main objectives, "deep in his heart, he rejoiced at the flight of the Arabs"? And why does he criticize only Israelis and never Arabs for "aggressiveness," "provocations," and "fanaticism"? This sort of partiality pervades the text.

Indeed, the very title bares Shlaim's bias, for as he himself admits, "collusion" connotes "a shabby and secret deal," and his study strongly suggests there was something disreputable about 'Abdullah's reaching agreements with the Zionists. Indulging in so pointed and

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parochial a revisionism mortally injures what could have been a fine work of scholarship.

For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. By Ian S. Lustick. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. 244 pp. $11.95 (paper).

The religious messianism that developed in Israel after 1967 has become so active politically that it now drives that country's *Kulturkampf*. This fundamentalist movement, combined with the religiously orthodox (who are not the same people), has changed Israel's secularist and progressive image among Western liberals. Lustick describes the first phenomena and exemplifies the second.

He argues that fundamentalist extremism represents the redemptive temptation — seeking the end of history as we know it — that has plagued Jewish political life many times in centuries past. He appreciates some of the inner world of fundamentalist Jews and comprehends many of the differences among them. He has done good research, although he depends heavily on Israeli secularist writings, and those mainly in translation.

At the same time, Lustick betrays extreme discomfort with the fundamentalists. He believes they "will prevent the Israeli political system from responding positively . . . to opportunities to achieve [a peace] agreement, no matter how attractive its terms." This might be a greater worry had the Arabs actually offered more opportunities for peace in the last forty years; to suggest that Israeli fundamentalists are or may become the main impediment to peace is far-fetched indeed. Lustick then suggests that the fundamentalists may even take power in Israel, in which case they will threaten United States interests much the same way Khomeini's Iran does. He argues that the United States should intervene in Israeli politics to support forces opposed to fundamentalists. Such speculative exaggerations and loose talk are so irresponsible that they overshadow whatever useful research has been done here. They also make one wonder just who is the extremist in this story. A.M.G.

The Middle East Military Balance, 1987-1988. By Aharon Levran and Zeev Eytan. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 498 pp. $45.00.

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University annually publishes a survey of security issues that, roughly speaking, does for the Middle East what the International Institute for Security Studies' *Military Balance* does for the whole world. The difference, of course, lies in the level of detail. This volume's 250 pages of essays deal authoritatively with such subjects as Syrian efforts in Lebanon, terrorism, the Arab-Israeli air and naval balances, and the evolution of the Syrian armed forces. Then, 230 pages of tables and lists provide

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a uniquely informed and detailed accounting of weapons and manpower in the region from Morocco to Iran. Where else could one hope to find a listing of South Yemeni transport aircraft or Qatari armored personnel carriers? Clearly, the authors are well-informed; in addition, they draw on the collective expertise of the Israel Defense Forces, further enhancing their work's information and authoritativeness.

Oil and Labor in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and the Oil Boom. By Peter N. Woodward. New York: Praeger, 1988. 195 pp. $39.95.

Title and publisher notwithstanding, this is not another dry account about labor patterns in the Persian Gulf, but a well-written, insightful, first-hand account of expatriate life in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps most valuable are the detailed descriptions of many phenomena that would otherwise go unrecorded: a productivity index of the principal nationalities employed in Saudi Arabia (Americans at the top with a 1, followed by Europeans at 1.25, Indonesians at 2, and ending up with Indians and Sri Lankans at 4); a look inside the startling workings of a Saudi firm; a tour d'horizon of foreigners' living conditions; and a telling contrast between the Third World natives' family-oriented motives for working in Saudi Arabia and the Westerners' rather more egoistical goals.

The Political Language of Islam. By Bernard Lewis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. 168 pp. $14.95.

Lewis, the most eminent Middle East specialist in the English-speaking world, has written an original and highly informative study. As do several other of his recent books (notably *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* and *The Jews of Islam*), his new work offers a synoptic view based on wide readings over a long career — and a superb filing system. The heart of *Political Language* is a systematic survey of Arabic and Turkish words bearing on public life. This approach allows Lewis to show the underpinnings of political thinking among the Muslims, as well as the great divide between the premises of their thinking and those of Western political theory. He argues that "the political language of Islam is acquiring a new relevance and a new significance. It is also acquiring a new content." Lewis's study offers all the virtues of a solid reference book plus the insightful asides and profound generalizations one has come to expect from his writings.

Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon: The Experience of Five Industrial Nations. By Roy Licklider. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. xv + 343 pp. $38.50.

Although "we have learned a good deal about the economic consequences of the oil weapon, we remain largely ignorant of its

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political impact," Licklider maintains. To correct this imbalance, he scrutinizes closely the behavior of five oil-consumer states (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the United States) in the mid-1970s. The result is a fascinating, subtle, and well-argued review.

The Arabs' goal in 1973-74 was a change in policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, but this the oil embargo did not get them. Indeed, Licklider can find "almost no policy change on the Arab-Israeli dispute" by the five states, confirming the nearly universal conclusion that economic sanctions do not work.

But something else happened in 1973-74 — the oil boom. If the embargo was not effective, the vast increase in the wealth of some Arab countries was. Increased Arab purchasing power, not the fear of future oil shortages, did indeed lead to changes in the way that the five industrial states approached Middle East politics. Specifically, all of them eventually moved in the Arabs' direction. Where the threat of embargo failed, the threat of boycott worked.

Licklider draws theoretical and policy conclusions from his analysis. Theoretically, he sees 1973-74 confirming that "it is extremely difficult to force a target state to alter its policy on a topic the target feels is important." Practically, he sees future attempts to brandish the oil weapon — or any other commodity sanction — producing even more meager results than the Arab effort.

Toward Arab-Israeli Peace: Report of a Study Group. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988. 42 pp. $3.95.
Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988. 113 pp. $7.50.

These two brief works seek to influence policy chiefly by the names associated with them. Thus, the Brookings report was "coordinated" by William B. Quandt (possibly the most prominent Middle East expert associated with the Democratic party), and co-chaired by Herman Eilts and Samuel Lewis, two diplomats of long experience. Its study group included Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr., Rita Hauser, Paul Jabber, Charles McC. Mathias, Robert Neumann, Harold Saunders, and Kenneth Wollack. The second book's committee, chaired by Lawrence Eagleburger and Walter Mondale, included Stuart Eizenstat, Frank Fukuyama, Richard Haass, Robert Hunter, Charles Krauthammer, Ann Lewis, Michael Mandelbaum, Joseph Nye, Jr., Daniel Pipes, Dennis Ross, Barry Rubin, Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Tucker.

Judging by its make-up, one might expect the Brookings committee to be less sympathetic to Israeli concerns, and it is. Specific differences between the two emerge over such important questions

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as: How much should the Soviets be involved, and at what stage? How much of a veto over the peace process should the PLO have? And, how confrontational a stand should Washington take toward Syria?

More striking, though, is the similarity between the two groups' assumptions: on Jordan's central role, the limits of U.S. leverage, the significance of the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, the obstacles posed by Middle East divisions (in Israel, the Arab world, and the Palestinian nationalist movement), the need for interim steps, and the dangers of techno-military competition. Does this mean consensus is emerging over U.S. Middle East policy? Yes, perhaps it does. A.M.G.

AFRICA
by Michael Radu

Africa in the 1990s and Beyond: U.S. Policy Opportunities and Choices. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. Algonac, Mich.: Reference Publications, 1988. 309 pp. $12.95 (paper).

Despite contributions by a number of respected Africanists, the contents of *Africa in the 1990s and Beyond* repeats well-worn policy recommendations that have already failed. Specifically, many of these pieces include a premise that has proved disastrous: the assumption that the United States should shun the use of leverage with black-ruled African states. David Laitin commends the Reagan administration's refusal to use the huge infusions of U.S. famine relief for political purposes against the genocidal Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. Mohamed El-Ashry and Dorsey Burger suggest that providers of foreign (read: U.S.) assistance to Africa should not dictate the direction of development in that region, but that foreign benefactors should instead "pay more attention to what the recipient countries and their people want." The problem with that approach is that "the people" are seldom knowledgeable about development priorities. And, even if they were, their wishes rarely count; rather, the whims of dictatorial governments reign supreme. Such governments should not be considered legitimate actors in the process of problem resolution; they are the root of the problem.

The recommendations offered here provide little help to those (admittedly few) policy makers in Washington who would like to see a larger and more positive U.S. influence in Africa. Instead, the book rehashes the policies of the Carter administration and offers them up in a barely refurbished package.

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In the Name of Apartheid. By Martin Meredith. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. 252 pp. $25.00.

Superficial, emotional, and biased writing on South Africa has become a worldwide indulgence, and this book provides another example of the genre. The author, a British journalist, tries to go beyond the limitations of his trade by using an extensive (if one-sided) bibliography, but succeeds only in repeating banal assumptions. More interesting is that Meredith's reporting belies his own thesis — that no significant reform in the structures of apartheid has taken place. What of the dismantling of the "pass" laws, the legalization of blacks' right to live in urban areas as South African citizens, and the like?

Descriptions of the ruling National party and the African National Congress (ANC) illustrate the author's limited understanding of South African politics. The National party, far from being a single-mindedly racist, "right wing" party, is consistently trying, amid heated internal debates, to combine the need to reassure whites with the necessity to accommodate black grievances. Admittedly, this may be squaring the circle, but it deserves a far more serious analysis than Meredith provides. Conversely, his analysis of the ANC is equally simplistic, providing no assessment of the organization's ideology, internal structure, leadership, or practices. Moral indignation over apartheid, natural as it is, cannot substitute for an understanding of the peculiar dynamics of South African politics. And this volume, while abounding in the former, contributes very little to the latter.

Islam and Urban Labor in Northern Nigeria: The Making of a Muslim Working Class. By Paul M. Lubeck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 362 pp. $49.50.

Lubeck offers an implausible thesis: that Islam supports class consciousness in Northern Nigeria. Not only are Hausa and Fulani workers in Northern Nigeria more class-conscious than Islam-conscious, he says, but their class-consciousness was nurtured by Islam.

He reaches this peculiar conclusion by relying upon the notoriously unreliable census data coming from Nigeria. Those statistics are especially poor in regard to religious demography, for the precarious Muslim-Christian balance of power could easily be imperiled by an objective census. Indeed, the author essentially acknowledges this problem through a series of evasive caveats. The data, he says, represent "only . . . a cross section of workers' consciousness during one moment in a long-term process of class formation." Such weaknesses cast doubt on the credibility of Lubeck's entire enterprise. The author expends remarkable efforts in field research trying to prove a thesis few observers can take seriously. The volume thus becomes an attempt to impose irrelevant concepts upon a recalcitrant

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reality, and stands as a quintessential example of the alienation from reality that characterizes so many American students of Africa.

State, Resistance and Change in South Africa. Edited by Phillip Frankel, Noam Pines, and Mark Swilling. London: Croom Helm, 1988. 325 pp. $45.00.

The overwhelming majority of the contributors to this volume are South African academics, mostly from the elite, liberal, and English-speaking University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. Not surprisingly, they share a common bias against the Afrikaner establishment, a certain subliminal sympathy with revolutionary anti-apartheid organizations, and a knowledge about the realities of South Africa well beyond that of most American academics and politicians.

The result is by turns good and bad. Tom Lodge's look at the ANC displays his unequaled expertise on the topic — and his limited willingness to acknowledge the ANC's revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist nature. Michael Evans and Mark Phillips, however, have produced a dangerously misleading report on the South African Defense Force, by seriously underestimating the SADF's ability to crush armed insurgency. Fascinating but no more than competent is Colleen McCaul's study of Inkatha, the moderate and (mostly) Zulu organization that manages, by combining a deft use of patronage with appeals to Zulu historic pride, to be simultaneously nationalist, traditionalist, reformist, and well-disciplined. Contrary to the efforts of some of the contributors, this volume remains a useful source for understanding contemporary South Africa.

Zambia: Between Two Worlds. By Marcia M. Burdette. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 210 pp. $29.95.

The political-economy approach taken by Westview's series of studies on Third World African states finds peculiarly unimpressive expression in this volume. Zambia is one of Africa's (and socialism's) worst basket cases. But the reader is never told how Zambia, a potentially viable nation, became one of Africa's worst examples of corruption, mismanagement, and misery. Something less than two pages is devoted to the "humanistic socialism" that has destroyed Zambia, nor is there an attempt to examine President Kenneth Kaunda's personal role in the crack-up.

The author's suggestions for change in Zambia seem to call for more of the same policies that have made the country so poor: more and "better" planning, more autarky and more "industrialization." Equally annoying is the author's unwillingness to touch the disturbing but fascinating topic of Kaunda's continuing Pan-African prestige — despite his consistent record of dismal failures, and despite his double-dealing with Rhodesia before 1980, and with Angola and South Africa

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for decades. This is certainly not the place to learn about the political culture, economic policies, and vagaries of "humanistic socialism" in Zambia.

EAST ASIA
by Arthur Waldron

Embattled Korea: The Rivalry for International Support. By Ralph N. Clough. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 411 pp. $29.95.

South Korea's history since World War II has been punctuated by unexpected explosions: war, presidential assassination, coup, industrial revolution, terrorist attacks, major riots, and now the beginnings of a democratic revolution. Perhaps from now on, the country will have only smooth sailing. But who would predict it?

Ralph Clough would. This, his seventh book, thoroughly examines the two Koreas: their histories, economies, military establishments, and internal politics. Background chapters on history and diplomacy are very useful as summary. Clough also assesses the key diplomatic relationships of each (Pyongyang with Moscow and Peking; Seoul with Washington and Tokyo), and suggests guidelines for American policy. Predictably, he calls for a gradual reduction of tensions and an eventual recognition of each Korea by the other. As writer and analyst, Clough bears the stamp of the Foreign Service he left nearly twenty years ago.

But if Clough the writer displays the Foreign Service officer's virtues of broad scope and careful balance, Clough the analyst suffers from the corresponding vices. Peering into the future, his caution leads him to hew to the consensus and neglect the discontinuous in favor of the incremental. Though he can scarcely be blamed for not predicting South Korea's dramatic democratization, he can be faulted more generally for not giving serious consideration to the possibility of dramatic and nonincremental changes for better or worse, of which democratization is but one example. Though Clough's bland scenarios for the future may prove accurate, it would be illuminating to ponder what else might happen.

The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan's Development Success. By K.T. Li. Introductory Essays by Gustav Ranis and John C.H. Fei. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. 202 pp. $25.00.

Of the many statistics that illustrate Taiwan's economic success, here is one of the most telling: in the period 1960-1980, economic growth averaged about 9.5 percent annually (versus 3.5 percent for

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the United States). How did this happen? Li is well placed to explain, for he had much to do with Taiwan's economic miracle. In 1954 he argued for rebating taxes on materials used for the manufacture of exports (then mostly textiles), a key step in the country's development, and he served almost continuously thereafter as one of the most influential economic planners.

Here Li notes those aspects of Taiwan's experience that can be transferred to other developing countries. Interestingly enough, his list is not solely economic. He emphasizes the need for an open economy and for the right educational and social policies. In this connection, Li frequently cites Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and though skeptics may smile, it is hard to argue with success. Unfortunately, Li draws no lessons in the realm of politics. Yet for most of the period in question, Taiwan was Chiang Kai-shek's fief, and getting him to accept a policy was surely as crucial as formulating it. Perhaps someday Li will tell that story as well. After all, liberal economists in today's autocratic developing countries require political wisdom no less than social and economic advice.

Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965-1975. By Thomas R. H. Havens. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987. 338 pp. $37.50 ($17.50, paper).

Japan today spends more on defense and pays less heed to the United States than at any time since 1945. In retrospect, it is clear, the Vietnam War did a great deal to bring this about. But cause and effect, as Havens demonstrates, were anything but directly linked.

The Liberal Democratic party, Japan's ruling party since World War II, offered low-key and commercially profitable support for the U.S. war effort. Anti-war Japanese, in turn, directed as much of their fire at Tokyo's cooperation as they did at America's effort in Vietnam. The chief effects of anti-war activism, consequently, were not in slowing the war in Indochina; they were in cutting the Japanese loose from a secure but psychologically demeaning relationship with the United States. Though the anti-war movement was pacifistic and left-leaning, its paradoxical legacy turns out to have been a renewed sense of national pride and a willingness to develop the armed forces.

This subtle and fascinating book, which skillfully relates Japanese domestic and foreign policies, deserves attention from anyone concerned with the great imponderable of Asia's future — the role of Japan.

In Search of an East Asian Development Model. Edited by Peter L. Berger and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988. 243 pp. $29.95 ($16.95, paper).

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Beginning with the premise that the "Western-centered perspective is no longer adequate" to understand the process of economic development, Berger suggests that analysts look more closely at East Asia. Japan and the "four tigers" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) have modernized in a manner sufficiently different from the West, he argues, that they constitute an alternate model for the process.

The ten essays that follow are consistently strong, and in total they succeed admirably in making Berger's point. Gustav Papanek's long chapter provides a stunningly clear profile of economic change in the five East Asian capitalist countries. He concludes that economic policies have been "at least as important as cultural factors in explaining high growth." Lucian W. Pye briefly but tellingly isolates the political features characteristic of the five countries. Jan Swyngedouw offers a supple and stimulating assessment of Christianity's role. And Kyong-Dong Kim makes a notable case for "very unusual nonrational forces" having provided the impetus for South Korea's development heretofore.

The emergence of these developed countries in East Asia has muddied the theoretical waters by making it even more difficult to isolate features conducive to modernization. At the same time, their dazzling variety makes it less likely that analysts will alight on some superficial factor — such as Christianity, the white race, or democracy — and mistakenly pronounce that to be the key. D.P.

Maryknoll in China: A History 1918-1955. By Jean-Paul Wiest. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1988. 614 pp. $29.95.

While other Christian orders have founded universities and sought to influence elites, Maryknoll's aim has been to reach the common people and the poor. During its heyday in China before 1949, Maryknoll priests and nuns founded dozens of rural parishes, clinics, orphanages, and leprosariums. So when the Communists, who also sought to "serve the people," came to power and utterly repudiated them, the wound to Maryknollers was painful and the subsequent soul-searching thus proportionately deep. One indirect product among some members of the order was receptiveness to a blending of Marxism with Christian doctrine in liberation theology.

Wiest's official history tells the first part of the story in wonderful detail. The reader comes away with a sense of how it felt to be a Maryknoller in China in the days before Communism, and he understands how deeply this made-in-America missionary enterprise affected American Catholicism. But it remains for someone else — not the official historian — to trace the reconceptualization after 1949 and Maryknoll's very different impact subsequently on the American church and society.

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LATIN AMERICA
by Michael Radu

American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador. By A.J. Bacevich, et al. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988. 58 pp. $9.95 (paper).

The lack of coherence in U.S. doctrine on counterinsurgency since 1979 has produced confusion in policy toward El Salvador. Fortunately, change now appears possible, for the four authors of this volume are military officers on active duty, and they understand the problem well. And what a problem it has been. The many U.S. government institutions involved in El Salvador — the Defense Department, State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, Congress, and AID — never found a common goal and frequently worked at cross purposes. Much was left to chance. Coordination between the U.S. embassy and the American military in San Salvador was mostly a matter of personal chemistry between the ambassador and the commander of the Southern Command in Panama. Congress separated economic aid from military assistance, and in the process denied El Salvador the most important tool needed for successful counterinsurgency: an integrated grand strategy.

Occasionally the authors' grasp proves disappointing. For example, obsessed as they are by the socioeconomic "root causes" of counterinsurgency, they miss the evolution of insurgent organizations from political movements into professional military forces. Their recommendation to professionalize the military seems less than realistic when the military is (as in El Salvador) the only institution with a national character and so expected to perform essentially political duties. Nonetheless, this volume is an outstanding example of intelligent, pragmatic analysis, and significantly contributes to the renewed debate on the proper U.S. role in Third World conflicts.

The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century. By David Bushnell and Neill Macaulay. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 335 pp. $24.95 ($11.95, paper).

The causes of underdevelopment remain mysterious, but blame is often, and conveniently, placed on colonialism. Despite the apparently narrow focus of this volume, it offers one of the best recent attempts to examine such myths. The authors show that the first century of independence in Latin America saw large strides toward economic and social development, particularly under liberal govern-

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ments in Chile, Guatemala, Argentina, and Colombia. Only since the 1920s has that progress slowed. Independence clearly fueled creative energies, which then abated under assault by intellectual and political influences from Europe.

Bushnell and Macaulay demonstrate that this took the form of an unwillingness to shift from commodity exports to manufacturing. Instead of accepting the short-term pain of such a shift, Latin governments chose to protect inefficient industries. Further, they transformed the state into the dominant factor within the economy. This evolution, complicated by nationalism, resulted in small markets, uncompetitive industries, and ultimately in the quasi-fascism and demagoguery represented by Juan Peron in Argentina and Getulio Vargas in Brazil. The former pulled Argentina down from an advanced economy to a Third World country. The latter delayed Brazil from reaching its economic potential.

The Emergence of Latin America is a prerequisite to understanding the world south of the Rio Grande. It is also an invaluable tool in comprehending post-decolonization economic patterns.

Guyana: Politics in a Plantation Society. By Chaitram Singh. New York: The Hoover Institution/Praeger, 1988. 176 pp. $37.95.

Politics in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana has long had a distinctly African flavor. The ruling People's National Congress is socialist, and the opposition People's Progress party is Marxist-Leninist. Within these narrow limits of ideology, the two parties might have a hard time justifying their conflict — except for the unspoken, un-Marxist, un-socialist but nonetheless decisive element of race. Even before the country achieved independence in 1966, politics in Guyana was racially polarized between the largest ethnic group (the East Indians) and the second largest (the blacks). Blacks have retained political power since independence, by hook or by crook (mostly by crook), and in the process have established the most blatantly minority-based regime this side of South Africa and Burundi.

Unfortunately, Singh is so preoccupied with the formalities of politics in Guyana that he loses sight of the primary role of race and of minority black rule. He also neglects ideology, not understanding how it served as a screen both for racial domination and for the personal domination of the late Forbes Burnham. Nor does Singh offer insight into the role that such U.S.-born sects as the Peoples Temple of Jonestown fame played in Burnham's pidgin Leninism. Singh has a unique command of the facts, data, and institutions of Guyanese politics; yet he cannot see the living rain forest for a few stage-prop trees.

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La Cruz Fragmentada. By José Luis Chea. San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial DEI, 1988. 356 pp. c475 (paper).

Churchmen in Guatemala have responded to change in four ways over the past half century. These might be labeled traditionalist, reformist, rebellious, and revolutionary. The hierarchy has steadily moved from traditionalist to reformist, while showing greater tolerance for rebellious responses — mostly by priests who remain loyal to Catholicism's fundamentals. But this tolerance is not meant to encourage revolutionary responses from the clergy, whose attraction to Marxism and violence is often dearly paid for — in blood by themselves, in respect by the Church.

Chea offers the best scholarly analysis of this history; an English translation of his work would be a service to Anglophones who now have access only to highly biased analyses. The author's data suggest that a growing proportion of native-born clergy, now some 38 percent of the total, does not translate into growing support for violence. These data thus challenge the claim that local realities push the clergy toward the revolutionary left. On the contrary, native Guatemalans have been an almost insignificant element among the revolutionary priests, far behind those born in the United States, Italy, and Spain.

Perhaps the major gap in Chea's book is the author's lack of attention to dramatic increases in the fundamentalist Protestant churches of Guatemala. Those churches now represent as much as 20 percent of the Guatemalan population, by far the greatest percentage in Latin America. Examining the causes of this phenomenon, including attitudes within the Catholic Church, would have made this excellent volume better still.

News Coverage of the Sandinista Revolution. By Joshua Muravchik. AEI Studies. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1988. 128 pp. $9.75 (paper).

If ever there was a clear-cut case of the media distortion of a major event, it was the case of the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979. Muravchik has analyzed that distortion by studying the coverage in four major newspapers (*The Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Washington Post*), a foreign weekly (*The Economist*), and the three major American television networks.

Muravchik finds that *The New York Times* and the *Post* were the least objective and even, on occasion, the least competent in their coverage. He also finds that some correspondents were less prepared to understand the Sandinistas' ideology. Alan Riding of *The New York Times* managed to make the Sandinistas' collectivization campaign proof of their moderation, by arguing that giving land to individual peasants would be the "truly radical" thing to do. But if reporters were less than fully in touch with the facts, editorial writers were

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one step further removed — often out of touch with the news on their own front page, and both more naive and more misleading than their own reporters. One of Muravchik's more ironic conclusions is that television, despite the medium's disadvantages in providing in-depth analysis, was less guilty than the print media of misrepresentation or of implicitly advocating the interests of the Sandinistas.

This small study is notable for its objectivity, balance, and seriousness of research. One can only regret the author did not expand his investigation to consider media treatment of the ongoing civil war in Nicaragua.

Pinochet: The Politics of Power. By Genaro Arriagada. Winchester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988. 196 pp. $12.95.

Arriagada, a leader of Chile's opposition Christian Democratic party, is limited in his understanding of Pinochet by his lack of desire to understand the man. But, however biased, his attempt to examine the Chilean leader and his regime contains an exhaustive analysis of the Chilean army officer corps, an insider's view of the disputes among the country's opposition parties, and an interesting review of tactics used by the Marxist left. Arriagada restates the view that Marxist violence is intended to polarize Chilean society — a goal shared by the regime, incidentally. Less astutely, he dismisses the Pinochet government's economic success and pronounces the free-market experience of the late 1970s a failure.

Unfortunately, Arriagada considers sharp differences between his party's style of opposition and that of the revolutionary left merely tactical. In fact they rest on profound moral distinctions. Sadly, too, the lessons of the Allende regime are poorly understood here, and Arriagada seems unaware of the fear felt by many Chileans that the same politicians responsible for the Allende debacle, particularly those in his own party, will make the same errors again.

Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. By Thomas P. Anderson. New York: Praeger, 1988. 272 pp. $14.95 (paper).

Anderson, a pioneer American analyst of Central American politics, seems not to have kept up to date. This textbook shows the effects, for Anderson is virtually unaware of the most interesting and challenging developments in Central American politics — the growth and increasing sophistication of the totalitarian left. He even misspells the most aggressive Guatemalan Marxist-Leninist group's name (changing it from ORPA to OPRA), an appropriate symbol of his lack of understanding. In the chapter on Nicaragua, the author makes some effort to see through the propaganda fed him by Tomás Borge — but not enough. Apparently, Anderson cannot accept the evident

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fact that a non-traditional, anti-nationalist, Marxist-Leninist, and willingly pro-Soviet regime exists in Central America. This same reluctance seems also to lie behind his lack of interest in the revolutionary left's activities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. One can only hope this book will not serve as a text; it is a disservice to truth and to the author's own previous scholarly accomplishments.

Soldier Without Fortune. By John L. McClure. New York: Dell Publishing, 1987. 251 pp. $3.95 (paper).

McClure's account of his participation in the continuing Nicaraguan civil war — the only first-hand account of an American fighting on the anti-Sandinista side — contrasts sharply with the dozens of accounts by American leftists providing support to the regime. It is an important and engrossing document.

Unlike the many pro-Sandinista reports, McClure does not pontificate about the rightness of his cause, although he is clearly prepared to risk his life for it. McClure also has the courage to discuss his own frailties, and at times, particularly during a hilarious escapade in Suriname, even to portray himself as an innocent abroad — again, a very different persona from the usual. McClure has a fascinating tale to tell, but his choice of style and vocabulary does a grave disservice to his cause, and to the thousands of Americans who support it. The very title is misleading. Why does an American fighting without pay for the contras portray himself as a mercenary? Why does he use the vocabulary of a soldier of fortune, when he is a well-established psychotherapist with a Ph.D. in psychology? The answer may lie in the decision of the author (or his publisher) that a book about Americans fighting Marxism-Leninism has no appeal, and so this work is directed to readers of adventure tales.

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

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